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Abstract 
rhe object of this thesis is to illustrate how the sports environment 
engenders a 'normal-abnormal' approach to the classification of athlete 
personality disposition. An athlete whose perceptions of self are in 
conflict with the normative stereotype may feel that his identity as an 
athlete is threatened, and respond to this threat with high levels of 
both trait and state anxiety. 
The ·traditional approach to the study of athlete personality has, 
in seeking to differentiate the athlete from the non-athlete, promulgated 
this classificatory system. It is argued here that, as a consequence, 
what is needed is a paradigm shift away from the current emphasis upon 
group process to a concentration on individual praxis which focuses on 
the athletes' perceptions of self whilst performing. In order to effect 
this 'athlete-centred' paradigm a self-schema was proposed consisting 
of the self; not-self; and ideal self. 
The experimental sample consisted of five university rugby union 
1st. XV squads, and a questionnaire was administered on two occasions. 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts; biographical details; an 
Interpersonal Check List; and Spielberger' s State Trai t Anxiety Inventory. 
An empirical analysis revealed that 'normative' personality typologies 
emerged for each aspect of the self-schema on both questionnaire admin-
istrations; a competitive-dominant selt; a rebellious-distrustful not-
self; and an autocratic ideal. The homogeneity of the players about 
these perceptual norms was influenced by the degree of formal structure 
inherent in their respective teams. However, there were deviations apparent 
in all five teams and it was established that there was a significant 
relationship between ego-threat and trait anxiety - players whose self-
schemata did not stress these normative traits perceived themselves as 
self-effacing, dependent, low in self acceptance and high in their 
levels of trait anxiety. Conversely, although statistically significant, 
neither the 'normative' nor deviate self perceptions had any theoretically 
uniform effect upon the relationship, proposed by Spielberger, between 
trait and state anxiety. The reason advanced for this being that 
Spielberger's conceptualisation of state anxiety is uni-dimensional, and 
as such is not sensitive to differential ego-threat. It'is proposed 
therefore that until further research takes place the utility of state 
anxiety as a significant affective dimension of the self-schema is in 
question. 
As a conclusion, and in the light of the empirical data, a more 
flexible, humanistic approach to coaching is proposed which includes 
techniques for the identification and reduction of intra-psychic conflict 
and high levels of anxiety. 
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CtlAPTE!U 
MUflro (1968). defines the function of a myth as being "to record 
and present the moral system (of a particular institution or society) 
whereby present attitudes and actions are ordered and validated", (p.122). 
It is the purpose of'this_chapter to indicate how those researchers 
involved in the analysis of personality and sport, have done little more 
than perpetuate a mythical 'moral system' which entails perceiving the 
athlete as being somehow different from the rest of humanity (sic); , 
non-athletes. As a consequence of this approach the sports psychologtst 
has conferred 'scientific authenticity' upon a selected array of 
normative personality traits which both 'order' and 'validate' the 
athlete's experience of himself. However, what they fail to realise 
is that any deviation from these norms will necessarily entail the 
athlete tovalidating himself, with the,possible consequence of intra-
psychic conflict and psychological maladjustment 1 althaugh for the 
most part variations in athlete personality are subsumed by the use of 
mean statistical scores, and any athlete whose 'personality' does slip 
the fine mesh of the statistical net usually has his 'inappropriate' 
behaviour attributed to other, more socially acceptable factors such 
as' worry over physiological injury or the tran~ient effect of the 
ubiquitous 'bad patch'. The following analysis will establish therefore 
how this mythical sports-type is the result of an inadequate paradigm 
and in so doing an athlete-centred paradigm, based upon the existential 
and phenomenological philosophies, will be advanced as a more suitable 
methodological and theoretical alternative for the analysis of athlete 
personali ty. 
It' is 'ag~eed by 'most, if not all theorists, that sport reflects 
macro-societal trends (Hoch 1972; Scott 1972; Mihalich 1982,), and as 
such it is hardly surprising that the athlete's ability to maintain 
a constantly high level of performance has never been of greater 
importance than in today's contemporary sports environment. The 
economic, political and, in particular, the immediate interpersonal 
pressures from the coach and team-mates to succeed in competition 
(ipso facto to win), has ultimately obscured the fact that the 
-----------
---- - -,------ ----- -,-.-
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2. 
participants are human beings, and in so doing they have placed heavy 
psychological as well as physiological burdens upon many athletes, 
both amateur and professional alike. 
However, the effects that these pressures can have upon the three 
major categories of psychological process, cognition, connation and 
affect, has for the most part been ignored and as a consequence any 
psychologically 'inappropriate' behaviour is usually attributed to 
either bad luck, rebelliousness or a poor motivational disposition. 
The maxim thus seems to be a distorted inversion of the Latin 
'mens'sana in corpore sana'; it must be a healthy mind because it's 
a healthy body. 
To help meet the demands of the sports environment for unqualified 
success, a new branch of a relatively young academic discipline, sports 
psychology, has evolved. However, its emphasis upon performance 
rather than the athlete's self-perceptions whilst performing, has again 
obscured the athlete's existence as a being-in-the-world. Indeed it is 
the contention of this introductory chapter that the sports psychologists 
have merely authenticated a set ofprocrustean2 norms which serve only 
in perpetuating the myth that the male athlete is specifically different 
to the rest of humanity. Although, as the following discussion will 
illustrate much of this research is methodologically and theoretically 
inadequate. 
It must be stated at this point however that it is not the aim of 
this thesis to discredit previous research, as Magee (1973) states 
"in logic, scientific law is conclusively falsifiable, although it is 
not conclusively verifiable" (p.23), it is rather to establish a 
'paradigm shift' towards an athlete rather than a performance centered 
approach. Popper (1981), in his observations upon scientific epistemology, 
has summarised my contention: 
"It is a profound mistake to try to do what scientists and 
philosophers have almost always tried to do, merely prove the truth 
of a theory, or justify our belief in a theory, since this is to 
attempt the logically impossible. What we can do however, and this 
is of the highest possible importance, is to justify our preference 
for one theory over another." (in Magee, 1973, p.36). 
In order therefore to attempt the justification of an athlete-
centred paradigm, it is necessary to review, briefly, the current 
status of sports personality research with an emphasis upon it's 
theories and methods. 
( 1 ) Sports Person a).ity; Its .Metbodologica:L$l(;t Theoretical Basi$: 
3. 
;PCarron (1980), has described the principle theoretical orientation 
within sports personality research as one based upon the question as 
to "what are the unique iqentifiable personality characteristics which 
differentiate athletes from non-athletes" (p.9). To achieve this aim 
two contrasting research strategies had been used; one based upon 
explanation/prediction, where an attempt is made to see if, in fact, 
personality dimensions have an effect on performance. The second 
however contrasts different sports to see if there are any personality 
orientations specific to them. Within both these strategies 
trait personality theory has had the greatest influence. Allport (1961), 
has defined·a.morphogenic trait as a: 
"generalised neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual) 
with the capacity to render many stimuli .equivalent, and to initiate 
and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and stylistic 
behaviour" (p. 373). 
Transposing Allport's definition onto the sports personology research 
paradigm will then (theoretically) indicate which 'neuropsychic 
structure(s), delineate athletes from. non-athletes. To this end many 
theorists have produced 'profile descriptions' of athletes from at least 
seventeen different sports. The results indicating that: 
"When the activity and level of performance are held constant, 
interesting consistencies in personality have been reported, and 
furthermore some evidence has been presented in support of the 
existence of certain sports types" (Kane 1978 p.122).t/' 
~These types are reported as being characterised by a high level of 
dominance, social aggression, leadership, tough-mindedness and emotional 
control. However, whether or not these traits can be regarded as 
concommitents of successful performance has now become the object of the 
credulous versus the sceptical debate. The sceptics point to the fact 
that there is no empirical evidence which points to a consistent 
athletic profile. The fault lies, they state, in the utility of 
4. 
personality research and many point to its methodological and conceptual 
errors (Rushall 1975). Carron (1980), gives an example of one such 
error when he poses what he feels to be one of the basic conceptual 
questions: 
"It is difficult to determine whether athletes differ on personality 
characteristics if an athlete cannot be clearly distinguished from a 
non-athlete" (p.31). f 
;fOther methodological and conceptual errors which,it is proposed, 
have affected the identification of a consistent sports type have involved; 
the use of non-sport specific questionnaires ('Kroll, 1970; Martens, 1975; 
Rushall 1975); inadequate statistical analyses (Hardman, 1973; Martens, 
1975)jand improper interpretation of the results (Fisher 1974; Martens 
1975; Rushall 1975).,f 4Ji<'·ft 
!"The general picture is then one of methodological, theoretical 
and conceptual confusion and as a consequence attempts to rectify the 
situation have proposed;, taking into account the psychological 
salience of the situation (Endler and Hunt 1973); developing personality 
assessment techniques which are specific to sport (Martens, 1975; 
Kroll, 1976 ); abandoning trait theory altogether because of its 
"inability to account for a sufficiently large proportion of the behavioural 
variance" (Carron 1980·p.36), or less drastically reclassifying the 
a.thJ.etes personality profiles according to the particular sports 
involvement, i.e. team or individual sports, long or short duration 
(Schurr, Ashley and Joy 1977). Carron (1980);favours this method 
as: 
"It is apparent that a number of findings conform to 'traditional' 
or 'stereotypical' personality profile for athletes" (p.40). 
Again, the methodology has been used to do little more than 
'confirm' the existence of sports types. The author's concluding 
that athletes engaged. in team sports are more extroverted, more dependent and 
manifest less abstract reasoning than non~athletes. l' 
J Schurr. et· al' s emphasis upon the athlete-sport interaction however, 
does seem to indicate the beginnings, if not of an athlete_centred 
5. 
approach, at least a greater degree of theoretical specificity.1f 
Although Kane (1978) qualifies the use of the interactionist approach 
when he states that: 
"To establish the superordinate importance of the interaction as 
opposed to the person or the situation in sport will need a great deal 
more subtle and supportive existence than that which is currently 
available" (p. 136). 
He does however, preface these remarks with the observation that the 
attractiveness of this particular approach is reasonably assured "if 
only_. tOncQmpl,emeol; trait (profile) descriptions" (emphasis added). 
One of the more recent theoretical perspectives, given scant 
attention by most sports personality theorists, but which is more in 
keeping with the objectives of this thesis, is that which has 
attempted to analyse the athletes experience of self. Unfortunately 
this approach has for the most part tended to single out athletes as 
having quasi-mystical experiences during performances. The emphaSis 
has therefore been upon self-actualisation and the incidence of peak 
experiences and- "flow" (Csikszentmihaly, 1975). 
However there has been some doubt expressed as to the 'scientific 
validity' of such existential approaches. Carron (1980), therefore 
describes the phenomenological theoretical approach as although having: 
"some appeal (undoubtedly due to its humanistic orientation) a 
major limitation has been the i'lability to test the theories via a 
strong scientific approach" (p. 17). 
CiJ't-'-
fIt is apparent, even from this cursory review of sport personality 
research that there appears to be some degree of confusion not only as 
to its future development but also the validity of many of the 
methodological and theoretical approaches used in previous research. 
The current view within this discipline does appear to involve establishing 
that there are fundamental differences between athletes and non-athletes, 
and fundamental similarities between 'athlete-types', this view 
being held consistently even in the face of conflicting research. 
~tens (1975), proposes therefore that: 
"The first step towards improving the quality of research 
in sports personology is not the correction of methodological 
or interpretive errors, although these too must be corrected, but 
it is the adoption of a viable experimental paradigm for studying 
personality" (cited in Carron 1980 p. 31).1 
6. 
Although Martens sees the future of personality research as being 
couched in merely experimental terms, his proposal for a new paradigm 
r 
will form the basis of the following critique. 
(2) . Sports. PersonalitYi .. A. Critique 
Kuhn (1962) has proposed that "particular coherent traditions 
of scientific research (normal science) take their shape from paradigms" 
(p.10). And he defines a paradigm as: 
"The source of the methods, problem fields and standards of 
solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time. 
As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a 
redefinition of the corresponding science" (ibid). 
Consequently, in order to achieve a 'paradigm shift' as proposed 
by Martens above, a redefinition of sports personality must occur. 
This can be achieved by using Lakatos' (1970) concept of sophisticated 
falsification, however, as "there is no falsification before the 
emergence of a new theory" (Lakatos op cit p.119), it is proposed that 
both the th~oretical perspectives of the sports-type, and also the 
scientific methodology which has structured its analysis and theoretical 
permanence are both inadequate. As a consequence they have simply 
produced a psychology based upon mechanistic and deterministic 
principles, and as such obscured, and ultimately constrained the 
individual athlete's personality. The methodological falsification will 
be considered first. 
Personality has been defined by Child (1968) as the: 
"More or less stable internal factors that make one person's 
behaviour consistent from one time to another and different from the 
behaviour other people would manifest in comparable situations" (p.83). 
~.o Lf . 7. 
!/Transposing this definition onto the results obtained from most of 
the sport personology research, it is clear that there has been little 
emphasis upon individual differences, rather it has concentrated upon 
establishing group similarities. The fault lies partially in the 
emphasiS those currently involved in personality research have placed 
upon the scientific metho~~RYChlak ,(1977) states that: 
"Psychologists derive their terms form all manner of sources 
including analogies to philosophical models that have been woven into 
the very fabric of their metaphysical outlook 'on scientists'" (p.187). 
Rychlak, proposes that most current psychological research is 
grounded in "Lockean philosophy", which is based upon an "empirical 
determination of all the mind represents" (ibid) , similarly it is 
a deterministic philosophy which emphaSises the active nature of the 
(objective) environment and passive nature of man. 
It is possible'to see the effects of Lockean empiricism within 
sports personality. Carron (1980) defines science as a "systematized body of 
knowledge" which is acquired through observation, measurement, 
classification and finally the generation of theories and laws. 
Using Kuhn's terminology these are the "acceptable steps" which are 
to be taken in the design of experiments. Rychlak ,(1977) states: 
"Resting ultimately on the procedural evidence of an overriding 
paradigm, rules act as strictures. If the researcher does not follow 
the rules of the proper science, ending in validating evidence, he is 
not going to be listened to", ( p. 185) •. 
This type of approach has been heavily criticised by many involved 
in humanistic psychology but perhaps its most vociferous critic was the 
founder of phenomenology itself, Edmund Husserl. 
Husserl (1965) argued in his paper entitled 'Philosophy as a 'Natural 
Science' that "The true method follows the nature of things and not 
our prejudices and preconceptions". And although this statement is 
grounded in philosophical idealism, when it is applied to psychological 
method, Husserl's objections are clear. 
• 
8. 
He states: 
"How could psychology fail to see that in its purely psychological 
concepts, with which it cannot at all dispense, it necessarily gives 
a content that is simply not taken from what is actually given in 
experience but is applied to the latter·" ('1965, p.133). 
I This process of giving objective meaning to athletes personality 
dispositions has been prominent within sports psychology through the 
use of inadequate statistical methods. Hardman.(1973) has criticised one 
such approach when he pointed out that there is a: 
"danger inherent in trying to establish an athletic personality 
type ••••••. through the use of mean scores. Only rarely does a 
researcher give the range of scores obtained in an investigation. 
Usually the mean score is given which can lead the reader to the 
conclusion that the group is a homogeneous one." (p. 79) • 
However Hardrnan's preconception that there is in existence a sports-
type is still in evidence as he concludes by expressing that: 
"some members of athletic groups seem to succeed despite a wide 
divergence from the group mean" (ibid;. emphasis added). 
The emphasis seems to be therefore upon verifying rather than 
falsifying the already accepted paradigm i.e. the sports-type, despite 
conflicting evidence. ~ 
Merleau-Pohty (1967) emphasises the.advantages that the phenomenological 
method has for the researcher, and also its importance as a means of 
re-establishing the athlete's experience of himself as a being-in-the-
world within scientific methodology, when he states that: 
"1 am not the outcome or the meeting point of numerous causal 
agencies which determine my .bodily or psychological make-up. 1 cannot 
conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of 
biological, psychological or sociological investigation. 1 cannot shut 
myself up in the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even 
my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of 
view •.•.... The whole universe of science is built upon the world as 
directly experienced and if we want to subject science itself to 
rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and 
scope, we must begin by re-awakening the basic experience of the world 
of which science is the second-order expression " ( p. 356) • 
9. 
It is important to emphasise Merleau-Ponty's view, supported by Polanyi 
(1958), that 'scientific' lmowledge is dep.endent upon, and affected by 
experience: 
"For as human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a 
centre lying within ourselves •••••• Any attempt rigorously to 
eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must 
inevitably lead to absurdity" (Polanyi 1958 p.3). 
However, the phenomenological approach, as was illustrated by 
the views of Carron above, has been equated with a lack of scientific 
validity, presumably as it is regarded as either lacking any empirical 
methodology, or representing a rejection of the 'scientific approach'. 
However, this is not the case. Van Kaam (1969) states that: 
"Empirical observation, experimentation, measurement and 
accumulation of data should be fostered in all different psychologies. 
From the viewpoint of comprehensive psychology, however, (retaining 
the wholeness of lived experience) much of this admirable effort is 
wasted if there is no phenomenological explication of WOgt it is that 
is being observed, experimented upon, measured, correlated and applied." 
(in Rychlak op cit p.195). 
Moreover, Schutz (1962) has formulated three criteria with which to 
construct and evaluate a social-scientific model. Consequently in 
order to establish validity, a phenomenological social science must 
satisfy the following postulates: 
(1) The postulate of logical consistency: this includes the clarity 
and distinctness of the constructs and their compatibility with 
the principles of formal logic. 
(2) The postulate of subjective interpretation: this includes the 
construction of a model of the individual mind and its contents 
which can explain the data the psychologist has gathered: this 
enables the results to be interpreted in terms of the subjective 
meaning they have for the individual. 
(3) The postulate of adequacy: each concept in the model must be 
constructed so that an act actually performed in the world in the 
way indicated by the construct would be understandable for the 
actor himself and for his fellow men in terms of commonsense 
10. 
schemes of interpretation, (adapted from Schutz origional). 
It is evident from the above that a phenomenologically based 
psychology need not abandon scientific methods. Moreover, wh~n the 
current practices in sports personality research are contrasted with 
Van Kaam's and Schutz proposals it is clear that methods have obscured 
the subject matter; personality "the internal factors that make one 
person's behaviour .••....• different fronthe.behaviour other people 
•...•• manifest." Indeed, it could be argued at this point that 
sports personology is in the pre-paradigm stage. Kuhn (1970) states 
that: 
"The pre-paradigm period .•.• is regt.;larly marked by frequent and 
deep debates over. legitimate methods, problems, and standards of 
solution "( pgs. 47 -48) • 
The credulous versus the sceptical debate, the confusion over 
methodology and the conflict based around psychological theorem do 
indicate the existence of a pre-paradigmatic period. However, within 
these debates the emphasis has still centred upon researchers supporting 
and not falsifying the existing paradigm, and it has been in this 
approach where method has apparently obscured any theoretical 
(paradigmatic) shifts. The following will indicate the inadequacy of 
many of the theoretical notions existent in current sports personality 
research. 
'At-v /The prevalent theoretical movement in sports psychology concerns 
establishing (a) whether in fact athletes di~f~r in personality 
disposition from non-athletes and (b) whether there are sports-types. 
To this end numerous personality profiles have been generated for 
athletes from many different sports and as a consequence a sports-type 
has emerged. He is stable, dominant, socially aggressive and low in 
(anxious) arousal, and although lip-service has been paid to deviations 
from this mean typology, (Harctman,. 1973), the theories have mostly been 
aimed at accounting for individual similarities rather than any 
differences. 1/ 
However, within this theoretical approach there are several 
anomalies (or areas of falsification) which ultimately question the 
validity of maintaining such an approach. 
The first anomaly throws into doubt the contention that what the 
sports psychologist is actually measuring is athlete personality. It 
11. 
is proposed here that it is not individual personality which has been 
assessed but rather the athletes 'depersonalised personality', and this 
is an extremely important theoretical point for those involved in the 
analysis of team sports, (rugby, soccer or hockey for example). 
Previous research conducted into intragroup process (Rabbie 1974; 
Dion 1979), established that when groups are in competition there is a 
great emphasis upon conformity. Consequently, under these psychologically 
salient conditions: 
"social behaviour tends to become more uniform ••••• This is because 
under such conditions, individuals define themselves ••••• in terms of their 
common attributes as group members and not in terms of their idiosyncratic 
features as unique people" (Brown and Turner 1981 p.40). 
, It is evident therefore that the presentation of athletes' 
personalities as somehow similar, and also distinct from those of non-
athletes, has much to do with the influence of group process rather than 
any unique disposition. Within this factor there are two additional 
theoretical anomalies which require elaboration. The first concerns 
the importance of the person by situation interaction effect; the second 
the prevalence of a solipsistic approach. 
It will be remembered that Kane (1978) questioned the superordinate 
nature of the interactionist approach which had been particularly emphasised 
by Endler and Hunt (1973). Yet it is theoretically inconceivable that a 
person, any person, could be thought of as being somehow distinct from the 
effects of his or her environment. Kane (1978) states: 
"The problems in allocating the correct amount of importance to the 
person, the situation and the interaction in sports performance will not 
be resolved easily or quickly"(p.136). 
However, this is again an example of research methodology obscuring theory. 
It is not up to the researcher to weigh the relative importance of 'the 
person, the situation (or) the interaction', it is the individual perception 
of the athlete. Merleau-Ponty (1962) emphasised the role of the 
person by situation in his philosphy of perception. Mallin (1979) 
summarises the importance of this emphasis when he states that: 
12. 
"When Merlea:u-Ponty says that a man is in a particular situation 
or is situated by something, he means that the. subject or some state of 
the subject is thoroughly intertwined with the object, body, other person, 
or general milieu that is indicated. It is his aim to overcome the 
perpetual problem of Cartesian dualism (I think therefore I am) and its 
resulting extremes of realism by showing that neither the subject Cl' 
object is primary and that, when taken as distinct, (as per. many 
personality theorists), both are theoretical abstractions from the unified 
si tua tion that founds both" (p. 8 ) • 
Consequently, any theoretical proposal as to the nature of athlete 
personality must not only specify the situation with which he or she 
interacts, but it must also account for.the depersonalizing.effect of 
p 
the person versus gr.oup versus the situation interaction. Moreover, .if 
'personality' is to some degree situation and group specific then the 
whole conceptual difficulty as to what differentiates an athlete from 
a non-athlete is largely immat~rial,as identity is given definition by 
the psychological salience of the situaUon and the needs of the group, 
Also, and of perhaps greater' theoretical significance, as the athlete 
identity defined hy the above process is based upon both situational 
(performance) and also gr'oup norms, any analysis of sports personality 
must account for the influence of the athlete role, As: 
"By playing roces, the individual participates in a social 
world, By internalIsing these roles, the same world becomes 
subjectively rea:' to him," ( Berger and Luckmann, 1979,p. 91)3 
The athlete role is then a powerful influence not only in shaping the 
actors beliefs as to how he should beHave, but also the others expectations 
as to how he will behave. The role therefore orders and supervises 
potential and also actual social interaction. 
However, individual consciousness is not merely a passive receptor 
of situational role requirements. Cognition nlediates the athletes role 
response. His behaviour being dependent upon the ease with which his 
perception of self is congruent with the role demands. Previous l'8Seat'ch, 
based solely upon a performance centered paradigm, has therefol'e failed 
to account for the fact that the similarit.ies in athlete personality 
type could be due to a conformity engendered by the role requirements of 
the performance situation, and not as evidence for consi.stencies in ath-
lete personality. 
--------------
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furthermore, situations are nearly always defi~ed by either real 
or fantasised others and it is a fundamental error of personality research to 
either ignore or attempt to estrange an individual from his social 
environment. Hegel (1964) states: 
"Self-consciousness exists in itself and for-itself, -in that, and 
by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness" (p.20l).· 
Therefore, if there is no theoretical interpersonal orientation the 
conceptualisation of the athletes' int.entions aTe extl'emely difficult both 
to define and to understand. Similarly the motives, needs or indeed 
the pressures described above, behind the typological traits of 
dominance or social aggression are incomprehensible without a clearly 
defined interpersonal perspective. for ·instance are these traits 
perceived by the athlete as pertaining to his actual identity or are 
they simply seen as the necessacy personality dispositions for successful 
performance? Are the traits teleological or deterministic? It is 
evident the;'efore that a theoretical orientation which accounts for the 
concept of intentionality i.s crucial if there is to be a shift. away 
from the psychological de~ermination of performance as being the sole 
criterion affecting per~onality disposition or self perception. As 
Solomon (1972) contenris: "The situation (performance) itself, while 
clearly restrictinr; my choices •• '.' does not determine my choice" ,(p. 294). 
Consequently, it is the intentions of the athlete not the performance 
situation which affects personality. Husserl (1967) summarizes the importance 
of this construct when he remarks that.: 
"every intentional experience - and this is the fundamental mark 
of all intentionality - has its "intentional object" i.e~ its 
objective meaning. Or to repeat in some other words: to have a 
meaning or to havA something "in mind" is the cardinal feature of all 
consciousness" (pgs. 261-2) 
The personality or behaviour of an athlete during'a performanc~ is 
then a correlate of self perception, the intentions and role requirements 
associated with the situation, and also a f0UI'th element; the mood state 
which the performance situation evokes. The influence of this final but by 
no means unimportant factor will be briefly described below. 
------- --~--------
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Current approaches to the analysis of sports personality have 
not accounted for the effect that an athletes mood can have upon his 
behaviour. Mood attunes the individual to the situation. For example 
if an athlete is anxious about a particular performance then his 
being-in-the-world will be attuned to threats to his self. As such 
mood states are an important factor in determining how a person will 
behave in a particular situation as they emphasise or heighten the 
'pitch' of certain personality traits. Consequently they are ·not dynamic 
properties in the sense of causing a particular behaviour, rather they 
disclose the meaning of the situation of relevance to the individual: 
This means of course that far from being a fixed property personality 
is a flexible, dynam.ic const.ruct which by definition makes every 
performance situation unique in terms of the particular pattern of 
behaviour it evokes. 4 
At the beginning of this (;hapter the status of the athletic 
personality type, as being distinct from non-athletes and influential 
in achievir,g successful performance, was likened to a myth. The 
"scientific-auther.tication" of this myth has subsequently been. shown to 
be the product of an inar.equate paradigm,grounded in a naturalistic and 
deterministic psychology. 'It will be remembered that a myth was 
defined as a societaJ phenomenon which both orders and validates the 
attitudes of the mf'wbers within a particular community er society. 
It is apparent tr.erefore that the sports psychologists mythical 
sports-type, orders and validates not only the athletes perception of 
his personal adequacy, but also the coac:~' s expectatio(ls and perceptions 
of how an athlete should behave. The myth is therefore accepted as a 
norm which delineates athletic behaviour. 
Moreover, in seeking wider scientific recognition and in their 
perpetuation of an inadequate methodological and theoretical concept-
ualisation, the sports psychologists have effectively ignored both the 
existence of, and therefore the effects, that deviations from thes2 normative 
typologies can have upon the athletes self-perceptions. As Goffman (1979) 
states "one can say, then, that identity norms breed deviations as well 
as conformance" (p.154). The final section will consider both' the 
existence and effects of this contention for the athlete wi thin a' 
competitive sports environment. 
- -----------
----------------
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(3) Toward an Athlete-Centered Paradigm 
The common perception of normative behaviour is one in which 
conformance is equated with adjustment, non-conformance with 
maladjustment. Indeed Scott's (1958) criterion of social adjustment is 
one where: 
"adjustment is necessarily determined with reference to norms of 
the total society or of some restricted community within the society. 
Accordingly, one may conceptually define adjustment as adherence to 
social norms "( p. 31) • 
However, the non-conformity which results from a failure to maintain 
"such norms has a very direct effect on the psychological integrity 
of the individual" (Gorfman 1979 p. 153), and can result in an 
individual perceiving himself as a 'discreditable' person, anxious, 
ashamed and who manifest feelings of inferiority. This particular 
psychological process is particnlarly re le' rant in what Sartre (1982) terms 
bonded groups, where a high de~ree of interdependence is necessary in 
order to achieve group goals. Group structure is held together by fear, 
anxiety and guilt. 
The questions and cor,tentions to which this study. will address 
. itself therefore concern: (i) An examination of .athletes self 
perceptions to see if" in fact, there is any evidence to support the 
existence of a depe"sonalised sports-type. If so, does it conform to 
the one proposed ~y Lhe sports personality theorists. (ii) The effect that 
non-conformity to typological norms can have upon the athletes self 
perceptions with particular reference to ~onsciously perceived levels 
of anxiety. 
It is the contention here therefore that not all athletes perceive 
themselves as stable (low in anXiety), dominant individuals, and that 
many suffer inot'dinate 'pre' and 'post' performance anxiety. This is 
due to intra-psychic conflict generated by'a series of self perceptions 
which are felt to be incongruent with specific group and more genf:('al, 
environmental, normative typologies. 
The alternative, athlete-centred, paradigm is therefore one in 
which emphaSis is placed upon the athletes perception of himself 
whilst performing, with particular reference to his interpersonal 
notions of self •. Rogers' ( 1965 ), definition of the self concept defines 
the theoretical parameters of this study. It: 
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"May be thought of as an org~nised· configuration of perceptions 
of the self ••• It is composed of such elements as the· perceptions of 
one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of self 
in relation. to others and to the environment; the value qualities which 
are perceived as associated with experience and objects; and goals and 
ideals which are perceived as havihg positive and negative valence "(p.138). 
There are three important factors in the above definition which, 
it is believed, are axiomatic in achieving a theoretically comprehensive 
paradigm-shift: (i) An emphasis upon the athlete's perception of self 
in relatior. to his €roup, interpersonal env::'ronment. (ii) M emphasis 
upon the not-self; the notions of self perceived as having a 'negative 
valence'. (iii) Accounting for the athlete's 'goals and ideals' which 
are perceived as having a very definite 'positive valence'. 
Using the above self-schema information can be obtained pertaining 
to the athlete's phenomenal field,either singularly or in opposition; The 
former gives the researcher an insight as to the intentions behind an 
athlete's interpersonal motions of him-self. The latter gives a 
'measure' of personal adjustment and acc8ptance. This criteria is 
important when one considers the affective construct referred to· 
earlier; anxiety. 
The paradigm-shift can be conceptualised then as a change in 
theoretical methodology from 'process', with its emphasis upon 
mechanistic-determinisr.l, to 'SOCial praxis' (Sartre 1982) where the 
emphasis is upon: 
"acticn th8.c can be traced to definite decision undertaken out 
of definite motives by definite people ••• • •• Social events can be 
rendered intelligible by showing that they are the outcome of decisions 
taken in a social field by motivated act-ors". (Sedgewick 1982, p.81). 
The following chapter will attempt to "render intelligible" the 
individual praxis involved in an athletic group performance by contrasting 
the traditional personality approaches with the more contemporary 
humanistic, athletic-centred literature and research. The former will 
emphasise how the "process" of sports personality research has v~_E:wed 
the athlete as merely a nexus of selective traits, shaped by the 
demands of the performance· situation. The latter will concentrate upon _ 
a review of the literature associated with the effects that group process 
has upon individual praxis, represented by the self-schema described above. 
Laing (197n summarises this methodology when he states that: 
----- -------- -----
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"What happens in a group ·will be intelligible if one can retrace 
the steps from what is going on (process) to who is dOing what (praxis)" (p.22). 
This approach will not only emphasise the intra-psychic effects, 
(largely ignored by the more traditional (process) theoretical 
perspectives), that performing within a group can have upon the athlete. 
But it will also establish both tt:te methvdological and empirical trends 
which will be used in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
Footnotes 
1. Maladjustment: It is difficult to use any terminology "hich 
refers to a person's psychological health without impl~ ing 
value judgements. One way of reducing this inevitable by-product 
is to offer a specific conceptualisation as to what. toe term 
actually describes. For the purpose of this thesis then, 
maladjustment will be used to indicate a general dlsposition 
toward subjective unhappiness; loss of self-esteem, low 
self-acceptance and/or high levels of both gener&l and specific 
interpersonal anxiety. 
2.· Procrustean: Procrustes was the character io Greek mythology 
who took people of definite size and then e~ther stretched or 
truncated their limbs so that they w0uld f~t the beds 
he provided. (Sedgwick 1982 p.112) See also Laing 'The Politics 
of Experience and the Bird of Paradise' 1967. 
3. For a more detailed description as to the influence of roles 
on behaviour see Berger P. and Luckmann T. (1979) 'The Social 
Construction of Reality", London, Peregrine Books. Particularly 
. pages 89-96. 
4. A more detailed description of mood states can be found in Boss M. 
(1963), 'Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis', New York, Basic Books. 
------------_._. 
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CHAPTER .. 2 
11 Literatllre. ReY,iew of. the , Self-Schema and~ it:>.".ReliJ-tionship .to 
Traditionai.and.ContemporarY Perspe9tiye:> Within PSychology 
{The prevalent traditional and, for the most part, contemporary view 
of sport is one in which the athlete: 
"Once was and still can be treated as a sac,red being ••• ••• He is 
credited with the dignity of embodying a supreme value" / (Weiss 1969 p. 153). 
VAs a consequence both those involved in the serious study of ' the athlete, 
,the sports psychologist, and also the sports fan 'who obtains a,high degree 
of vacarious arousal through spectating, concentrate upon emphasising the 
difference between sportsmen ~nd women and the remainder of humanity; the 
non-athletes. I 
!I One such approach' has been the research conducted by the sports. 
psychologist into the 'profile' descriptions of various athletes' 
personalities. Using either the Cattell 16 P.f. or the Eysenck P.I. 
these researchers hav~ produced personality profiles for Olympic Champions 
(Heusner 1952); Rug'-,y Players (Hardman _ 1968; Sinclair1968)j Swimmers 
(Hendry, 1968); Ra~ing Drivers (Ogilvie 1968) and footba~lers (Kane 1966). 
In all, at lease seventeen, different sports have yielded a 'profile' 
and Kane (1978) proposes that on this evidence: J' 
I "It is noticeable that when the activity and level of performance 
are held constant, interesting consistencies in personality have been 
reported and furthermore some evidence has been presented in support of 
the existence of certain sports 'types'./ (p.124) 
I; Consequently: 
"There is a tendency for the male athlete to be described in terms 
of , extroverted and ,stable dispositions and for women athletes to be 
shown as relatively anxious extroverts." (P.122j/ 
~-.~. - --' .---------' -----------
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YAlthOugh these stereotypical traits have been shown to be based 
upon an inadequate theoretical and methodological approach, they are 
accepted as those "supreme value(s)" which somehow differentiate the 
athlete from the non-athlete. Their psychological stability is evidently 
just one part of the general personality disposition and on the whole 
these prevalent traits are not only those which are most valued by 
modern capitalist ideology, but they also embody the gender role 
definitions which permeate society. Of specific interest to this study 
is Hardman's(1968) profile of the rugby player; highly sociable, dominant 
and conscientious but low in sensitivity, insecurity and tension. 
(anxiety). / 
It is important to realise however, that although the research is 
for the most part inadequate, it does illustrate the importance of the 
relationship between sport and self identity. IJack Scott (1972) 
indicates the psychological salience of the sports environment when he 
states that "with few exceptions, a dedicated athlete in his late teens 
or early twenties gets nearly his entire identity from his sport involve-
ment'jI;!SimilarlY Stein and Hoffman researching into sports and male role 
strain (1978) report that "the role of the athlete was the most salient 
for the athletes we interviewed. For most of them, "sport was everything.'''' 
(p.139). /' 
However, as was indicated both in chapter one and above, this role 
or self identity is posited by many as being delineated by the needs of 
the competitive environment. Mihalich (1982) summarises the parameters 
of athlete endeavour when he contends that: 
"Winning with honour and decency and compassion is the essence of 
sports and athletics and life itself" (p. 13). 
Although to win the athlete must possess a particular personality 
disposition. Indeed. Stephen Ward, a practising psychiatrist, expresses 
his horror at the sports environment which does not stereotype its 
athlete's self-image. In his essay "Winning is Everything" Ward (-1978) 
states that: 
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"I am not a believer in the Little League 1 philosophy that everyone 
who shows up should get to play, regardless of who wins ••• It is 
somehow or other not very nice anymore to win ••• The Little League 
philosophy fosters security-seeking dependence, acceptance of weakness 
and goals of mediocrity. It does not breed superior athletes or 
enterprising citizens" (pgs. 142-143) • . 
The view of sport and its relationship to the athlete is therefore one 
which emphasises certain selective traits which are delineated by the 
parameter of success, and which in turn reflect the macrocosmic needs of 
society at large. However, most involved in the sporting environment 
have appeared to selectively inattend to deviations from these norms. 
Consequently they ignore the fact that the stresses imposed by this 
type of selective environment leads to the construction of a 'normal' 
and 'abnormal' approach both to athlete personality, and the perception 
of self within the sports participation framework. 
This proposal is worth discussing in more detail in order to: 
1) dispel any doubts as to its existence and 2) to consider the 
influence it has upon the athlete~ self identity whilst he is performing 
or anticipating performance. 
In order to examine the existence of abnormal behaviour 
within sport, previously defined as the degree of an 
athlete's subjective unhappiness (Coles 1982), consider the following 
statements: 
"Among the activities through which men seek release from everyday 
life, games offer in many ways the purest form of escape ••• they 
obliterate awareness of everyday reality, but they do not do this by 
dimming awareness but by raising it to a new intensity of concentration. 
Moreover.,. they have_.no side-effects,. ~Qv~rs or._emotional cQmQl;!,qations". 
(Lasch 1978.p.loo~ Emphasis added) 
Conversely Cratty (1978) states that: 
"Emotional problems among athletic groups are not only found in the 
professional ranks. It has been estimated that within a 40 - 60 member 
roster of a high school football team, from 1 - 2 are on the verge of a 
nervous breakdown during a season, while at least 12 - 15 others could 
benefit from some kind of psychiatric or psychological counselling, due 
to the stress imposed by the sport" ( p.209). 
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Cratty's figures indicate a 34% approximate rate of psychological morbidity. 
Similarly, Beisser (1977}, Stein and Hoffman (1978) and Patmore (1979) 
have all established that the pressures of the sporting environment can 
have far reaching effects upon the equilibrium of the athletes psyche. 
The two statements above can be thought of as belonging to two 
opposing schools of thought. Borrowing from the sceptical-credulous 
debate currently taking place within sports personality research2 ; the 
former statement can be categorised as belonging to the sceptical school 
whose prevalent view is that there is no relationship between participation 
in sport and intra-psychic conflict. 
Adopting the credulous approach necessitates evaluating the way in 
which the concept of normal/abnormal behaviour proposed above affects 
the athletes' involvement in sport. To achieve this aim the athlete-
centred self-schema will now be discussed in detail, firstly with 
specific reference to the effect on the athlete of the intra and inter 
group environments. 
Shaw (1976) has defined a group as comprising "two or more persons 
who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each person 
influences and is influenced by each other person" (p.ll). These 
"influences" can be conceptualised as being the product of a series of 
interpersonal relations, themselves delineated by members perceptions, 
motivation, goals, organisation, interdependence and interaction (Turner 
and Giles 1981). However the way in which these factors affect individual 
psychology within the group process has led to some divergence in 
views.~One of the first theoretical analyses of the social psychology 
of the group was proposed by Allport in 1924. He stated that: 
"There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and 
entirely a psychology of individuals" (p.6). 
And this appears to be the approach favoured by the sports psychologists 
in their profile analyses of sports groups~ However, both Sherif (1936, , 
1967) and Asch (1952), criticised Allport's individualism and proposed 
instead that the group was a social gestalt whose essence, or 'total', 
is different to the mere sum of its parts. As a consequence individuals 
are changed in the group context because the group has a phenomenological 
reality for its members which' cannot be reduced to the sum of .its parts. 
(Turner, 1981). 
22. 
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I Turner proposes therefore that group members stereotype themselves: ;f 
"Once some specific social identification is salient, a person assigns 
to self ••• the common, typical or representative characteristics that 
define their group as a whole." (p.39) 
And although he contends that the research at present does not permit a 
systematic presentation of these salient conditions, previous research 
does suggest that group membership becomes more salient in conflict 
situations with an out-group (Sherif 1967; Dion, Earn,and Yee 1978; 
Doise 1978,'); where there is a distinctiveness of the group in a certain 
environment (Bruner and Perlmutter 1957); or by the number of group 
members present (Doise 1978). 
The importance of these factors for the sports group, 
particularly a rugby team, is apparent, as out-group confrontations are 
~ marked by a high degree of conflict, and the in-group is not only 
~ environmentally distinct but reguloted to a specific size; fifteen. 
~The effect, that the group-identity has upon the individual has been 
at the centre of much contemporary research, and it has been conceptualised 
by Tajfel (1978), Goffman (1979) and Turner (1982) as representing a 
change from personal to social identity. Turner has termed this identity 
change 'depersonalisation', whereby: 
"Under conditions where a shared social identification becomes 
salient, social behaviour tends to become more uniform both within the 
in-group and towards the out-group. This is because under such 
conditions, individuals define themselves ••• in terms of their common 
attributes as group members and not in terms of their idiosyncratic 
fea tures as unique persons". (Brown and Turner 1981, p. 40 ) • / 
Social identity is regarded by Turner as being one half of the self-
concept, the other being constituted by personal identity. For him the 
former represents social category membership (race, sex, student and so 
on), the latter the idiosyncratic attributes of personality. However, 
such a dichotomous theoretical division is erroneous as one can never 
remove the personal from the social identity and vice versa. It is 
rather the interpersonal or social situation which delineates an 
individual's personal/social identitT, the two terms being symbiotic. As 
Storr (1981) states: 
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"to talk of personality as if it existed apart from interpersonal 
relationships is meaningless." (p.129) 
Consequently, a more accurate theoretical representation of the process 
of depersonalisation would be that it is the psychological salience of 
the social situation, specifically the pressure to conform to certain 
normative traits, which delineates identity. As Hampson (1982) observes: 
l'''(Personality) traits should not be treated as though they referred 
exclusively to people; they also refer to situations. Viewed in this 
way 'personality' becomes a characteristic composed of both person and 
situation"(p.163);I 
The salience of the sports group however is also mediated by the 
concept of 'normal' and 'abnormal' behaviour, the former being defined 
by those 'authenticated' traits associated with winning. Sage (1978) states: 
"The individual player is expected to do his best to fit himself 
into functions which are needed by the organisation. This is vividly 
exemplified by the popular locker-room slogan: "There is no I in team." 
••• Instead of coaching from the expressive foundation of personal 
fulfilment, coaches often adopt a production profile in working with 
athletes." 
Consequently: 
" 
Thus we 
(1966), 
wish as 
many coaches have defined coaching as analogous to sculpturing 
have two sports psychologists, Bruce Ogilvie and Thomas Tutko 
labelling athletes who will not be moulded in the ways. coaches 
"problem athletes" " <p.157). 
The "problems" defined by the two psychologists range from a lack 
of~oachability\ through injury-proneness to depression, and it is worth 
looking at their study in more detail as it clearly defines the coach as 
guardian, and enforcer, of the normative typologies which have been at 
the centre of this discussion. 
Og.ilvie and Tutko (1966) reported that the 64 coaches' personalities studied 
yielded 12 common attributes. These included that they were (a) highly 
success driven, (b) highly ordered, (c) outgoing, warm people (d) open, 
trusting people. They also found however that the coaches as a whole 
manifested a low tendency to be interested in the dependency needs of others, 
24. 
and that they were disinterested in providing the understanding or 
emotional support for athletes who sought them out for counselling. There 
is something of a contradiction here, in that the coaches were reported 
to be 'outgoing', 'wann people', 'trusting and unusually mature". The 
two authors comment that they were continually "reminded by these men 
that 'I'm no social worker; my job is to teach how to win.'" (ibid p.24) 
The authors' examination of the problem athlete begins by looking at the 
athletic 'trait' of 'coachability' which they define as representing the 
need for order and as the capacity of the athlete to show appropriate 
deference. They propose that the athlete who exhibits a balance 
between these traits will "present few problems". 
It is then as Goffman (1979) states~ 
"He who adheres to the advocated line is said to be mature and to 
have achieved good personal adjustment; he who does not follow the line 
is said to be an impaired person, rigid, defensive," with inadequate "inner 
resources"; (p. 140) 
a problem athlete. Indeed there is some evidence here to suggest that 
the coaching process endeavours to deindividuate rather than depersonalise 
the athlete, The former implying a loss or shedding of identity in group 
situations. The athletic group then shares some affinity with Sartre's (1982) 
'bonded' and Laing's(1962) group 'nexus', both constellations being held 
together by fear, anxiety and guilt in terms of what "the other group 
members will do to the member who secedes or betrays," (Sedgewick 1982 p.80). 
In order to understand how such a group environment could provoke 
such an affective response it is necessary to discuss, in some detail, 
the interpersonal notion of self encompassed by the self-schema proposed 
in chapter 1. 
It will be remembered that the self-schema comprised of three separate 
yet interrelated self-percepts; the self, the not self and the ideal self. 
It is proposed, before describing the specific properties of each and the 
way in which they affect each other, to briefly review the tradition of 
self-psychology. 
The position of the self within psychology generally has only 
really received 'authentication' in the last two or three decades, and 
this is due mainly to the work of Carl Rogers and his other humanistic 
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oriented colleagues. However, although the self has only recently been 
accredited as being not only a worthy area of study but also as an 
important factor within the clinical and therapeutic setting, it has a 
long history; longer in fact, than the academic discipline of psychology 
to which it now belongs. Unfortunately, during this time the self has 
become synonymous with a multiplicity of different terms, so much so that 
it is difficult to conceptualise it historically with any degree of 
specificity. Becuase of this factor only those self-theorists who have 
influenced the development of the self-schema will be reviewed, in an 
attempt to posit it within some historical perspective. 
The concept of self is i?extricably linked to philosophical discourse 
and in particular the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant(1934) stated that 
"there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience" (p. 54). 
Furthermore he observed that there was something very significant for 
human development in the fact that each infant becomes conscious of 
himself first as 'me' then, only later as 'I'. This order has subsequently 
been confirmed as universal (Becker, 1962), and as such it indicates that 
a child "becomes a point of reference in relation to others before he 
becomes an agent of action for himself" (ibid p. 33) • Consciousness or 
'knowledge' of self is then a fundamentally social experience. 
It was not however, until the work of William James (1890), that the 
'self' entered the realm of psychology proper. ~ith his concept of the 
'Global Self', James shifted the emphasis "from a philosophical and 
subjective experiencing 'I' to a psychological and empirical 'Me''', (Burns 
1979, p.28). A proposal which advanced Kant's original thesis as it 
submitted that the self is comprised of two components which discriminate 
between pure experience, (I; the self as subject) and the content of that 
experience, (Me; the self as object). James' theoretical division 
therefore paved the way for a psychological quantification of the 
(interpersonal) Me, and re-introduced the problem (which has been an 
embarrassment to the phenomenologists since Husserl) of how one can ever 
'know' the content of another I. A more cogent development within self-
psychology however, followed the work of G.H. Mead (1934)and C. Cooley (1912). 
They introduced the concept of symbolic interactionism to the developmental 
study of the self. This emphasised that the individual was not a passive 
receptor of environmental stimuli but an organism which modified, through 
individual experience, the predominantly social cues, rhey therefore 
introduced the concept of the intentionality of consciousness into 
psychology. 
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Unfortunately however, with the rise of the behaviourists (Watson 1925, 
Thorndike 1932, Hull 1943), the 'non-visible' self was effectively 
dismissed from the ranks of psychological enquiry, until the work of the 
neo-Freudians (Fromm 1947, Erickson 1956, and Sullivan 1956), and the phen-
omenological humanists (Lewin 1935, Kelly 1955, Rogers 1959). Both the work 
of Kelly and Rogers was heavily indebted to the previous findings of such 
theorists as Cooley (1912) and Mead (1934), and also the philosophy of Kant. 
However it did represent a refinement of previous research, both theoretically 
and methodologically. Rogers (1980), thus contends: 
"The only reality I can possibly know is the world as I perceive it 
at this moment ••• There are as many worlds as there are people" (p.102). 
Rogers, although realising the importance of the generalised other, 
emphasises the importance of the individual's self-concept as a kind of 
umbilicus attached to, and yet mediating, the perceptions of his or her 
social reality. Kelly, too, marked a shift away from Mead and Cooley's 
'other centered' approach with the introduction of his personal constuct 
theory. As such he emphasised that "psychology is man's understanding of 
his own understandingl' He therefore selectively mediates his perceptions 
and cognitions of reality by delineating it with reference to his 
experience of self. 
The importance particularly of both Rogers and Kelly's work, for the 
proposed self-schema is their emphasis upon man as mediating-his experience 
of reality by referring to his-self. It thus allows the introduction of 
intentionality, needs, values and also affect into the theory of self. 
However, one final points needs clarification,namely why 
the object of empirical analysis is a self-schema rather than a self-
concept. A concept can be thought of as a mechanism which enables an 
individual to classify the Object of perception into meaningful categories; 
the specificity of the category being dependent upon the nature of 
the concept. A schema on the other hand, is "the image of the thing with 
which the imagination aids the understanding in its procedure" (Chambers 
Dictionary 1972). Consequently the self schema is the author's 
theoretical understanding of what the self-concept is thought to be, 
and as such it is dependent upon the vagaries of his experience. It is 
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then as Smail (1982) contends: 
"Scientists seek and work for objectivity on the basis of their 
personal acquaintance with their subject matter: it is not imposed 
upon them from without and cannot be set up as a test of the validity 
of scientific statements" (p.68). ----
Borrowing from Rogers (J965), the definition of the S~lf can be conceptualisecl 
as~ing: 
"The perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percept 
and concept of self in relation to others and to the environment" (p.138). 
\ 
Within this are two theoretically important factors which must be 
accounted for in any notion of 'self perception, the 'others' and the specific 
environment in which the interaction with these others takes place. 
The importance of either real or fantasised others within any 
personality theory has been attested to both within the theoretical and 
methodological concerns of chapter 1 and also within the present 
literature review. However, this importance has not yet been developed with 
any degree of specific theoretical significance. 
Hegel (1964) was perhaps one of the first to indicate the significance 
of the other both for the control and development of the self. As a 
consequence he proposed that "self-consciousness attains its satisfaction 
only in another self-consciousness'(p.201). In order to illustrate this 
process he used the 'parable' of the Master and Slave. The Master is 
"another consciousness existing on its own account which is mediated with 
itself through another consciousness" (p.201).,However, ,this mediation entails 
that although the master is self-sufficient - in the sense of having the 
slave dependent upon him - he is also dependent upon the dependence of 
the slave for his own definition of self; the master. In much the same 
way a hermit can only define himself as a recluse through the absence 
of concrete others; he is still dependent upon the existence of 
others in order to achieve a sense of nim-self as hermit. 
More contemporary uses of the importance of the other(s) for 
defining self have been in the psychological theories ofCooley (1912), 
Mead (1934), and in·particular Sullivan (1953) and Leary (1957). 
Sullivan proposed the theorem of reciprocal emotion as a way of 
conceptualising the dependency of self on other. He writes: 
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"Integration in an interpersonal situation is a reciprocal process 
in which (1) complementary needs are resolved, or aggravated; (2) reciprocal 
patterns of activity are developed, or disintegrated; and (3) foresight 
of satisfaction, or rebuff, of similar needs is facilitated" (1953 p.198). 
The theorem of reciprocal emotion was subsequently elaborated by the work 
of Leary and his colleagues at the Kaiser Foundation. Leary (1957), borrowing 
heavily from Sullivan, proposed an interpersonal system of personality 
based upon his theory of reciprocal relations. He emphasised that: 
"Interpersonal reflexes tend (with a probability significantly 
greater than chance) to initiate or invite interpersonal responses from 
the "other" person in the interaction" (p.123). 
However, although there is essentially no significant theoretical 
difference between either of the above proposals, Leary, unlike Sullivan 
subsequently developed a specific methodology with which to analyse his 
contention. 
Perhaps the most simple illustration of Leary's theory of reciprocity 
or complementarity (Carson 1969) is his example of the sado-masochistic 
relationship. He states that : "sadistic-critical behaviour pulls 
resentment, distrust, fear and guilt from "others" (1957, p 343). 
Consequently: 
"The common genus of household sadist usually operates in reciprocal 
relationship to masochistic marital partners who respond submissively." 
(ibid p.343) 
(A more detailed account of Leary's theoretical methodology will be given 
in the -following chapter). An essential element within Leary's 
reciprocal theory is the construct of intentionality. He.has termed this 
factor the principle of self-determination whereby he contends that man 
is responsible for his own goals, motives and attitudes within an inter-
subjective world. This factor has particular reference when one considers 
the 'profile descriptions' described earlier, as the normative typologies 
given by this particular process were essentially non~interpersonal •. The 
situation is then as Leary (1957) states: 
"Terms such as depressed, impulsive and inhibited, for example, 
refer to characteristics that possess maximum meaning when their inter-
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personal purpose is added ••• a popular diagnostic phrase (such) as 
"the patient acts depressed" is really not- very great until we add, overtly 
or implicitly, the social implication"(p.5). 
Although Leary's contention is couched in the nomenclature of the 
psychiatric environment, it should not be dismissed as being irrelevant 
for the sports environment. Particularly. if, following Leary's instructions, 
the profile trait of dominance for instance was given its social 
implication of perhaps the player perceives himself as dominant in order 
to 'pull' obedience and respect from others. He therefore maintains or 
enhances his self-esteem by (a) conforming to the normative personality 
traits seen as maintaining successful group functioning and (b) by 
receiving positive feedback from those with whom he interacts, by his use 
of a dominant interpersonal orientation. 
Uriel Foa (1961) conceptualised the relationship between self, other 
and group structure when he wrote that: 
"an interpersonal act is an attempt to establish the emotional 
relationship of the actor toward himself and toward the other, as well 
as to establish the social relationship of the self and other with 
respect to a larger reference group"(p.350). 
There is contained within Foa's statement the second factor taken from 
Rogers definition which was posited as having significance for the self-
schema, namely the reference group or environmental situation within 
which the series of self-other interactions take place. 
For Mallin. (1979), being in a situation: 
"implies being actively involved in try~ng to determine one's present 
circumstances ••• But this struggle to understand the situation is equally 
the attempt to work out a kind of principle of action that will both 
organise its diverse elements and establish a role in respect to them" 
(pgs. 10-11). 
However, most, if not all situations, and in particular that of the 
sporting environment, are bound by normative interpersonal parameters 
which delineate or 'depersonalise' self perception. The implications for 
the cognitions based upon these perceptions are then as Endler (1980) 
observes, in that: 
"Situations, and the perceptions or meanings of situations in terms 
----
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of cultural norms and roles are the basic determinants of behaviour. 
Instead of asking whether (personality) traits or situations are 
the major source of behavioural variance, one might profitably ask "How 
do persons and situations interact in determining behaviour" (p.253). 
The importance of these cultural, or group norms and roles, is indicated 
by Geode (1961), when he writes that a role relationship is: 
"a set of mutual expectations of behaviour between two or more actors, 
with reference to a particular type of situation. These expectations are 
backed by normative based sanctions applied by ego, alter and others. 
Thus, both ego and alter know, or believe they know, what the 'other' will, 
in fact, do in the situation" (p.249). 
Geode continues that in some instances both ego and alter are in 
'tension'; ego may know that alter is not conforming with the norms of 
that particular situation. However, rather than ego adjusting his 
cognitive predictions "he feels that alter should adjust his performance to 
meet ego's expectations" (ibid). This, as we have seen in the research 
of Ogil vie and Tutko ( 1966) , is the view of many coaches and it must be said 
the athletes themselves • 
The pressure to shift ego's self perception to that of alter can 
ultimately lead to a series of disjunctive (Sullivan 1953) or false-
self interpersonal interactions (Laing 1971), and although these compensatory 
mechanisms will be discussed in greater detail. later in this chapter, 
before moving on to the second element within the self-schema, consider 
the following observations by Sartre.(1956), in which he details the condition 
of societal obligation for self: 
"This Obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all 
tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of ceremony ••• there is the 
dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they 
endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, 
an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, 
because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he 
limit himself to his function as a grocer" (p. 59). 
Most, if not all of the above discussion regarding the salient 
psychological factors which delineate the .self,·can be attributed 
to the second percept of the self-SChema, the not-self. Consequently only 
a brief review of its theoretical properties will be given in order to 
avoid needless repetition. 
The definition of the not-self to be employed within this thesis is 
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that it is comprised of: 
"The goals or ideals which are percieved as having ••• negative valence" 
(Rogers op cit). 
Unfortunately the pauci~y of the available research on such a construct 
effectively negates any comprehensive literature review. However, it is 
still felt to be an extremely important element within the totality of 
the self. 
Perhaps one of the nearest one can get in terms of previous research-
ers using the 'not-self' in the way in which it is to be used in this 
study, has been by the personal construct theorists. Wright (1970) states: 
"A symptom may be regarded as a part of a person's experience of himself 
which he has singled out and circumscribed as in some way incongruous with 
the rest of his experience of himself ••• On account of the incongruity 
with the 'self' it tends to be regarded as non-self" (p.222). 
Within this statement there is again the intentionality of the person to 
deliberately 'detach' the symptonlor not-self from the remaining self, 
and in this way the concept is the same as the self. Moreover, 
it must be realised that at some other time the person could become his 
symptom if circumstances or the situation allowed. It is then as Gergen 
(1977) suggests: 
"the individual harbQlrs a multitude of self-relevant concepts, many 
of which are inconsistent if not diametrically opposed. Thus, the same 
experience of self may be coded differently from one situation to the 
next ••• In this sense, the individual may feel at one moment that he is 
truly sensitive as a person, but at another that he is brutishly 
calloused" (p. 165) • 
The implication is therefore that given the profiles offered by previous 
research, the sporting situation mediates not-self perception so that 
it encompasses non-dOminant, non-aggressive or non-sensitive traits. 
Unfortunately the significance of these polar constructs cannot be taken 
per se, as the athletes have never been asked which traits they do in fact 
find incongruent or inconsistent with their sense of self. This is a similar 
fault in many other psychometric techniques and one cannot simply assume 
that self and not-self are diametrically opposed. The person must 
consciously reject those aspects of him or her-self which (s)he perceives 
----
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to be incongruent with the needs of the particular situation. 
The final construct which completes the phenomenal self-schema is the 
ideal self. Borrowing again from Rogers statement which has formed the 
basis of the schema's theoretical perspectives, the ideal self can be 
defined as "the goals or ideals which are perceived as having ••• positive 
valence" (1965). However, it is felt that although structurally accurate, 
this definition does not, encompass the full meaning of the 'idealised' 
perception of self. A far more accurate representation is offered by 
Murray and Kluckhohn (1953): 
"One of the important establishments of personality is the ego-ideal, 
an integrate of images which portray the person "at his future best", 
realising all his ambitions." 
These ambitions however: 
"are imaginatively created and recreated in the course of development 
in response to patterns by the environment - mythological, historical, 
or living exemplars" (p.40) •. 
The stereotypical or normative images of the athletic personality encompass 
strong mythological (see chapter 1), historical and contemporary pressures 
to strive for dominant, extrovert ideals. Indeed only those athletes who 
fit the mythological and historical mould are treated as living examplars 
of athletic idealism. 
Most of us should be educated in the good life and how to attain it. 
In this the athlete provides a much better model than the scholar ••• In 
his highly visible pursuit of a highly visible perfection, he illustrates the 
age-old advice to become the person you are" (G. Sheehan 1974, cited in 
Mihalich 1982 p.51). 
However the: 
"Win at any cost syndrome is reflected in the excessively competitive 
character of contemporary sports and athletics and (in) the tendency of 
unscrupulous administrators and coaches to resort to dehumanising tactics 
to ensure victory" (Mihalich 1982 p.26). 
"excesses in sports are a microcosm of society. When society stops 
cheating, then we can expect the same of intercollegiate sports" (Paterno 
1978, cited in Mihalich op cit p.27). 
------------
33. 
"In the traditional male role, taught in part through sports, inter-
personal and emotional skills, are relatively underdeveloped, and feelings 
of tenderness and vulnerability are especially prohibited. The ideal 
sportsman is tough, strong and aggressive." (Pleck 1976, p.156) 
The situation, as illustrated by the four statements above, is 
therefore one which questions the very nature of the ideal itself. 
Consequently is the ideal (a) what people believe they are supposed to 
feel or believe; or (b) a 'real ideal' in which they do in fact believe; 
or (c) an ideal which, if 'believed', will engender credibility to a self-
system which it would otherwise lack. 
The view proposed by Leary (1957) is that: 
"the acceptance of certain ideals tends to link the individual to 
strong forces in his world." (p.202). 
These ideals, he suggests, can come from parental, religious or more 
importantly, from a person's societal group. Syrnonds (1946) has described 
the process, proposed in (c) above, where a 'discreditable' self-system 
can develop feelings of belonging and worth by acceding to the models and 
values of his group: 
"One looks for support by acceding to the wishes of society through 
its laws and customs, so that one feels secure as a member of the group 
and derives power from the group."(cited in Leary 1957 p.202). 
Leary, using information obtained from research conducted into 
individuals' ideal or value systems, posits that for most (9~~), dominant 
or responsible interpersonal themes structured the respondents ideals. 
He concludes that "This homogeneity is a cultural stereotype," (p.205), 
and as such he proposes that other cultures (or groups) could idealise 
other normative values. Some thirty years earlier Freud had also recognised 
the importance of cultural or environmental effects upon the development 
of the ego-idea13, "the differentiating grade in the ego which forms out 
of all the limitations imposed on the ego by the external world, " (Guntrip, 
1972). An extension of this proposition, of more interest to the aims of 
this thesis however, was Freud's discussion in 'Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego' (1921) of the way in which ego-analysis can be used 
as a means of explaining group ties. Freud argues that each individual 
within the group identifies himself with the leader in that part of his 
ego, called the ego-ideal. He then substitutes the leader .. ·for his. ·ego--
ideal, thus falling completely under the leader's direction. The important 
factor here is the way in which Freud proposes that an ideal is introjected 
from some external source, 'adopted' as one's own and then used as a group 
manifestation of control. However, as we have seen,it is not the leader 
who acts as some kind of group ideal, but the group's instrumental and soc-
ial environment; coach, peer group, and/or the sports psychologist. 
The ideal self, like its two perceptual counterparts, is not a 
'passive' or merely additive percept within the totality of the schema. 
Indeed, although each one of the percept's has an importance in its own 
right, the self-schema takes on an additional or more distinct quality 
when each of the percepts "oppose" or more accurately, interact with one 
another. It is therefore important to see the instrumentality of the 
schema not as a elementaristic or additive model of self, where the total 
impression is one taken from the summation of all the separate pieces of 
information (Asch 1952). But as a perceptual Gestalt which cognizes the 
athletes perceptions of group reality into something more than the mere 
sum of his schematic parts. As such, the perceptual field of the athlete 
within the sports group is subject to the Gestalt "Law" of the inter-
dependence of parts, thus each percept within the self-schema is structural 
in: 
"relation to each other (one) to form an organised whole, so that 
each part influences the other parts, and the characteristics of any part 
are determined by its membership in the total system" (Brown and Turner, 
p.35 1981). 
Moreover, the effect upon cognition of this 'total system' is one which 
necessitates that each group member perceives himself, not in isolation, 
but as we have seen through Sullivan's and Leary's theories of complement-
arity, as members of a social entity. And as such they: 
"internalise group products such as slogans, norms, values and 
stereotypes and so achieve shared frames of reference which regulate and 
coordinate their actions and attitudes" (ibid). 
This internalisation of the group product has been demonstrated with 
reference to each aspect of the self-schema. In-group deviants are 
labelled 'problem athletes' as they fail to adjust their 'total system' 
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to the normative frames of reference; they consequently fail to consume. 
However, it is only by' tracing. group process back to individual 
praxis, a methodology proposed in the conclusion of the previous chapter, 
that the intelligibility or intentionality of the athlete-as-a-being-in-
the-group can be analysed, and any attempt made for it to be understood. 
For the most part it is in not adopting this shift of perspective that 
has l~ to many talking not about personality but group process. We 
are then left to assume that athletes brivg to the competitive situation 
a cluster of traits which not only make them distinct from the population 
~~ large, but which also ensures the prospect of success. However, apart 
from the cross-situational validity of such an approach, which is in 
itself in doubt, the kind of statement it generates in general that 
"sports people as a group are extroverted" (Nias, New Society 1982) is so 
broad as to be absolutely meaningless. 
The perspective of the self-schema is summarised by Martin Howarth-
Williarns (1977), when he writes that: 
"Laing notes that a group as §ugh can never actually do anything, 
except through the praxis of an:tndividual. That is, process cannot be 
attributed to a group as a whole; or rather apparent group process can 
always (in theory) be traced to a multiplicity of individual praxes" 
(p.33). 
Although as noted previously, the group, particularly in sport, has to 
ensure its existence- its continued survival. As such some 'measures' 
have to be taken to ensure the compliance of these individual praxes within 
the group process. Consequently to understand the implications of this 
statement, both for the individual self and also for the theoretical 
objectives of this research, it is proposed to borrow from the work of 
John Paul Sartre in order to briefly review the delineators of the 
structural permanence of groups. 
Sartre (1982), begins his discussion of the group by examining the 
conditions under which it arises. The simplest form ()f group he argues is 
the series, and to illustrate he gives the example of people queuing for 
a bus. The members of this 'group' have only the forthcoming bus as their 
common object of unification, thus "they relate to each other only in so 
far as they all relate to a common external object." (Howarth-Williarns p.34). 
The second, more complex and' distinct group,' is the fused group and to 
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illustrate the particular properties of its formation Sartre uses the 
stonning of the Bastille .during the E'rench Revolution. He argues that 
faced .with the danger of the troops who were surrounding Paris, the 
differences that separated people began .to diminish. As a consequence 
the fuSed groqJ was fonned, whereby:. 
"The individual discovers common action as the sole means of reaching 
the common objective". (Poster, 1979, p.84) 
However, the group cannot maintain its state of '. spontaneous , fusion 
forever. Somehow the group must ensure its survival, and it can only 
achieve this through the commitment of its members. Sartre refers to this 
commitment as 'terreur' or terror •. Consequently: 
"In order to preserve the group from disintegration th', group it:;:"lf 
places severe restrictions on its members. The internal diillger to the 
group is countered by the demand for allegiance to the "se,cial unit." (Stack, 
1977 p.121-122). 
Therefpre: 
"The individuals being-in-the-group is a.free consent to accept the 
right of the group to his praxis and the absolut~ right of all over each 
individual." (ibid) 
Thus the interpersonal structure of this third new group, the bonded (Sartre) , 
or nexual group (Laing), is based upon 'violence and terror' or to put 
it in less dramatic but more realistic terms, anxiety and guilt. These 
affects being generated by a self out of. the "decision or 'pledge' before 
the others to join together in linked activity for the achievement of the 
common group goal", (Sedgewick, 1982, p.80). 
The metamorphosis of the group from serial to nexual and the inter-
personal implications for self of such a shift, parallel the change which 
has taken place now that play has become, for many~ sport. The group of 
workmates kicking a football at dinner-time or the play of children in 
the park fonn a series, and the situation is as Caiilois (1969) observes that 
.games attempt to substitute ideal conditions for the "normal confusion of 
everyday life"(p.49). However, in circumstances where out-group pressure entails 
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that in-group members confonn to ensure both the success and survival of 
the group, then play changes to sport; series becomes nexus. And it is this 
shift in emphasis that provoked. Huizinga (1~55) to argue that modern games 
and sports have been ruined by a "fatal shift toward over-seriousness" (p.197). 
The final 'section' of this review will endeavour to describe the 
possible effect that the group process has upon the individual praxis 
preforming within a 'bonded' group. This will be achieved by referring 
specifically to certain interactive combinations of the percepts within 
the self-schema, with particular reference to the affective component, 
inherent within both schema and group, of anxiety. The aim however is two-
fold, this review will not only introduce the reader to the topology of 
the athletes psyche, it will introduce some of the areas which will be 
empirically analysed in Chapter 5. 
Perhaps the simplest, but by no means unimportant interactive 
~roduct, given by a combination of specific percepts within the self-schema, 
is that which emerges from the self. and not-self perceptions. Together 
they offer an interpersonal parameter of self which is itself delineated 
by those perceptual poles seen by the athlete as having positive and negative 
valence. Their interaction forms, essentially, the superstructure of not 
only athletic personality disposition but also the particular mode of 
adjustment to group process. 
Using the sports psychologists athlete 'profile' as our 
illustration 'we thus, theoretically, have' a self perception which stresses 
dominant and aggressive interpersonal themes and, in all probability, 
a not-self which consciously rejects either s,elf-effacement or dependence. 
Therefore, the first interpersonal parameter of self perception is 
. structured along a continuum of dominance and submission. If this were 
in fact true, then given the specific theoretical perspective of this 
review we could .designate this perceptual t.ypology as constituting the 
norm; it must be said that given the comments of many involved in sports 
it certainly constitutes the stereotypical expectation. 
However, given this situation, what of those athletes who "seem to 
succeed despite a wide divergence from the group mean"? (Hardrran. 1973) • 
. 
The answer to this question introduces the first area of possible intra-
psychic conflict for the athlete whose ,self. and not-self per'ceptions 
are inconsistent with those of his group; a self perception 
which is not aggressively dominant and a not-self which does not reject 
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self-effacing dependency. For example Stein and Hoffman (1978), using 
24 male athletes between the ages of 21 and 32 found that ~ area of 
athletic role strain involved anomie or ambiguity. They define this type 
of strain as being "a confusion involving nonnative expectations of role 
partners'~p.139). This particular situation will be of importance 
in the later discussion regarding the concommittments of interpersonal 
anxiety. 
The second, and probably the more important perceptual interaction, 
is that between the . self ,and ideal self. the product of which will 
be termed self acceptance4• Crowne and Stephens (1961) state that: 
"While no single definition of self-acceptance would be accepted by 
all who use the term, the phenomenological view of Rogers seems to 
represent at least a common point of departure." (p.104). 
In fact the construct of self acceptance only really gained respectability 
within the clinical and psychotherapeutic psychological domains with the 
work of Rogers (1965). Rogers, using Stephenson's 'Q' technique5, attempted 
to measure via statistical correlation the way in which his client or 
person-centred therapeutic techniques facilitated a movement of self toward 
the ideal, or ideal toward self6: 
The correlation between self and ideal is initially low, but becomes 
much higher as a result of therapy .•• Thus the result of therapy would 
appear to be a greater congruence between self and ideal" (p.141). 
However, despite the proliferation of research conducted into the nature 
of self acceptance since Rogers first attempts to statistically map its 
effects upon the whole personality system, the ensuing multiplicity of 
meanings conveyed by the term has resulted in most definitions being either 
rigidly operational, where the parameters defining the variable are not 
specifiable,or highly abstract, where they are semantically loose and 
subject to differing interpretations,(Crowne and Stephens 1961). 
Given this criticism there is evidently some need to offer an oper-
ational definition regarding the way in which self acceptance will be used 
both here and also in the empirical analysis which follows. 
The construct of self-acceptance corresponds to MacCorquedale's and 
Meehl's (1948) early conception of a hypothetical construct: "something 
that cannot be observed but still is assumed to exist." As such a 
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definition must specify the parameters which conceptualise this particular 
aspect of an individual's phenomenological cognition in order to ensure 
that the variable is neither elusive semantically nor operationally. For 
the purpose of this research self acceptance will be defined as the degree 
of congruence between an individual's self and ideal self perceptions, 
mediated by his particular interpersonal environment, the result 
influencing whether cognition is positively or negatively biased. 
This defintion closely follows Brisset's (1972) conceptualisation 
of self-esteem in that it encompasses two basic psychological processes, 
(a) self-evaluation and (b) self-worth •. And it is by considering the 
polarities of these two constructs that most of the previous research 
into self acceptance can be subsumed. Consequently: 
"positive self concept can thus be equated with ... self respect, 
self-esteem, self acceptance; a negative self concept becomes synonymous 
with negative self-evaluation, self hatred, inferiority and a lack of ••• 
self acceptance" (Burns 1979 p.57). 
(It must be noted that each one of the above self-referent adjectives 
can be thought of as belonging to the generic term of either high or low 
self acceptance). Therefore, those individuals with a high level of self 
acceptance are regarded by most psychologists as being mature, adjusted 
personalities, those with a low level as being subjectively unhappy and 
unstable. As Sappenfield (1970) contends: 
"persons having normal self-esteem tend to perceive themselves as 
having the characteristics that they attribute to the ideal personality"(p.976). 
However, this rather tidy linear relationship between self acceptance and 
psychological adjustment has not been without criticism. Crowne and Stephens 
have proposed that the 'regression' is rather curvilinear. The authors 
state that: 
"those individuals describing themselves as very close to their ego 
ideals tend to deny and suppress threatening features of themselves and 
cannot be considered mature and healthy' (op cit p.110). 
They argue that such a person may be said to be "overly-integrated", a 
condition sufficient enough for a stable benign environment, where the 
pressures on the individual are never too great, however environmental 
stress can result in a high level of cognitive disruption. This view has 
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also been supported by the work of Neuringer, Lowell and Wandke (1966) 
who state that: 
"there is, phenotypically, stability of interpersonal relationships 
among high self-concept individuals. But this may be due to the masking 
effects of social group composition ••• However, the conflict-arousing 
effect of high self-concept individuals lurks behind this defensive screen" 
(p.321). 
In essence then extreme satisfaction and extreme dissatisfaction with 
self are to be regarded as unhealthy for the psychological stability of 
the individual (see also Butler and Haigh 1954 and Erickson 1956). However, 
although this research enables a specific conceptualisation of the construct 
of self acceptance to take place, the underlying question, to which this 
thesis will be addressed, is why the individual with a very low level of 
self acceptance (it would be more accurate to describe this situation as 
a high level of self rejection) has an ideal in which is enshrined such 
"bitter self-criticism" (Guntrip 1971). 
It will be remembered that the self-schema was described as a perceptual 
Gestalt and as such it is important to consider the role played in self 
acceptance of both the self and not-self perceptions. Consider the athlete 
whose sense of self deviates from his group norm, one possible way of 
feeling not only an integral part of the group, but also of diminish-
ing feelings of inferiority, is for him to adopt the values 
or ideals of the group and introject them as his own: 
"By taking on standards and ideals the individual wins approval 
and attempts to ward off disapproval. Heightened self-esteem and the 
avoidance of shame and inferiority can be achieved by the acceptance and 
expression of value systems" (Leary 1957 p.22). 
However, this intrOjection of external ideals can have a destructive and 
unsettling effect upon the rest of the personality system. It is as 
Murrayand Kluckhohn (1953) state "high aspirations can cause unhappiness 
and discontent". 
It is evident therefore that to compensate for the feelings of 
inferiority, generated by what is perceived to be an inadequate self 
and not-self system, the individual strives for superiority and dominance. 
This psychological process is similar to the Adlerian theory (1930) that the 
fundamental human motive is one which strives for superiority in order 
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to compensate for feelings of inferiority. However, within this compensatory 
psychological mechanism the motive or need inculcated in the ideal is 'other 
directed', as it is bound by the requiremnets of the bonded group process. 
Indeed Murray's (1938) definition of a need emphasises. the relationship between 
the individual's perception of himself and the 'objective' requirements 
of the environment. A need is: 
"sometimes provoked directly by internal processes of a certain kind ••• 
but more frequently ••• by the occurence of one of a few QQmmQnly eff~t~ 
press [environmental forces]" (pgs.123-124, emphasis added)-
Similarly Kluckhohn's (1951) definition of a value emphasises the influence of 
group characteristics: 
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit ••• characteristic of 
a group of the desirable, which influences the selection from available 
modes, means and ends of action" (p.342) 
He continues that such a conception of the desirable is usually related to 
beliefs about the nature of reality, and it is evident that the 'reality' 
of the group process is one in which the dominant interpersonal relation-
ships between self and other is somehow accepted as 'given' within the 
performance situation. 
The needs of the athlete who introjects an ideal which is incongruent 
with the remainder of his self-schema leads to the situation whereby 
he erects a false-self in order that he becomes, to use Heidegger's (1962) 
expression, part of 'Das Man', his goal being to be 'average': 
"Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness, 
whid\ is an existential characteristic of das man" (p. 127) 
The consequence of such an existence is inauthenticity; thus none 
of his actions, values "not even his conception of self is his own" (Solomon 
1972 p.215). Laing (1979) summarises Heidegger' s philosophical statement 
when he states that: 
"To be 'authentic' is to be true to oneself, to be what one is, ••• 
to be 'inauthentic' is not to be oneself, to be false to oneself" (p.127). 
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Although Laing elaborates upon Heidegger's proposal by emphasising 
that it is how much 'room' -a person has to 'move' which determines their 
position of authenticity: 
"The space, geometrical and metaphysical of both adult and Child, 
is highly structured by the influence of others" (ibid,_ p.135). 
Laing's comment is particularly pertinent to the athlete who is performing 
as his 'room to move' is bound not only by his position or specific role 
within the team, but also by the physical dimensions of the pitch, delineated 
by the rules of others, upon which the performance takes place; the athlete 
cannot therefore leave this place or his position as it would negate his 
existence as an athlete. 
It is clear from the above review that the percepts inherent within 
the self-schema, whether in isolation or particularly in concert, delineate 
the athletes cognitions with which he mediates his interpersonal response 
to the external reality of performance. Moreover, there is an important 
relationship inherent within this psychological process which for literally 
centuries, has been held in dispute; that between cognition and affect. 
Coles (1982) states that cognition is: 
"the perception and evaluation of one's ability to deal with the 
environment. The affective component is anxiety ••• Since there is a 
relationship between the ability to control or predict the consequences 
of an event and this emotion" (pgs.123-124) 
Affective processes are commonly referred to as feelings, moods and 
emotions, and they constitute what Aristotle referred to as the 'appetite 
systems' (Coles 1982). Moreover, since Grecian times, they have been 
regarded as contradistinct from 'intellectual', or 'normal' social 
behaviour (Peters 1960). As a consequence much time has been spent upon 
attempting to define affective processes in isolation. Wundt (1896), 
proposed that human feelings could be described in terms of a tripartite 
system; pleasantness-unpleasantness; eXCitement-quiescence; and strain-
relaxation. Titchener' (1921), reduced this categorisation into the single 
dimension of pleasantness-unpleasantness which was subsumed by Beebe-Centre 
(1932), under the heading of 'hedonic tone'. Although the tridimensional 
theory did re-emerge in the 1970's with the work of Russell and Mehrabian 
(1977), who suggested that three independent and bipolar dimensions were 
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necessary in order to define emotional states; pleasure-unpleasure; degree 
of arousal; and dominance-submission. 
It is clear from previous research that in attempting to define 
affective processes in isolation from the rest of the psychological systems, 
i.e. cognition and connation, then we are presented with a very one-
dimensional view, grounded in psycho-physiological response patterns. 
Similarly, where attempts have been made to account for the subjective 
emotional experience and the physiological changes, there has been much 
contention as to the primacy of each system. Such that the James-Lange 
theory (1890; 1885).specifically denies that there was any intervention of 
consciousness between physiological stimulus and emotional response. 
However, more recent research into stress and anxiety has shown that 
cognitions and affect are in fact a 'two-way street' (Coyne and Lazarus, 
1980). Hereemphasis is placed upon the perceived self-efficacy of the 
individual within a particular situation rather than a cause and effect 
relationship. This has particularly been the case with the work centred 
upon a cognitive-phenomenological approach to affective responses. Coyne 
and Lazarus write: 
"Although we argue that stressful emotions and coping are products 
of cognition - that is, the way a person appraises or constructs his 
relationship with the environment -·we do not mean that the relationship 
goes only one way. In an adaptational encounter, environmental demands, 
cognitive appraisal process, coping and emotional response interpenetrate, 
each affecting the other." (ibid p.150) 
The work of Lazarus overcomes the determinism and myopia of the 
previous concentration upon either cognition QC affect, and meshes affective 
response into the self-schema with its emphasis upon the interaction of 
self-perception with the situation.)Lazarus (1966) introduced the concept 
of 'cognitive appraisal' as the method by which the individual judges the 
demands of the environment and his or her resources for managing them. 
This includes the 'primary appraisal' which entails evaluating the effect 
of the situation upon one's well being; and 'secondary appraisal' which 
refers to the person's ongoing judgements concerning his or her coping 
resources.! Thus we have an emphasis upon an organisrnic approach to the 
relationfhiP between cognition and affect which concentrates upon the 
chain of events, organised by the individual's perception of himself, 
which lead to a particular affective response, rather than a psycho-
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physiological description of that response in isolation. 
Bandura (1971.), has also emphasised the important role that perceived 
self-efficacy has in affective behaviour, and Ellis (1962), specified 
the manner in which maladaptive emotional reactions are a function of 
various irrational beliefs manifested in internal self-statements, 
(Smith 1980). Ronald Smith (1980), using college and professional athletes 
(Smith, in press; Smith and Smell, 1978) and borrowing from the work 
of Ellis (1962), Lazarus (1966), Schachter(1966) and Arnold (1967), has 
proposed that the relationship between cognition and affect has four 
major elements: (a) the situation, (b) the person's cognitive appraisal 
of the situation, (c) affective response and (d) instrumental behaviours. 
Smith's description of these four psychological processes proposes that 
the stimuli that constitute the situation can be either external or internal 
in origin, i.e. an example of the former would be the stimulus of the 
forthcoming game, of the latter, thoughts, images or memories which could 
entail either positive or negative experiential appraisals. However, it 
must be said that Smith's external/internal division is somewhat 
academic as the two can be more accurately thought of as inter-dependent. 
The person's cognitive appraisal of the situation again contrasts 
sharply with those nonmediational models of behaviour which conceive the 
situation as directly stimulating the physiological component of the 
particular affective response. However as Smith (1980) states: 
"Appraisal processes create the psychological reality to which people 
respond, and the nature and intensity of emotional responses are a function 
of what people tell themselves about the situation and about their ability 
to cope with it" (p.266). 
(It is apparent from the above statement the extent to which Smith has 
been influenced by the work of Lazarus as he has subsumed under one 
heading both the primary and secondary appraisal processes). 
Physiological responses, the third component of the model, a,re 
according to Smith "intimately related in a bidirectional fashion to 
appraisal processes" (ibid)., Therefore, not only does the cognitive 
appraisal of the individual mediate his affective response but also the 
physiological response provides feedback as to the intensity of the emotion 
being experienced. Consequently, the feedback process facilitates a fluid, 
ongoing process of appraisal and re-appraisal (Schachter 1966). (This 
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proposed feedback loop will be of particular importance when discussing 
the theoretical relationship between trait and state anxiety below). 
The final part of Smith's model, the instrumental behaviours made. in 
the situation, include task-oriented, social and coping behaviours. These 
factors being affected by both cognitive and physiological processes. 
Smith's model emphasises the importance of the relationship between 
cognition and affect, in particular the part played by the individual's 
perception of self in the mediational or appraisal process. However, 
before giving a detailed review of the properties inherent in the specific 
affective-response of importance to this study; anxiety, the following 
elegant description by Sartre (1956) will perhaps elucidate and hopefully 
converge the theoretical propositions behind the self-schema and their 
relationship to the model described above. 
"Let us imagine that I have just looked through a key-hole. I am 
alone and on the level of non-thetic consciousness. This means first 
of all that there is no self to which I can refer my acts in order to 
qualify them, "I am my acts." "All of a sudden I hear footsteps in the 
hall. Someone is watching me" What does this mean? It means that I am 
suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications occur ••• 
First of all, I now exist as myself: I see myself because somebody 
sees me. _ I discove.r shame; shame of self. I am indeed that object which 
the Other is looking at and judging" (pgs.259-260) 
Within Sartre's description we have illustrated the importance of 
the Situation; myself looking through a key-hole, and also the influence 
of the interpersonal environment; the presence of the other, for the 
perception of self and the resulting cognition of reality. The subsequent 
interpersonal perception 'pulls' judgement from the other upon my self. 
However it is important to note that the other does not have to speak, 
it is my intention or praxis as a 'voyeur' which establishes the reciprocal 
interpersonal link between we two. The cognition of this particular 
reality provokes the affective response of shame, although the mediational 
aspect of cognition could, just as easil~ invoke feelings of fear, guilt 
or anger. 
Perhaps the most culturally pervasive affective disturbance, and 
certainly the most documented, is that of anxiety, so much so that 
W.H. Auden (1947) has termed the post-war period the age of anxiety. 
Yet it is hard to conceive of any age which could have been exempt from 
this particular emotion. Its existence is inherent in man's development 
from birth until death with no regard for historical specificity. 
!,VThe importance attached to the understanding of the psychological 
determinants of anxiety has resulted in it becoming the cornerstone of 
most, if not all personality theories since its central position in 
Freud's psychoanalytic, theorie~';and its subsequent relevance to much 
of contemporary psychop&thology and psychiatry. However, the consequence 
of this proliferation of research is that the literature is now replete 
with a wide, and sometimes confusing array of competing terms: 
" •• with some authors using different terms to refer to the 
same basic concept, while others use a single term, often in the same 
article, to refer to a number of different concepts" (Akutagawa 1968, 
cited in Coles 1982 p.124). 
Thus we have neurotic anxiety; moral anxiety; test anxiety; anxious 
feelings of inferiority; separation anxiety and so on. As a consequence 
there is on occasion, as Akutagawa contends,some theoretical as well as 
methodological confusion couched in the generic term of anxiety. In order 
to attempt to overcome this problem, and prior to describing the relation-
ship between the self-schema and anxiety, a brief review of what are 
considered to be the major developments in anxiety research will be 
given. Obviously a whole thesis could be written tracing the theoretical 
revisions prompted by the influence of previous research, as such, and 
to ensure some degree of specificity, theoretical priority will be given 
to introducing the reader to those research developments which engender 
an interpersonal, self-oriented, perspective of anxiety. 
I'The universality of anxiety as a concomitant of the human condition 
was asserted as long ago as the eleventh century by Ibn Hazm who observed 
that: 
"one end in human actions which all men unanimously hold as good, 
and which they all seek, I have found only this: the aim of escaping 
anxiety~' (in Spielberger 1972)./ 
However, it was Sigmund Freud who attempted to construct a comprehensive 
nosology and aetiology of anxiety in relation to his psychoanalytic 
theories of PSYChopathology.~Freud (1979) observed that: 
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"Anxiety ••• •• is in the first place something that is felt ••• 
As a feeling, anxiety has a very marked character of unpleasure ••• , the 
problem of anxiety is a nodel point at which the most various and important 
questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood 
of light upon our whole mental existence" (p.288).~ 
Freud's description of the physiological aspects of anxiety have remained 
largely unchanged, (see p.40 'On Psychopathology' 1979): increased tension 
in the Skeletal muscles; changes in the cardiovascular system; and 
increased activity of the gastrointestinal system, (Coles 1982). However, 
he found it a great deal harder to specify, with any degree of satisfaction, 
the psychological characteristics of anxiety. 
His original theoretical formulations posited two different types 
of anxiety: realistic anxiety, which referred to specific objects in the 
individual's phenomenal field and was essentially synonymous with fear; 
and neurotic anxiety, which was an irrational affective response to a 
seemingly innocuous or unintelligible external stimulus. Freud (1963) 
observed that everyone has suffered from realistic anxiety, however: 
" I think the question has never been seriously enough raised of 
why neurotics in particular suffer from anxiety so much more and so much 
more strongly than other people" (pgs.392-393). 
He proposed therefore an aetiology of neurotic anxiety based upon 
disturbances in the economy of the libido; premature ejaculation, abstinence 
from masturbation. Subsequent re-formulations of this theorem saw 
Freud revise this. specifically libidinous orientation in favour of a 
more holistic approach. Q'He decided that realistic and neurotic anxiety 
had similar affective characteristics, what differentiated them was the 
source of their anxiety: 
"A real danger is a danger which threatens a person from an external 
object, and a neurotic danger is one which threatens him from an instinctual 
demand" (1959p.167)/ 
{Freud argued that these neurotic dangers were based upon the child's 
psychological development. Anxiety therefore began at birth with separation 
from the mother, it is transformed into castration anxiety in childhood, 
and then castration becomes moral or social anxiety, generated by the 
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super-ego in adulthood. Consequently it is the loss of a loved object, 
mother, penis or social approval, which characterises the instinctual 
1 
demand of neurotic anxiety./ . 
Freud's formulations upon the nature of realistic and neurotic anxiety 
provide a rich and essentially convoluted array of ideas. Therefore, although 
the above pr~cis only represents a drop in Freud's theoretical ocean, there 
are still a number of points, inherent in the above description, and 
subsequently revised by others which form the basis of the theoretical 
view of anxiety taken in this study. 
1Freud emphasised that the ego was "the actual seat of anxiety" and 
this marks an important developmental stage in the aetiology of anxiety. 
The ego or self, as described above, is subject to threats from "three 
harsh masters": threats from the external world resulting in realistic 
anxiety; from the super-ego resulting in moral or shame anxiety and from the 
id resulting in neurotic anxiety. There is then the beginnings of an 
interpersonal approach to anxiety as it has a close affinity with social 
rejection, isolation and helplessness.~ 
~From this point (1925) until the 1950's there was little experimental 
work conducted into the nature of human anxiety outsiqe the ambit of psycho-
analYSiS, most emphasised ethological studies, for example Liddell with 
sheep (1944) and others with dogs/ It was probably the traumatic 
/ 
aftermath of the second world war which led to a renewed interest in human 
anxiety, much as the first had motivated many of Freud's later theoretical 
revisions. The work of Grinker (1966). on veterans, emphasised that anxiety 
caused by war was often accompanied by a state of dependency, characterised 
by a need to rely on others. He thus began the experimental documentation 
of the way in which individuals use specific interpersonal orientations 
to overcome the threat of traumatic events to self. 
~It was the work of the 'neo-Freudian' Harry Stack Sullivan however, 
that did most to integrate anxiety into an alternative personality system 
based specifically upon interpersonal relations. Sullivan (1953), like 
Freud, proposed that it was the mother/child relationship which originates 
the infant's first feelings of anxiety, however unlike Freud, this was 
not characterised by the experience of birth but by an empathic process: 
"The tension of anxiety, when present in the mothering one, induces 
anxiety in the infant" (p.41) ! 
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This induction process occurs not only through empathy but also,he 
emphasises,when the child is left or separated from its mother.;'As the 
experiential capacities of the child develop, the precipitating circumstances 
of anxiety are chiefly associated with the disapproval of significant 
others, particularly the parents.! Beyond infancy anxiety is associated 
with a 
has an 
drop in self-esteem and an increase in 
interpersonal referent (Carson 1969). 
insecurity, and it always 
For Sullivan then the self-
system of an individual is motivated by anxiety: 
"The self-system thus is an organisation of educative experience 
called into being by the necessity to avoid or to minimise incidents of 
anxiety" (op cit p.165). 
~Consequently Sullivan emphasised the primary role of interpersonal 
relationships rather than Freud's intra-psychic conflicts, in the aetiology 
of anxiety. Moreover, and this is of importance to the sports environment, 
he emphatically distinguished between anxiety and fean ForSullivan 
there was no realistic anxiety and neurotic anxiety but only fear and 
anxiety( The former being characterised by: 
"the felt aspect of tension ar~s~ng from danger to the existence or 
biological integrity of the organism" (ibid, p.50) 
such as anOXia, starvation or injury to parts of the body. The latter 
being an exclusively human, social anxiety: 
"As such, it is elicited by the experienced disapproval and/or 
condemnation of significant others" (Fischer, 1970 p.34). 
~TimothY Leary.(1957), working Sullivan's theoretical and clinical observations 
into a personality methodology, also emphasised the motive force of anxiety: 
"Personality is the multilevel pattern of interpersonal responses 
expressed by the individual. Interpersonal behaviour is aimed at reducing 
anxiety. All the social, emotional, interpersonal activities of an 
individual can be understood as attempts to avoid anxiety" (p.16 V 
Leary, like Sullivan, sees the existence of anxiety as being grounded 
exclusively in "mankind's social interdependence". However Sullivan, (and 
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also by theoretical association Leary) is criticised by Guntrip (1973), 
for proposing such a neurotic relationship: 
"Sullivan's self-system or self-dynamism, being totally motivated 
in its development by anxiety is therefore a neurotic phenomenon. This 
cannot be the whole truth about the nature and development of the self, 
the ego or 'I'" (p:1.83). 
In essence Guntrip's criticism reasserts the primacy of the self in its 
relationship with anxiety: anxiety must be seen as a product of the self 
and not vice. verca. H.owever it is important to note that this observation 
in no way reduces the importance of either Sullivan's or Leary's theories 
regarding the influence that interpersonal relationships have upon both 
self and anxiety. 
Up to and including this period the clinical and theoretical concern 
had concentrated upon either anxiety as pathology or its development and 
societal pervasiveness. For Freud there was realistic and neurotic anxiety; 
a gradient of nervous excitation which differentiated normal from abnormal 
affective responses. For Sullivan there was only one anxiety, interpersonal 
anxiety, and this was seen as being either mild or severe; an emotional 
polarity with no middle ground. There was little to tell us either how 
or why people differed in their capacity to be anxious, the question 
which first prompted Freud's theoretical formulations, although there 
was overwhelming support for the notion that anxiety was the result of 
a threat to the self from either real, fantasised or symbolic others. 
pflt was not until the introduction of the trait/state theoretical 
perspective that there was a marked shift away from the emphasis upon 
psychological morbidity, and an attempt made to specify why, and under 
what circumstances individuals differed in their capacity to be anxious./ , 
~It was Cattell and Scheier (1958: 1961) who, using the mathematical 
technique of factor analysis, dichotomised anxiety into two distinct 
components; trait anxiety and state or 'real' anxiety. The trait factor 
was defined as a relatively permanent personality characteristic reflecting 
individual differences in anxiety proneness. Conversely state anxiety 
was conceptualised as being a transitory affective state or condition 
which fluctuates over time. Moreover, apart from identifying these 
two affective constructs, the factorial methodology also established that 
anxiety per se was a second rather than a first order factor7 ; the first 
being characterised by guilt, self-rejection, dependence, low ego-strength 
and self-effacement. Consequently, Cattell authenticated, via 
a statistical analysis, a multidimensional interpretation of the aetiology 
of anxiety which Freud had in fact evolved some thirty years earlier, but 
given a different nomenclature and Sullivan (1953), had proposed,with his 
theory that anxiety was a complex emotion which suggested shame, guilt 
and humiliation.1 
Adding to this multidimensional perspective was Mosher (1966) who 
defined guilt and anxiety as related concepts; Katz and Ziegler (1967) 
who discussed guilt as a parallel condition to anxiety; and Gottschulk 
and Glesser's (1969) classification of anxiety into six inter-related sub-
types of which guilt and shame were two. These and other related findings 
led Janis (1969), to conclude that anxiety is a concept which: "most 
theorists use as a generic term that includes ••• shame and guilt" (p.75). 
Furthermore Izard (1972),again using factor analysis, defined anxiety 
as a variable combination of fear and two or more of the fundamental 
emotions of distress, anger, shame, guilt, shyness and interest-excitement. 
IHowever, although anxiety had been shown to be both a multidimensional 
and also a dichotomous affective phenomenon, there was no theoretical or 
methodological principles which emphasised the relationship between the 
trait and state conditions. It was Spielberger (1966:1967) who suggested 
a theoretical relationship between the two which, put simply, states that: 
"In general, it would be expected that those who are high in A-trait 
will exhibit A-State deviations more frequently than low A-trait individuals 
because they tend to react to a wider range of situations as dangerous 
or threatening. High A-trait persons are also more likely to respond 
with increased A-state intensity in situations that involve inter-
personal relationships which pose some threat to self-esteem" (Spielberger 
Gorsuch and Lushene 1970 p.3).;I 
!However, this approach has not been without criticism, particularly 
concerning the construct validity of trait anxiet~ Carson (1969), 
suggests that trait anxiety is the same as a self-effacing interpersonal 
orientation and support for this view was also offered by Kindle and 
Posnich (1967). Criticisrn·of·this nature ignores, or fails to 
understand the complex relationship between perception of self, cognition 
and affective response; self-effacement is not synonymous with anxiety, 
its association with what Cattell described as the first order factors 
of shame, low ego-strength and dependence do predispose the individual 
to perceive his interpersonal environment as threatening and therefore 
manifest high levels of anxiety trait. jConversely Coles (1982), proposes 
a more balanced critique concerned with the nature of manifest (state) 
and latent (trait) anxiety. He contends that latent anxiety has the 
connotation of being active but not seen, however if anxiety is an affective 
response then itis a contradiction in terms for it to be present but not 
active. This dilemma can however, be overcome in two ways; by referring 
not to ananxiety response but to a tendency or predisposition to respond ? 
with anxiety (state), and by proposing aninhibitory mechanism (cognition) 
which is also present and neutralises or mediates the impulse to respond. 
In effect what Coles describes is the mediational link, proposed by Lazarus 
(1966) and Smith (1980) above, between cognition and affect~ 
Much contemporary research has concentrated upon refining the 
theoretical and methodological links between trait and state anxiety, 
however an extensive review of these findings will be deferred until 
chapter 3, when they will be described in relation to the way in which 
they affected the construction of this study's research methodology. 
Before embarking upon the concluding section of this review,-(the 
relationship between the self-schema and anxiety~ it is necessary to 
describe the development, both theoretical and methodological, of the 
sports psychologists research into the athlete's interaction with, and 
predisposition toward anxiety, as it too contributes to normal-abnormal 
model of athlete behaviour. 
/Within sports psychology, research into anxiety can be subsumed under 
one heading, the relationship between anxiety and performance. There are-
two main areas of concern which are encompassed by this particular 
objective: the part played by anxiety in the athlete's total personality 
system; and the drive or motivatory effect that anxiety has upon an 
individual's capacity to learn or perform a particular skill. Both 
approaches have emphasised the trait approach, although in the case of 
the latter there has been a higher degree of both theoretical and method-
ological sophistication in its use of manifest, trait and state and most 
recently, sports competition anxiety.;' 
qMost of the research conducted into the relationship between 
athlete personality and anxiety disposition has used the Cattell 16 PF 
as its methodological tool, and as such it is just one, second order part, 
53. 
of an overall profile description~ 
/The general view proffered by this approach is that athletes are on 
the whole emotionally stable or non-anxious. However, a comprehensive 
analysis of these profile descriptions by Hardman (1973), established 
that this 'finding' was based upon erroneous conclusions. He observed 
that for the second order factor of anxiety the predominant pattern was 
for the profile scores to be either average or above average, with top-
class athletes tending to be much closer to the population norm (ie. stable 
and non-anxious) than less co~petent performers. Consequently he concludes 
that: 
"in light of these results it is surpnslng that the claim that 
games players are stable or non-anxious is p'rsued •••• a comparative 
lack of anxiety has been a characteristic of good players and this has 
led to the belief that such players have a degree of stability greater 
than the wrm of the total population" (p.93)./ 
However, as with the personality system as a whole, the view that athletes 
are in some way different to the rest of the population is hard to eradicate, 
and their high degree of emotional stability is just the affective component 
of the overall mythology which surrounds the athlete personality. 
"fT.he second, and by far the most prevalent research approach has 
emphasised the relationship between anxiety and its inhibitory or 
facilitatory effect upon learning or Rerforming a simple or complex motor 
task. This approach, due to the controvertible nature of the findings, 
has utilised three different yet generically similar forms of anxiety; 
manifest, trait and state, and sports competition anxiety. Manifest 
anxiety (Taylor 1953. 1956; Spence 1956,1958), was used by researchers 
such as Hammer (1967), Carron (1968) and Martens (1969), in order to 
differentiate between the degree of emotional. arousal manifested by 
individuals on simple and complex motor tasks. However, a review of the 
findings proposed by twenty-eight (iifferent experimenters was conducted 
by Martens (1971), and the results were found to be extremely contentious. 
In an effort to obtain a greater degree of uniformity Martens (1977) proposed 
using the situational trait-state anxiety approach, and when this too 
proved equivocal he introduced the concept of sports competition anxiety, 
(1977a). Martens defines competition trait anxiety as: 
"a tendency to perceive competitive situations as threatening and 
to respond to these situations with feelings of apprehension and tensionll~ 
(p.8). 
;,IAlthough Marten's approach is. laudable because it attempts 
to introduce a situation specific methodology of anxiety, his concept of 
competitive anxiety trait is so broad as to pose many more questions than 
answers~(He has 'lumped' together, whether intentionally or unintentionally, 
every possible source of stress; the 'objective' competitive physical 
environment, the 'objective' social environment and the subjective 
competitive environment are all subsumed by competitive anxiety. ) 
Consequently it is not possible to specify which aspect of the competitive 
environment is perceived as either generally or specifically threatening. 
Is it fear of physical injury, of failure, or of negative appraisal by 
one's significant others? In effect, because of this confusion, Martens 
has defeated his own objective as we have only a vague idea as to the 
anxiety-threat confluenc~. ~It is as Endler (1980) points out; as anxiety 
is multidimensional the anxiety trait measure must be congruent with the 
perceived threat!' i.e. the interpersonal ego-threat interacts with an 
interpersonally ego-threatening situation; physical danger threat with 
physical danger situation and so on. 
~e theoretical, methodological and perhaps most importantly, the 
'conclusive' findings of the sports psychologist, leaves the reader with the 
impression that the (low) level of athlete anxiety/is taken a priori, with 
no reason advanced for affective disposition save for the fact that they are 
athletes. ~e are left with the impression that athletes are on the 
whole non-anxious but, as with all population distributions, there is some 
variance between the members in their degree of 'non-anxiousness' which 
can effect the learning or execution of a skillI' The concluding part 
/ 
of this review will establish that no such a priori, or affective 
determinism can be accepted as an explanation for athlete anxiety 
diSPosition.fRather it is perceptions of self which mediate trait-state 
anxiety responses./ Consequently, rather than trace anxiety forward toward 
I 
its effect ·upon performance, which is a bit like shutting the stable door 
after the horse has bolted, a more fruitful and also accurate approach 
would be to establish how the performance situation is perceived by the 
self as threatening and invokes general or specific anxiety responses. 
The emphasis is therefore upon the performer rather than upon performance. 
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A simplistic, yet accurate summation of the theoretical developments 
in the psychology of anxiety, would emphasise the inextricable link between 
an interpersonal notion of self, or reflexive I, and the predisposition 
to be generally (trait), or specifically (state) anxious. fSPielberger 
contends (1966; 1966a; 1971) that the relationship between the self, taken 
as a holistic integrative unit, and anxiety is ego-syntonic/ High anxiety 
trait persons are in general self-depreciatory and concerned with "fear 
of failure", consequently such individuals, in ego-threatening situations, 
will manifest intense levels of real or state anxiety. Empirical support 
for Spielberger' s theorem has come from Hodges (1968), 0' Neil, Spielberger 
and Hansen (1969), Hodges and Spielberger (1969) and Rappaport and 
Katkin (1972), (see also Auerbach (1969); Mcadoo (1969); Hodges and 
Felling (1970); and Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene(1970», who all report 
that in ego-threatening situations high anxiety trait individuals report 
greater changes in their levels of anxiety state then their low anxiety 
trait counterparts. 
/Within the sports environment Stein and Hoffman (1978) have termed 
this ego-syntonic affective relationship 'role~intrinsic anxiety'. After 
interviewing 12 athletes they conclude that it is the demand for excellence 
which caused many of their respondents to worry about embarrassing them-
selves, failing, or not 'looking good~ The situation is graphically 
summarised by one respondent who stated: 
"Before any game ever, from Little League to college, nausea, 
butterflies, whatever you want to call it ••• • •• I was afraid of losing, 
of failure, of performing poorly... • •• I was always far too self-
conscious~ I felt every eye was on me," (ibid, p'.146). 
The threat of interpersonal evaluation is reported by Endler (1977) 
to be at the heart of the competitive sports situation. Indeed Endler 
and Flood (1980) using 41 male 'track' athletes found that: 
"The interaction between social evaluation A-trait and the stressful 
track-and-field situation was significant;' (in Endler 1980 p.265). 
However, although it is apparent that trait anxiety disposition is 
at bottom ego-syntonic, this perspective is particularly uni-dimensional 
and says very little about the other contributory mechanisms, of equal 
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importance, which tend to be subsumed under this all-embracing term. 
Looking at the self in its capacity as the bedrock of the phenomenal 
self-schema, much research has emphasised the relationship between dominance, 
submission and anxiety. Wolpe (1969) argues that assertion and anxiety 
are mutually exclusive, a view supported by Russell and Mehrabian (1977), 
and given empirical authenticity by Brown (1963) who, using 77 women 
undergraduates reported as inverse correlation of -.34 between dominance 
and anxiety. The interpersonal referrent, inherent in this relationship, 
was emphasised by Weitzner, Stallone and Smith (1967), who established 
that not only did "high manifest anxiety subjects have a low self-opinion" 
but they were also dependent upon the encouragement, sympathy and affection 
of others. This self-other complementarity and anxiety disposition has 
also been observed by Leary (1957), who reports a high degree of association 
between docile-dependence and "manifestations of overt, free-floating 
anxiety" (p.296), and Schachter (1972), who found that affiliation or 
affiliative desires increase with anxiety. 
A further psychological perspective subsumed under the garnmut of the 
ego, and which is inherent in the self-schema, is the individual's degree 
of self-acceptance; the product of the degree of congruence between self 
and ideal self. Rollo May (1980), has concluded that it is one's ideals 
or values which encapSUlate the distinctive quality of human anxiety. 
He writes: 
"One now validates himself by fitting into the herd: What makes him 
prey to anxiety is to be different, to stand out. (He concludes) 
anxiety, may be at bottom, separation anxiety". (p.243) 
However this flight into 'otherness' as a means of validating self entails 
conflict. Leary (1957) states that: 
"the value system may play a destructive and unsettling role in the 
total personality system. Ideals which are too elevated or standards 
which are too strict may lead to severe conflict ••• • •• with a resulting 
feeling of guilt and self-dissatisfaction" (p.202). 
This factor is particularly important when one considers the rigid 
and extremely narrow cluster of traits which make up the athlete's value 
system, and the obvious pressure to conform, indeed the desire to conform 
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so as to be like everyone else, establishes a particular form of stress 
based upon perceptions of~normai/and 'abnormal' typologies. 
nature of ideals and their relationship to both high and low 
anxiety has been established by Furlong and La Forge (1975), 
that: 
The pervasive 
levels of 
who report 
"It has been found that high anxious sUbjects have more negative 
self-concepts than their low anxious colleagues, while there is no difference 
between the two groups in ideal self concepts". (p.237). 
Similarly, Bond and Lader (1976), using a matched group experimental 
design found that the 30 patients who complained of suffering from free-
floating anxiety saw themselves as unsuccessful, weak, tense and passive. 
However, they found that there was a high degree of similarity between 
the patients and the 'normals' ideal self perceptions; the difference 
being in the discordance manifested by the patients between self and ideal 
self. It is possible to conclude therefore that the ideal self is less 
variant than the actual self because of the former's tendency to stereotype 
(Furlong and La Forge). Given this, it is possible· that the in-group deviant 
attempts to overcome his feelings of anxious inferiority by adopting a 
value system which will re-integrate him back into the group. However, 
as Leary pointed out this compensatory process can, and more often than 
not does, exacerbate the situation. Ohmacht and Muro (1967), using 125 
college freshmen established that there was a significant difference 
between high and low self acceptance groups on seven of the sixteen scales 
incorporated within Cattell's 16 P.F. Furthermore six of these seven 
contributed to the second order factor of anxiety; ego-weakness (C-), 
shyness (H-), guilt (0+) pelf conflict (Q3-),paranoia (L+~ ergic tension (Q4+). 
Consequently, the overall contribution to cognition of these 
depreciatory, dependent and submissive self-perceptions is that they fOCUS, 
specifically, upon the threat of the possible negative consequences which 
may occur during the course of social interaction; i.e. fear of failure, 
rejection or disapproval. Therefore the general threat of the environment 
is transposed into real anxiety by the inordinate array of situational 
cues and the individual's perceived incompetence or inadequacy in dealing 
with them. Indeed both Watson and Friend (1969), and Richardson and Tasto 
(1975), have reported the association between a general fear of negative 
appraisal and interpersonal trait anxiety. 
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It is apparent from the tenet of the above that the ego-syntonic 
approach to the description of both trait and state anxiety disposition, 
is multidimensional. Consequently, to attribute anxiety 'proneness' solely 
to cognitions based upon 'fear of failure' or 'self-depreciation', is to 
ignore the complex psychological process described in the main by Lazarus(1966) 
and in particular Smith(1980), above. Thus we must account for the real, or 
fantasized interpersonal situation; the perceptions of self in that situation; 
the cognition of reality based upon these perceptions; and the affective 
response based upon this cognition. 
Therefore, a more accurate method of summarising not only the 
relationship between self and anxiety, but also the salient points raised 
throughout this chapter, would be to use Laings (1978) concept of 'ontological 
insecurity' instead of the rather ubiquitous concept of ego-syntonicity 
favoured so far. 
Laing describes the o.ntologically secure person as: 
"experiencing hi$ own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated 
from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his 
identity and autonomy are never in question". (ibid, p.41) 
The athlete however, and particularly the team athlete, is 
'differentiated from the rest of the world' by extraordinary circumstances; 
he is depersonalised or 'petrified'into himself as-an-athlete by a highly 
selective cluster of normative traits, given authentiCity by his coach, 
peer group, the spectators and sports psychologist, and which delineates 
both connative and affective predisposition. This high degree of 
depersonalization engenders a'normal-abnormal'approach to athlete 
behaviOur, enforced in particular by the exigencies of the bonded group 
process where control is maintained by 'terreur'; the anxiety registered 
within each individual by the fear of what the other group members will 
do to the member who secedes or betrays the group; rejection; ostracism 
or even expUlsion from the group (Sedgewick 1982). 
Consequently, .those who fail to conform are labelled 'problem-athletes' 
and as such their deviant in-group behaviour does not disturb the delicate 
equilibrium of group functioning. Thus group process obscures individual 
praxis, a situation which can entail, for some, an interpersonal 
atmosphere which provokes the individual to manifest ontological insecurity 
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where the player is concerned not with expressing himeslf through his 
sports involvement but with preserving himself, his identity. This can 
be achieved hy assuming a more dependent or affiliative interpersonal 
orientation and also by an adoption of the values or ideals of the others. 
However, as 5artre (1956) states "conflict is the essence of 'being for 
others'" (p.364) and the erection of what is in essence a false self-schema 
exacerbates rather than alleviates intra-psychic and interpersonal tension. 
Therefore the anxiety generated by this situation is anxiety in the face 
of all one's possibilities, a general (trait) anxiety or dread concerned 
with: 
"not merely 'that one is' (one's existence), but 'what one is' (essence) 
and 'who one is' (identity)!' (Collier 1977 p.2). 
The realisation of these Situations, as represented by the threat 
posed by the forthcoming performance, induces real or state anxiety. 
The following chapter will describe the metholologies which will be 
used to analyse these propositions. 
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Footnot!ls 
1. It is reported by Burke and Kleiber (1978) that over one and a half 
million, seven to twelve year olds take part in this junior version 
of adult professional baseball. Much concern has been expressed of 
late as to the long term damage that such a highly organised 
competitive environment can have upon children's physiological and 
psychological development. Torg et al (1972) describe the problem 
as one where: 
"Little Leaguers must compete to make the team, must compete 
to play in each game, and are subjected to intense pressures to win 
by adult coach and spectator" (in Straub 1978 p.204). 
2. The credulous-sceptical debate prope~ was introduced by Morgan (1978), 
as a means of representing· the two points of view, currently held in 
sport personality research, as to the validity of predicting athletic 
success from psychological data. Morgan summarises the debate as 
follows: 
"The credulous psychologist would lead us to believe that 
psychological (personality) data are certainly useful in predicting 
success, whereas the sceptical would argue that psychological data 
are of little or no value whatsoever" (p.218). 
3. Freud proposed that cultural influence upon the development of the 
ego-ideal takes the form of parental interpretations of the 
traditional values and ideals of society. These interpretations are 
then transferred from parent to child; a process which represents the 
introduction of external, or social limitations upon the developing 
ego. Freud also proposes in 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego' (1921) the important part played by the ego-ideal in the 
development of groups. He suggests that groups consist of: 
"A number of individuals who have put one and the same object 
in the place of their ego-ideal and have consequently identified 
themselves with one another in their ego" (p.80). 
In terms of the proposals of this study the values of the sports-
type have replaced parental limitations, and this contagion of object 
identification produces the depersonalised group. 
4. Wylie (1974) points out in her comprehensive review of the method-
ologies used to measure the self-concept the many other terms used 
in the ambit of psychology generally as being synonymous with self-
acceptance. She states that terms such as self satisfaction, self 
acceptance, self-esteem, self-favourability, congruence between self 
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and idea! "are so intertwined and overlapping in the literature that 
the constructs must be discussed as a group" (p.127). In keeping 
with her. proposal and in an attempt to avoid confusion, the concept 
of self-acceptance used in this study represents a generic term under 
which all the other constructs of self-regard are subsumed. 
5. Stephensons 'Q'-sort technique, named after the English psychologist 
William Stephenson, consists of a subject being given a number of 
cards containing personality descriptive items. The subject is 
instructed to sort these items into ,line piles which are arranged 
along a continuum according to the degree with which the item is thought 
to correspond with S's idea of self: Most like me being nine, least 
like me, one. The S is also forced by the instructions to place a 
specified number of cards onto each pile, so as to yield a quasi-
normal distribution. The test is then repeated with the S arranging 
the items according to the degree with which they are characteristiC 
of his ideal self. The results of the two sorts can then be correlated 
and a coefficeint, representing the S level of self acceptance, obtained. 
For a more detailed analysis of the Q-sort see Wylie (.1974) ps.128 -
150, and for a more complete description of its use within Rogerian 
non-directive therapy see Hall and Lindsay (1970), pgs.538-543, and 
Rogers (1965), pgs.140-141. . 
6. Rogers comments that in many cases self-rejection, 
caused by a discrepancy in self-ideal self perceptio~ can be reduced 
not by moving the self c<loser to the ideal, but by r·estructuring the 
ideal so that it is a more realistic, attainable v~lue system • 
. 
7. Child (1970), defines a factor as being 'the out~ome of discovering a 
a group of variables having a certain characteristic in common' (p.13). 
This factor or characteristic is the result of a statistical analysis 
. which initially correlates all the variables under scrutiny with one 
another; and then extracts the underlying c'.imensions or factors from 
the correlation matrix. In essence this sec~ndary procedure discovers 
how best to reduce the number of correlations to a much smaller amount 
by selecting those clusters of items which, as indicated by the size 
and direction of the coefficient, are closely related and therefot't! 
measuring the same underlying characteristic. Second order factors, 
such as Cattell's factor of anxiety, is the result of a specific 
factorial technique termed·oblique analysis. As this presupposes 
that the variable correlations are not independent a new matrix can 
be generated by inter-correlation of the first order factors, and a 
second analysis carried out. The factors produced by this method are 
termed second order factors. One result of this method is that the 
number of factors is reduced. For example Cattell's 23 first order 
factors .. were inter-correlated and several second order factors 
emerged, one of which was anxiety. This second order factor of 
anxiety was reported as having high loadings on the first order factors 
of weak egc strength (C); timid (H), suspicious (L); guilt prone (0), 
low self sentiment (Q3); and tense (Q4). (for a more comprehensive 
description as to the statistical technique of factor analysis see 
Child 1970). 
QIAmB 3 
Research ~ethodolggy: 
l.eary's ltiterpei'sorialJ2iagnosis of .Personality; 
SPielberger eLal's State l'rait Anxiety.IhyentorY. 
In order to analyse the relationship between individual praxis 
represented by the self-schema, anxiety, and the influence of the 
bonded group process, it is necessary to gain access to the phenomenal 
perceptions of the athlete whilst performing or anticipating 
performance. The method favoured with which to achieve this objective 
is to use psychometric self-report questionnaires, as the athletes' 
responses to questions about himself can be empirically analysed and 
interpreted in terms of the theoretical propositions discussed 
previously. Two such methodologies were chosen; La Forge and Suczeks 
(1955), 'Interpersonal Check List' (known as the ICL), which is a 
methodological representation of Leary's interpersonal theory of 
personality; and Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene's (1970) 'State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory' (known as the STAI), ~he chOice being based 
upon the theoretical complementarity and interpersonal orientation, as 
is illustrated by the following statements: 
"Personality is the multilevel pattern of interpersonal responses 
(overt, conscious, or private) expressed by the individual. Interpersonal 
behaviour is aimed at reducing anxiety. All the SOCial, emotional, 
interpersonal activities of an individual can be understood as attempts 
to avoid anxiety or to establish and maintain self-esteem" (Leary 1957 
pgs. 15-16). 
Similarly, but streSSing the affective response rather than the 
personality disposition: 
"the STAI ••••• assess(es) primarily ego-threat or interpersonal 
trait anxiety ••••••.. interpersonal or ego-threatening conditions or 
situations interact with congruent interpersonal A-trait to evoke 
differential A-State changes." (Endler 1980 p.259) 
It is apparent therefore that, although the theoretical method-
ologies differ in the implicit or latent function to which they attribute 
either anxiety (Leary), or interpersonal relationships (Spielberger et al), 
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used in conjunction there is a stimulus-response congruence between the 
interpersonal perceptions of self within the sports environment ( as 
measured by the ICL), and the affective response to these perceptions 
with general or situation specific interpersonal anxiety (as measured 
by the STAI). It is possible therefore to transpose Smith's model (1980), 
which linked cognition and affec~ by positing the self as an intermediary 
influence (see the previous chapter), onto the contents of the two 
questionnaires. The object of the remainder of this chapter will be to 
describe this project in more detail by; (a) introducing the reader 
to the theoretical methodologies of the two questionnaires; a process 
which will also include a report as to their construct validity and 
reliability; and (b) by describing, .and obviously justifying the 
adaptations to the questionnaires' internal structures; the result of a 
pilot-study, and also to accord with the developments which have taken 
place in trait psychology since the two were formulated. 
1. The InterQersoDal Chec~ List 
The development of the ICL, like many other psychometric techniques, 
came out of the need to match a theory of personality, in this case 
Leary's interpersonal theory, with a method for quantifying the variables 
specified by the theory. Consequently, prior to discussing the specific 
properties of La Forge and Suc:zeck's adjectival check list, Leary' s 
parent theory, to which it belongs, will be described in some detail. 
Leary's interpersonal personality system is based upon the 
psychologism that man is a uniquely social being who is constantly 
involved in interactions with either real, fantasised or imaginary 
others; the type of interpersonal transaction being delineated by the 
necessity to avoid anxiety and to maintain or enhance one's self-
esteem. Leary was therefore critical of much 'of the traditional concept-
ualisation in psychology and the nomenclature of psychiatry for its 
solipsistic bias, and he cogently argues that in removing'aperson's 
behaviour from its interpersonal environment psychology renders its mean-
ing unintelligible. He maintains that as a consequence his objective 
is to the task: 
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"of understanding and predicting the subjects interpersonal 
behaviour in one specific environmental context - its relationship to 
a psychiatric clinic." (1957, p.6). 
As it is not the object of this thesis to 'diagnose' the 
stability, flexibility or appropriateness of an individual's inter-
personal personality disposition, much of Leary's initial theoretical 
discourse, which was aimed at producing a classification of normal and 
abnormal behaviour,is beyond the scope of this thesis. As such the 
description below will concentrate specifically upon the development of the 
interpersonal 'circumplex' (for further discussion of Leary's nosological 
formulations see pages 3 to 58 of the original text, (Leary 1957), although 
a more detailed assessment of this particular dimension of the personality 
system will also be considered when the administrative and interpnetive 
changes to the ICL are reviewed). 
In general terms,·Leary's theoretical formulations were heavily 
influenced by the work of other interpersonal theorists, particularly 
the so-called neo-Freudians. Thus the developmental theories of 
Erik Erikson (1950) and the 'character' studies of Harry Sullivan 
(1953) each contribute to the personality system. Indeed using the 
proposals and research findings of the above clinicians as a theoretical 
guide, Leary' proposed nine 'working principles' which, when taken 
together, would form "the basic requirements of an adequate science of 
personality", (ibid p.59). The fundamental postulate, and first 
'working principle' being his definition of personality: 
"Personality is the multilevel pattern of interpersonal 
responses ••• ••• Interpersonal behaviour is aimed at reducing anxiety" 
(ibid p.59). 
The remaining eight sketched the criteria by which he could affect 
a working model of this definition. These included accounting for the 
'multilevel' nature of personality; a scale or methodology which could 
account for the effect the interpersonal perceptions of self have upon 
the other with whom (s)he interacts; construction of a continuum of 
interpersonal behaviour; and that all measurements must be public and 
verifiable. 
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To achieve an integrated system based upon these 'principles' Leary 
systemised his interpersonal theory by defining, as the basic datum of 
personality, the: 
"communications by the subject or by others about his interpersonal 
activity. The basic units of personality come from the protocol 
language by which the subject's interpersonal behaviour is described," 
(p.34). 
Once the 'machinery' of personality had been defined Leary and his 
co-workers at the Kaiser Foundation observed, recorded and studied the 
interpersonal interactions of many small groups; male, female, neurotic, 
psychosomatic and normal. This mass of verbal raw data was then analysed 
with a view to describing and summarising the interpersonal activity 
under scrutiny. In the course of rating these verbal transactions 
it was noted that transitive verbs which predicate action i.e. insult, 
dominate or help, were the handiest method for describing what the 
subjects did to each other. Conversely, and of importance to this 
study, adjectives were found to be suitable for rating the content of 
the spoken descriptions of self. Thus a relationship between different 
expressions of personality could be made on the basis of a linguistic 
procedure; what you actually do in a situation is described by a verb; 
what you say about yourself in that situation by an adjective. Once 
this specification had been made the task facing Leary was to reduce 
an unwieldy and seemingly disparate "list of several hundred terms for 
describing interpersonal behaviour" (p.63) into their generic inter-
personal motives. This was achieved by putting together grammatically 
similar terms until all 'several hundred' were subsumed under a list 
of sixteen interpersonal motives. These, along with their alphabetical 
notations are listed below: 
A: Managerial P: Autocratic 
B: Competitive C: Narcississtic 
D: Aggressive E: Sadistic 
F: Rebellious G: Distasteful 
H: Self-Effacing I: Masochistic 
J: Docile K: Dependent 
L: Cooperative M: Overconventional 
N: Responsible 0: Hypernormal 
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It was then necessary to order these sixteen generic themes along 
a continuum and it was decided that a two-dimensional grid or circumplex 
allowed Leary to imply a systematic relationship between the variables, 
and thus account not only for the generic theme which summarises the 
interpersonal disposition of self, but also the 'pull' or effect that this 
disposition has upon the Other. Leary describes this systematic 
relationship as: 
"If we rate any behaviour as C, we have defined it in terms of all 
the other variables since C is one unit away from (and therefore close 
to) D and B, while it is eight units (and therefore quite different) 
from K." (ibid p.66). 
Empirical support for this relationship between the sixteen variables 
have been provided by the intercorrelational studies of both Naboisek (1953) 
and Lorr and McNair (1963) 1. 
The 'pull' or effect of an individual's interpersonal disposition 
has been described by Leary in terms of a probability statement: 
"Interpersonal reflexes tend (with a probability significantly 
greater than chance) to initiate or invite reciprocal interpersonal 
responses from the 'other' person in the interaction." (op cit p.123) 
A simple yet accurate illustration (if somewhat extreme), would be 
that masochistic interpersonal behaviour (I) pulls a sadistic inter-
personal response (E), from the other. <A more detailed description of 
these reciprocal relationships will be given in the review of each 
generic theme below). 
Once the sixteen variables had been ordered around the circumplex 
it was discovered that all the generic trends had some reference to a 
power or affiliative factor. Therefore a further degree of conceptual 
specificity could be obtained by bisecting the circumplex horizontally 
and vertically in terms of these two factors. Leary explains the process: 
"When dominance-submission is taken as the vertical axis and 
hostility-affection as the horizontal all the other generic inter-
personal themes could2be expressed as combination of these four 
nodal points." (p.64) • 
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A further modification was to combine adjacent themes, thus 
reducing the sixteen interpersonal variables into eight 'octants'; 
therefore the managerial and autocratic themes were joined to form a 
'power' octant, and this combination process was completed for each of 
the sixteen generic themes. Figure 1 overleaf illustrates the completed 
circumplex with octants, nodal points and the 'pull' which the inter-
personal reflex has upon 'the other', marked. 
Finally before discussing the I.C.L. and its relationship to Leary's 
personality system, the properties of the eight generic interpersonal 
themes will be described as they will provide summary descriptions 
of the experimental samples' interpersonal perceptions of self. 
1. Octant _~; .. ~agerial-Autocratic3: 
Leary describes those whose interpersonal perceptions of self are 
summarised by the AP octant as being individuals: 
"who express strength, force, energy and leadership, and who 
win from others respect, approbation, and deference" (p.323). 
He contends that there are many ways in which this 'power' can be 
manifested and he proposes that physical strength, particularly 
with the male, is a means of winning respect from other& An 
interesting factor when transposed onto the male sports environment. 
The more extreme forms of this power-oriented personality 
are characterised by autocratic, domineering behaviour. However, 
both moderate and extreme characterisations have the same motive; 
the avoidance of anxiety: 
"The (managerial-autocratic) individual is, we assume, made 
most anxious when he feels uncertain, confused or passive. He 
attempts to maintain security and self-esteem by means of his 
power-oriented operations" (p.325). 
The effect of this type of interpersonal disposition, using the 
'language' of the circumplex,is that AP pulls IJ, ~ee page 
65 above for all alphbetical notations)., or. power. and control 
provokes obedience and respect: 
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The outer circle of the circumplex shows the eight generic inter-
personal octants; the innermost their alphabetical notation. The middle 
ring indicates the type of behaviour that the interpersonal reflex 
tends to 'pull' from the other one. 
AP 
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However, as Leary comments the principle of reciprocal interpersonal 
relations is a probability statement. Therefore, it can, of course, 
be altered by the personality of the other, such that a managerial 
personality interacting with another who uses the same inter-
personal reflex "may generate a power struggle" (p.325). 
2. Octant BC; __ Compet;i.1;iYe-tIlgrciss:).stic: 
The BC interpersonal reflex communicates the message of superiority, 
independence and confidence. Consequently the individual whose 
self-perceptions are subsumed by this generic theme are most 
secure when they are independent and feeling that they are 
triumphing over other people. 
The position of the BC octant, adjacent to AP, suggests that 
the two are to some degree similar, the basic difference between 
them being in the "amount of positive or affiliative affect 
involved", (p. 333). As we have seen above the managerial person 
'trains' others to identify with his strength, and he or she gives 
the impression that this strength will be used to help the other. 
Conversely the narcissistic person tends to emphasise his superior 
difference from the other and gives the impression that his strength 
will be used to shame or humiliate the "other" (L?ary). The more 
extreme form of this interpersonal theme is marked by an almost 
compulsive desire for superiority: "He is driven to compete, 
exhibit and exploit" (p. 334). 
The BC personality is made most anxious by the threat of 
weakness or dependence; for them a humiliating and dangerous 
position. The effect of this behaviour provokes envy, distrust 
and feelings of inferiority from others. In the language of the 
circumplex BC pulls GHIJ: 
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As with AP this reciprocal interaction is a probability statement 
and as such a generalisation dependent upon the interpersonal 
reflex of the other, although Leary states that the 'pull' of BC 
"will be found to work in most cases." (p.334) 
The interpersonal reflex summarised by the DE octant represents 
those individuals whose personality dispositions stress cold, 
stern, punitive or sadistic tendencies. Leary, comments that a 
great majority of aggressive characters are to be found in the 
ranks of the socially approved; stern toughness being frequently 
admired and endorsed as being indicative of positive, social 
adjustment. It has certainly contributed to the mythical personality 
of the athletic sports-type (see the review of the work of the 
trait theorists in chapters 1 and 2). 
However, it must be noted that the 'aggression' characterised 
by this octant is not concerned solely with physical aggression 
(although this of course must be taken into account). Hostile 
critiCism, verbal derogation or insult are all subsumed under the 
generic,interpersonal theme. It is evident therefore that the DE 
personality is most secure when "flexing his muscles" or "expressing 
stern coldness." Conversely, he is made most insecure and anxious 
in situations which pull for tender, agreeable or docile feelings. 
The 'effect' of DE behaviour is to provoke resentment, distrust, 
fear and also guilt from the other. In the language of the 
circumplex DE pulls FGH. 
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Leary notes that the exception to this 'probablistic' rule being 
in the case of a sado-masochistic or crime-punishment relationship. 
4. Octaot EG; RebelliQ~s~Distr~strul: 
The rebellious-distrustful personality type eschews close 
relationships with others and manifests instead an interpersonal 
reflex centred around distrust and resentment. In a moderate form 
the F'G octant is associated with "a critical approach to the accepted 
conventions and to the accepted forms of social relationship" (p.269); 
its extreme by marked suspicion and an uncompromising rejection 
of "authority" (Carson 1969). As with the other octants this 
"security operation" is maintained so as to avoid anxiety. Leary 
proposes that trustful tender feelings tend to provoke anxious feelings 
of insecurity. 
The effect of F'G behaviour is to provoke resentment and 
superiority form others; In the language of the circumplex Fe pulls 
BCD. 
D 
5. Octant tlI+ S~l(-~((acing-MasQchistic: 
This submissive interpersonal reflex tends to communicate a 
message of obedience, self-consciousness and modesty to the 'other'. 
And it is by the process of self-depreciation that these individuals 
avoid anxiety and maintain security. In its more extreme form this 
behaviour involves an almost masochistic self-rejection. 
The effect of the HI reflex is to provoke depreciation and 
patronising superiority from others; HI pulls BC and DE. However 
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self-derogation can sometimes provoke sympathy "but if the guilt 
reflex does not shift in response to this positive reaction, the 
"other one" will inevitably respond with irritation and disapproval" 
(i.eary p. 285). 
DE 
HI 
6. OctanL JK.;. DocHS!"DS!pendent: 
The JK interpersonal theme is one of trusting and respectful 
conformity. Like HI above the behaviour is primarily submissive 
but it includes a degree of friendliness and affiliation, rather 
than self-derogation and apologetic conformity. In its more extreme 
form this reflex is characterised by cloying, helpless dependency. 
The JK individual is, as a consequence, made most anxious by the 
threat of independence or when called upon to make decisions. 
The effect of docility pulls strong, helpful leadership from 
others; thus JK pulls AP and NO. Although if the 'personality' of 
the other stresses a punitive interpersonal reflex (DE), the 
dependent individual may meet with stern disapproval, (Leary). 
AP 
.TK 
7. OctanLU1; COQperati ve-QyercQnventional: 
The motive behind this interpersonal reflex is to be liked and 
accepted by 'others'. Thus the LM personality "tends to seek 
satisfaction in sociability with others" (p.303). They emphasise 
cooperation and compromise; external harmony being more important 
than internal values. Social anxiety is mediated by an emphasis 
upon friendly, amicable responses. 
The non extreme form of this behaviour is characterised by the 
overwhelming desire to be seen to accept external values and to gain 
o 
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the approval of others. 
The effect of 'friendly-agreeability' is to provoke approval 
and friendliness from others. In systematic language LM 'pulls' 
MN. 
8. Octant NO-,_BesPoDsible::HYQernQrIlI?l: 
The NO individual attempts to present himself as a 'normal' person. 
A characteristic brought about by an emphasis upon 'strength' in 
interpersonal relationships. However, unlike A~ and in particular 
BC, the other octants which stress this generic theme, this 
'strength' is used in an affiliative way; power and independent 
self-confidence are used as methods by which to help, counsel or 
support others. The more extreme or 'hypernormal' form of this 
behaviour is marked by the overwhelming need to be popular, helpful 
and responsible, irrespective of the interpersonal 'needs' of the 
situation. The NO individual is: 
"we assume, most threatened by the prospect of appearing 
defeated, deprived, unfriendly, or passive." (316) 
The effect of responSible, protective behaviour is to provoke 
others to dependence and respect; or NO pulls KL. However, as 
Leary has been at pains to point out, this reciprocal interaction 
is dependent upon the interpersonal 'reflex' of the other, and, 
particularly in the case of the more extreme NO individual, the 
appropriateness of the reflex to a specific interpersonal situation. 
7'4. 
At the beginning of this particular section the I.C.L. was introduced 
as the methodology with the specific purpose of 'quantifying the variables' 
specified by Leary's interpersonal theory of personality. As such its 
description was deferred until the reader was made familiar with the 
circumplex and the "variables", or more accurately the eight generic 
interpersonal themes, which make up its circumference. The following 
discussion will describe how these theoretical parameters, imposed 
by the demands inherent in the circumplex, were to delineate the 
construction of the check list. 
It will be remembered from the above that the first of Leary's 
working principles conceptualised personality as a 'multilevel' 
construct. T·he I.C.L. was specifically developed to allow qualification 
of three of those 'levels', tw04 of which are of importance to this 
study: The kind of conscious communication (rIC), which concerns the 
phenomenal self-perceptions of the subject; and the level of values (IC), 
which is concerned with the "consciously reported ideals" (I..eary) of 
the subject (the C-affix denoting the 'measurement' of the level by 
use of the check list: see Leary 1957). 
La Forge and S~zek's (1955) objectives in constructing a questionnaire 
sensitive to the above levels of a subject's personality, was to 
develop a check list whose content would be representative of each one 
of Leary's sixteen hypothetical variables of interpersonal behaviour. 
Moreover, a further structural consideration was that since the check 
list was to follow 'ideographic procedures,5(I..eary) and so avoid 
'untestable scaling assumptions' (p.457), the selection of each inter-
personal adjective 'became of crucial importance'. The overall 
development of the I.C.L. took over four years to complete and included 
four revisions. The initial source of items for the check list was 
prepared by Suczek and it was comprised of 334 adjectives which were 
representative of trait lists extant in the psychological literature 
upto the 1950's. This comprehensive but unwieldy list was reduced to 
106 items on the basis of the pooled judgements of five psychologists. 
Subsequent revisions centered upon the issue of item reliability and 
validity and the researchers noted the effect of certain extraneous 
variables6: 
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"among these are the misunderstanding and failure to recognise the 
meaning of a word" (Leary 1957 p.459). 
In order to correct this source of contamination the words which 
made up the check list were checked by the patient culture at whom the 
questionnaire was aimed. The result was that. many words: "like 
discriminating, conciliatol"Y" (ibid p.459) were discarded because they 
were unintelligible to large numbers of the patients. However, perhaps, 
the most comprehensive revision was conducted upon 'Fol"ffi IIIb'. A 
series of intercorrelations were carried out to test the relationship 
between each item regarding the systematic relationship, proposed by 
Leary, between the octants: 
"a good item was characterised by high correlations with 
neighbouring items and low correlations with items more distant on the 
circle of variables" (ibid p.460). 
Leary reports that approximately 6,000 item intercorrelations 
were examined, and that replacements were made for items with a poor 
pattern of results. The remaining words were then re-checked by a 
gl"oup of five psychologists with respect to interpersonal category, 
comprehensibility and over-all desirability. Each word was then re-
checked by a conference of from foul" to six psychologists and the remaining 
satisfactory 01" modified words, formed the core of the new form of the 
check list Fol"ffi IV. 
During this period of revision the check list was administered to 
several thousand subjects. The principal use was as part of an 
evaluation procedure for incoming patients to the psychiatric clinic. 
However, other samples included several hundred university students; 
a group of dermatitis patients; and a group of 200 overweight women. 
The data used in the revision of the check list was derived from these 
samples, and the corrected list, Form IV, based upon this data is 
presented overleaf. 
The check list used in this thesis,.Fol"ffi IV, is comprised of 
128 items; eight for each of the sixteen interpersonal variables. When 
the form has been completed the raw data has to be converted, via a 
statistical process, into a 'summary' of the subjects' interpersonal 
perceptions; this procedure will be described below. 
( 
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TABLE_ 1: THE INTERPE;!lSQNAl.. __ CHECK LIST .. FOBM IV (La Forge and Suczek) 
Oct;u:lt; J;. M). ~erial-:AutQcr:'at:i.c 
A: Well thought of 
Makes a good impression 
Often admired 
Respected by others 
Always giving advice 
Acts important 
Tries to be too successful 
Expects everyone to admire him 
Oct;u:lt 2: ... BC,. Competi1;;i. ve:::N"'r:'c;i.ssistic 
B: Able to take care of self 
Can be indifferent to others 
Businesslike 
Likes to compete with others 
Thinks only of himself 
Shrewd and calculating 
Selfish 
Cold and unfeeling 
D: Can be frank and honest 
Critical of others 
Irritable 
Straightforward and direct 
Outspoken 
Often unfriendly 
Frequently angry 
Hard-hearted 
F: Can complain if necessary 
Often gloomy 
Resents being bossed 
Skeptical 
Bitter 
Complaining 
Resentful 
Rebels against everything 
P: Able to give orders 
Forceful 
Good leader 
Likes responsibility 
Bossy 
DOminating 
Manages others 
Dictatorial 
C: Self-respecting 
Independent 
Self-confident 
Self-reliant and assertive 
Boastful 
Proud and self-satisfied 
Somewhat snobbish 
Egotistical and conceited 
E: Can be strict if necessary 
Firm but just 
Hardboiled when necessary 
Stern but fair 
Impatient with others' mistakes 
Self-seeking 
Sarcastic 
Cruel and unkind 
G: Able to doubt others 
Frequently disappointed 
Hard to impress 
Touchy and easily hurt 
Jealous 
Slow to forgive a wrong 
Stubborn 
Distrust everybody 
H: Can be obedient 
Usually gives in 
Easily led 
Modest 
Passive and unaggressive 
Meek 
Obeys too willingly 
Spineless 
J: Appreciative 
Very anxious to be approved of 
Accepts advice readily 
Trusting and eager to please 
Lets others make decisions 
Easily fooled 
Likes to be taken care of 
Will believe anyone 
I: Able to criticise self 
Apologetic 
Easily embarrassed 
Lacks self-confidence 
Self-punishing 
Shy 
Timid 
Always ashamed of self 
K: Grateful 
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Admires and imitates others 
Often helped by others 
Very respectful to authority 
Dependent 
Wants to be led 
Hardly ever talks back 
Clinging vine. 
Qctant __ 1: __ U1. __ C09P~r<t ti v~::OverQonyent;j.onal 
L: Cooperative 
Eager to get along with others 
Always pleasant and agreeable 
Wants everyone to like him 
Too easily influenced by friends 
Will confide in anyone 
Wants everyone's love 
Agrees with everyone 
Octqnt __ 8: NO ,._ ResponsibJ-~-Hypernonnal 
N: Helpful 
Big-hearted and unselfish 
Enjoys taking care of others 
Gives freely of self 
Generous to a fault 
Overprotective of others 
Too willing to give to others 
Spoils people with kindness 
M: Friendly 
Affectionate and understanding 
Sociable and neighbourly 
Warm 
Fond of everyone 
Likes everybody 
Friendly all the time 
Loves everyone 
0: Considerate 
Encouraging others 
Kind and reassuring 
Tender and soft-hearted 
Forgives anything 
Oversympathetic 
Too lenient with others 
Tries to comfort everyone 
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The interpersonal circumplex is in essence a mathematical represent-
ation in two dimensional space; these dimensions being characterised 
by Dominance, situated at the AP octant, and Lov situated at LM. 
Consequently, using the results from the check 
self perceptions can be summarised in 
list, 
terms 
a person's 
of these two interpersonal 
oodal points. 
formula:-
This interpersonal vector is found using the following 
Dom = AP - HI + ·7(NO + BC - FG - JK) 
Lov = LM - DE + '7(NO - BC - FG + JK) 
Where AP equals the number of items from the check list belonging to 
category AP which are checked by the subject as describing his self; this 
'process' is continued until all the items are summed with respect to 
their generic interpersonal themes. The two indicies given by these 
formulae are then converted into standard scores using norms published 
by the Kaiser Foundation, (see Leary p. 495). These scores are then 
plotted onto the interpersonal grid, their intersection 'summarising' 
the subject's interpersonal perceptions in terms of one of the eight 
generic themes. The distance this point is from the centre, or mean 
of the Circle, representing the 'intensity' of the particular interpersonal 
trait. The use of an 'intensity' dimension allows a more specific 
conceptualisation of the subject's interpersonal perceptions as it 
differentiates between the moderate and extreme interpersonal theme~' 
combined in each octant. The 'limit' between these two 'scales' being 
calibrated by a circle whose circumference is one standard deviation 
away from the mean or centre of the circumplex, (the mean or centre was 
a figure determined by Leary from a clinic sample of 800 cases). 
Therefore, if the summary point falls below this limit it denotes a 
moderate form of the interpersonal theme, if above a more extreme 
form. For example if a subject's summary point falls in the AP octant 
below the one standard deviation parameter then he would be described 
as having a moderate managerial self perception. Figure 2 overleaf 
illustrates the calibration of the interpersonal grid and the positions 
of the different intensities of the generic interpersonal themes. 
'ii' 
~ 
~ 
> 
HATE ;;; .. 
~ I. 
« 
.. 
.. 
HOSTILE 
WEAKNESS [ 
F~ ~Ihe-DiagoQstic Grid (Leary 1957) 
DOMINANCE 
p 
.... 
0 
, 
E N\ 
\ 
I. 10 L I 70 8. 
\ F I M 
\ :r / H 
G .... 
-
, 
t K 
SUBMISSION 
FA.IINDLY 
STMNc.TH 
79. 
LOVE 
} 
FRIENDLY 
WEAl<.I'<IESS 
The letters within the inner dashed circle represent the moderate 
interpersonal themes, those within the outer portions of the circumplex, 
above one standard deviation, the more extreme themes. The calibrations 
on the two axes are used in conjunction with the standard scores to 
locate a subject's summary po~nt. 
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This method of summarising an individual's self perceptions in the 
form of a single point also allows comparisons to be made between the 
different 'levels' of personality measured. One of the aims of this 
thesis which was established in chapters one and two, is to analyse the 
kind of relationship which exists between the different self perceptions; 
self, not-self and ideal self. With regard to establishing, empirically, 
their degree of similarity or conflict, acceptance or rejection, Leary 
contends that this type of analysis is concerned with the 'structural 
variability' of the personality system and he, along with his co-
workers at the Kaiser Foundation, formulated a methodology with which 
to measure a person's perceptual variance. 
One such method involved measuring the linear distance between the 
different 'summary scores' in centimetres: 
"This had the advantage of directness and simplicity. It had the 
overweighing disadvantage of doing violence to the concept of the 
circle" (Leary p. 257). 
Instead, a more improved and sophisticated method was formulated by 
using the development of the numerical code system which Leary assigned 
to each octant, and which accounted for the differences in intensity: 
A = 1; P = I; B = 2; C = 11 and so on (see diagram on the previous 
page). Consequently, in using the numerical code system every score 
falling in the same intensity sector of an octant is assigned the same 
code. Borrowing from this method an attempt was made by Leary et al to 
establish a set of points on the circle which would represent the eight 
octants at two intensity levels; a total of sixteen points. Therefore 
assessing a person's perceptual discrepancy is simplified as the 
. position of his summary scores within any octant is considered to fall 
always at one point. Again the standard deviation unit described above 
was used to calibrate the different interpersonal intensities, and using 
a series of geometriC formulae7 these sixteen reference points were 
established. The standardised discrepancies generated by this method 
are illustrated in Table 2 below. 
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PAIR DISCREPANCY 
A-A;- P-P 00 
A-P; P-A 23 
A-B 26 
A-C; P-B 41 
P-C 44 
A-D 48 
A-F 62 
A-E; P-D 66 
A-H 68 
P-E 81 
A-G; P-F 84 
A-I; P-H 91 
P-G 105 
P-I 114 
(Leary 1957) 
Of course the above represents only a small proportion of all the 
possible interpersonal combinations and the Kaiser Foundation provides 
a table of weighted discrepancy scores with which to assess intra-
level variance (see Leary pgs;' 498-499). 
Research which has used the check list and Leary's interpersonal 
personality system can be summarised by placing it into two distinct 
areas; that ,concerned with their reliability and validity; and that 
which has emphasised the relationship between the generic themes, anxiety 
and discrepancies within the self-system. 
One of the most important issues regarding both the structure of 
the check list and the circumplex, is that of the proposed systematic 
relationship which exists between the eight generic interpersonal themes; 
i.e. adjacent octants on the circular continuum are more closely 
related than non-adjacent. Using results obtained from the ICL, La Forge 
and Suczek report that the relationship between the octants is a 
"monotonic decreasing function of their separation around the circle" 
(Leary p. 462). This relationship is illustrated in Table 3 below. 
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TABLE 3 
Octant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
AP 
BC 56 
DE 32 46 
FG 05 12 54 
HI -30 -31 -10 36 
JK 00 -21 -14 18 60 
LM 10 -09 -31 -27 21 44 
NO 12 -15 -06 -08 23 34 46 
(Decimal points omitted: From a sample of 200 neurotics (Leary 1957)) 
Further support for this circular ordering of personality variables 
has been provided by Stern (1958), Campbell (1959) and Lorr and MCNair(1963). 
Similarly, work conducted by Foa (1961), and Wiggins (1961; has 
confirmed, using factorial techniques, the 'Dom' 
of the circumplex. Wiggins reported that AP, BC 
and 'Lov' dimensions 
positive loading with dominance, HI 
NO all had positive loadings on the 
and DE had 
a negative loading; HI, 
a significant 
JK, LM and 
'Lov' interpersonal orientation; 
and finally that BC,DE, and FG loaded positively on the 'hate' pole of 
the circumplex (see Hamilton 1971). Test-retest reliability using the 
ICL is reported by La Forge and Suczek as being between . 73 for 
sixteenth reliability, and .78 for octant reliability. Similarly, 
Armstrong (1958) notes internal consistency coefficients of .95 and ·96 
for the self-ratings of normal and alcoholic subjects, (should the reader 
wish to supplement what is, of necessity, a brief review of the reliability 
of this methodology he or she should refer to the 6th 'Mental Measurement 
Yearbook' pages 1072-1073 and 1256-1258; and Wylie 1974 pages 213-223). 
The second area of research has concentrated upon the psychological 
referents, both cognitive and affective, which appear to be associated 
with.the generic interpersonal themes, The results of which can be 
summarised in terms of the octants relationship to the two axes of 
dominance-submission and love-hate. Using clinical observation, the 
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study of completed self-reports and also the relationship between the 
octants and certain scales on the M.M.P.I. (Minnesotta Mul.tiphasic 
Personality Inventory), Leary found that those themes toward the base 
of the vertical 'Dom' axis were all, to some degree, associated with 
anxiety. He states that self-effacing-masochistic individuals are 
"overtly anxious... They exhibit guilt and self-depreciation" (p. 286). 
Similarly JK, the docile-dependent octant is reported to be connected 
with anxiety neurosis, anxiety hysteria8 and neuresthenia.(Gottesfeld 
(1979) suggests that neuresthenia is 'no longer recognised or treated', 
and that the nervous debility or weakness symptomatic of the term is 
now embraced by the ambit of depression). The JK theme has also been 
found by the Kaiser Foundation to correlate with the anxious (D), 
worried and fearful (PE) scales of the M.M.P.I. The final point of what 
is an interpersonal triad is completed by a : 
"generalised 'nervousness' or anxiety vaguely defined and not 
tied to emotional causes" (Leary p. 301). 
Leary reports that 'cooperative' patients frequently describe 
themselves as tense, nervous and anxious. Conversely, the octants 
toward the apex of the 'Dom' axis have been found to have an inverse 
relationship with anxiety, and to be characteristic of a much more 
positive, accepting attitude toward self. Brown (1963) using 77 
undergraduates, found an inverse condition of-.44 between 'Dominance,' 
as measured on the circumplex,and anxiety, '0 result which corresponds 
to the factor loadings reported by Wiggins above. Indeed Leary 
reports that a psychometric sign characteristic of the competitive-
narcissistic personality is a low level of anxiety (as measured 
by the (D) scale of the M.M.P.I.) The relationship between perceived 
self-satisfaction (ideal self) and power or dominance, has been 
confirmed by the empirical findings of the Kaiser Foundation research. 
In a sample of 207 routine clinic intake patients who had completed 
the check list, 5~k placed their ego-ideal in the AP managerial octant, 
and 37% in NO the 'responsible' octant. In total this meant that 
9~k of all these patients had ego-ideals in the upper right-hand 
quadrant (denoting a concern with 'friendly strength'), and less than 
~k placed their ideal in the lower half of the circumplex (Leary p. 205). 
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Indeed Leary notes that the self-effacing sector of the circle 
"is the farthest removed from the standard ego-ideal of our culture" (p,286) 
which, when combined with an ego-ideal "invariably located in the 
opposite sectors" (p. 287) produces cognitions based upon inferiority, 
guilt and self-depreciation. I.n essence the force of the self-punitive 
ego rejects and demeans the self (Leary). Conversely, there is little 
or no conscious structural variance at the apex of the 'Dom' axis: 
"Managerial personalities •••••• are closely identified with their ego-
ideals" (p. 329). The relationship between the degree of structural 
variability and anxiety has been reported by Smith and Edwards (1963) 
who noted a significant correlation between self acceptance and anxiety 
(p<.001), and Brown who found that the greater the discrepancy between 
the self and ideal self the more anxious were the subjects (p<.001). 
The review so far has summarised the properties of the eight 
generic interpersonal themes in terms of their proximity to the 
vertical and horizontal axes of 'Dom' and 'Lov'. However, there is a 
third axis which although not as influential in Leary's theorising as 
the two above, will be of use in assessing the importance attached by 
the athletes to the construct of conformity. The points of the 
conformity-nonconformity axis are measured by, at the apex, L, M and 
N, and opposed at the base by FG. Leary comments that: 
"The individuals whose overt operations emphasise non-conformity •••• 
invariably isolate and alienate themselves from others" (p. 273). 
Conversely, the interpersonal 'operations' emphasised by the themes of 
L, M and N are all concerned with cooperation, consideration and helping 
others. 
As can be seen from the above, much of Leary's theoretical concern 
is with accounting for the effect that a particular interpersonal 
orientation has upon the other or others in the transaction. Unfortunately 
the reliability of his proposed patterns of reciprocal relations are 
based, as he describe~upon a probability statement, and as no 
empirical evidence is available to support these contentions the 
confidence which one can have in the response of the other is severely 
limited, (the way in which this has affected the interpretation of my 
results will be considered in the final section of this chapter). 
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However the work of Uriel Foa (1961), already cited in chapter 2 and in 
the above, elaborated upon Leary's theory of reciprocity by 
specifying not the response of the other, which as we have seen, is 
subject to the problems of reliable empirical verification, but the 
motive behind the particular interpersonal orientation held by the 
self toward the other(s). 
Foa has suggested that an interpersonal act is an attempt to 
establish the emotional relationship of the actor toward himself and 
toward the other. He argues therefore that the content of any act: 
"serves the purpose of giving or denying love and status to the 
self and to the other" (p. 351). 
Transposing this proposal onto the circumplex reveals that embedded 
within the two interpersonal axes' of 'Oom' and 'Lov' there are three 
underlying "facets": (1) The content of the interpersonal act 
(acceptance vs rejection). 
(2) The object of the interpersonal act 
(self vs others). 
(3) The mode of the interpersonal act 
(emotional vs social). 
He goes on to suggest (1965) that an interpersonal act can be represented 
by the product of the interaction of these three facets. The inter-
personal 'products' given by the eight generic themes are illustrated 
below. 
(AP) 
(BC) 
(DE) 
(FG) 
(HI) 
(JK) 
(LM) 
(NO) 
Managerial-Autocratic 
Competitive-Narcissistic 
Aggressive-Sadistic 
Rebellious-Distrustful 
Self-Effacing- Masochistic 
Docile-Dependent 
Cooperative-Overconventional 
Responsible-Hypernormal 
Social acceptance of the other 
Social rejection of the other 
Emotional rejection of the other 
Emotional rejection of the self 
Social rejection of the self 
Social acceptance of the self 
Emotional acceptance of the self 
Emotional acceptance of the other 
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In Foa's terminology, therefore, the eight generic themes convey 
implicit "messages" that give or deny love, or status,to the self or to 
the other (Carson 1969). The 'facet' profiles can be used therefore 
to complement and also to expand upon Leary's notion of interpersonal 
reflexes. 
2. Tbe Stat<;:_Trq.:\,t Anxiety Inventory: 
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory is a methodology based upon 
Spielberger's (1966) theoretical and conceptual extension of Cattell 
and ScheieJS(1958: 1961) factorial classification of anxiety. Both of 
these psychometricians differentiated between anxiety as a relatively 
permanent personality trait, and as a transitory affective state. 
The former referring to the relatively stable difference in individual 
anxiety proneness; the latter referring to a transitory emotional state 
characterised by feelings of tension and apprehension. By using this 
notion of individual differences in affective personality disposition, 
which is inherent in any trait psychology, Spielberger was able to 
propose a relationship between the two affective components based upon-
an indiViduals expectations as to the outcome of a self versus other 
interaction: 
"In general, it would be expected that those who are high in 
A-Trait will exhibit A-State elevations more frequently than low 
A-Trait individuals because they tend to react to a wider range of 
situations as ••••••••• threatening. High A-Trait persons are also more 
likely to respond with increased A-State intensity in situations that 
involve interpersonal relationships which pose some threat to self-
esteem" (Spielberger et al 1970 p.3). 
The psychological rationale behind the above relationship is 
based, Spielberger et al contend, upon trait anxiety having the character-
istics which Campbell (1963) calls "acquired behavioural dispositions", 
and which Atkinson (1964) refers to as "motives". Motives are defined 
as dispositional tendencies which remain latent until the cues of a 
situation activate them; and 'acquired behavioural dispositions' are 
the residues of past experience that predispose an individual to 
cognise reality in a certain way, and to manifest "object-consistent" 
response tendencies. fTherefore in the language of the trait-state 
theory, anxiety as a personality trait implies a 'motive' or 'acquired 
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behavioural disposition' that predisposes an individual to either perceive 
a wide range of objectively non-dangerous situations as threatening 
to self and to respond to these 'threats' with elevated levels of 
A-State; or to perceive a wide range of situations as non-threatening 
to self and manifest consistently low responses of A-State. 
In developing a 'self-evaluation' questionnaire sensitive to the 
above relationship, the objective of Spielberger et al was to construct 
unidimensional scales for the measurement of both trait and state anxiety 
disposition in adults; each item on the trait scale having a high item 
remainder correlation with its state scale partner, along with clear 
evidence of construct validity, (Spielberger, Vagg, Barker, Donharn 
and Westberry 1980). The development of these measurement scales began 
in 1964 and several revisions were made to their original format until Form X, 
which contains the scales used in this thesis, were developed. 
The original form of the questionnaire (Form A), consisted of 177 
items selected from three anxiety scales already in existence; the 
IPAT Anxiety Scale (Cattell and Scheier, 1963), the Taylor (1953) 
Manifest Anxiety Scale, and the Welsh (1956) Anxiety Scale. Item 
selection was based upon the results of a series of inter-correlations 
between the three scales; those items correlating .25 or higher were 
retained and their meaning modified so that they could be placed in 
a single measurement scale. The original idea being that by simply 
changing the administrative instructions A-Trait and A-State could be 
measured on the same scale. Repeated testing of Form A on several 
hundred undergraduate students, and correlation measures with the 
IPAT and TMAS, revealed that both the psycholinguisQc properties of 
some of the items and also their concurrent validity were unreliable, 
and eventually the scale was reduced to only 23 items. It was at this 
pOint,after several test-re test adrninistration~that Spielberger et al 
(1970) questioned the validity of measuring an individual's "trait and state 
anxiety disposition on the same scale. They report that although there 
was a moderately high correlation between the A-State and A-Trait scales: 
"Since the same items were used to measure both A-Trait and A-State, 
this correlation reflected, at least in part, the specific content of 
the individual items" (p.22). 
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Based upon this finding, the tests' authors decided to develop 
a second form of the STAI in which two different scales would be used to 
measure trait and state anxiety. Therefore, the results of any correlations 
between the two could be interpreted as reflecting an individual's 
affective disposition, without fear of contamination from the content 
of the scale's items. The revised format of the STAI, termed Form B, 
consisted of the 20 Form A items given with only A-State instruction, and 
20 new A-Trait items selected from an 'item-pool' after being subject to 
the inter-correlation criterion described above. 
After correlating this new form of the test with others already 
in eXistence9 the final step in the test procedure was to review the 
'offensive' nature of the scale items using high school and college 
populations. Any items reported as being 'offensive' or overtly 
threatening were replaced. The items from the STAI B (revised), and a 
number of possible replacements were then administered to 263 university 
undergraduates; items whose meanings were ambiguous were replaced by 
items comparable in content but worded in a more acceptable manner. The 
revision of the STAI which resulted from this final item-replacement 
process was deSignated Form X (should the reader require a more extensive 
description of the development of the STAI, he or she should refer to 
Spielberger .et aI's (1970) STAI Manual pages 19-22). This finalised form of 
the questionnaire consists of two, twenty item scales. One of which describes 
the symptoms of anxiety ,(state), the other indicating an individual's. 
predisposition toward anxiety(trait). Both scales require the respondent 
to rate him or herself on a Likert-type 4-point scale: The STAr A-Trait 
scale requires the individual to report how he generally feels in 
connection to. the listed items, by checking one of the four categories; 
Almost never; sometimes; often; almost always. The STAI A-State scale 
requires that the respondent report how he feel~at this moment in time, 
by again checking one of the four categories associated with each 
of the twenty statements: Not at all; somewhat; moderately so; very 
much so. The full contents of the STAI and the instructions used for 
their completion in this thesis are illustrated on pages 2-5 of the 
sample questionnaire, in Appendix A. 
In the course of validating the STAI more than 3,000 college 
students were tested on the initial form, Form A, of the questionnaire. 
And a total of over 3,300 high school and college students were tested 
on the most recent revision10 of the STAl, Form·X. In addition, normative 
data were obtained on more than 600 neuropyschiatric and medical patients, 
and for approximately 200 young prisoners (Spielberger et al 1970). 
Since this forms inception,Buros (1978) reports that the STAl has been 
used more often in psychological research than any other anxiety measure. 
As was the case with the lCL this research can be broadly summarised 
as falling into two areas; that concerned with the instruments validity 
and reliability; and that which used the STAl to assess the relationship 
between self perception and anxiety disposition. The former will be 
considered first. 
Research conducted into the validity and reliability of the STAl 
can be further sub-divided into two areas; the reliability of the proposed 
trait and state factors, both as individual constructs and in terms of 
the proposed relationship between them; and the validity of the uni-
dimensional factor structure of the inventory. Test-retest reliability 
for the STAl (Form X) is reported by Spielberger et al (1970) to range from an 
'r' of .73 to .83 for trait anxiety, and from .16 to .54 for state anxiety. 
Commenting upon these results the tests authors state that: 
"The low 'r' s for the A-State scale were anticipated ..••..••• because 
a valid measure of A-State should reflect the influence of unique 
situational factors existing at the time of testing" (p.9). 
Correlations between the trait and state scales are said to vary 
between .51 and .67, however the size of this correlation has been found 
to be influenced by the gender of the respondent and also the type of 
situational threat. On the whole males have been found to have a higher 
correlation between the two scales than females. ~r women the 
correlations between trait and state anxiety range form .11 to .53, 
with a median 'r' of .30. The corresponding correlation for males is 
reported to vary between .37 and .67, with a median 'r' of .47, 
(Spielberger et al 1970). The other influence mentioned above, the 
type of threat, entails that: 
"larger correlations are obtained between the scales under conditions 
which pose some threat to self-esteem" (ibid p. 12). 
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Consequently, high A-Trait persons in ego-threatening situations should 
manifest greater changes in A-State levels than do low A-Trait persons. 
Conversely in physical danger conditions, high A-Trait persons would not 
show any greater increases in A-State arousal than their low A-Trait 
counterparts, (Endler r980). Hoclges (1968), using college students on a 
memory task under different sources of threat; failure, physical harm, 
no threat, reported that although A-Trait appears to reflect differences 
in disposition to manifest A-State, it only has this ability when in 
response to threats to self-esteem or ego-threat. Similarly Katkin (1965), 
and Hodges and Spielberger (1966), found that threat of shock (physical 
danger) did produce increases in reported levels of A-State but that these 
changes were not in any way related to the level of A-Trait. Other 
support for the differential effect of a psychological versus a 
physiological stressor has been provided by .Hodges (1968); O'Neil, 
() d K tk ' .( 1972) 11 • Spielberger and Hansen (1969); Kent et al 1972; Rappaport an a ~n 
The secon~and possibly most comprehensive research into the inventory 
since its publicatio~ has concerned the validity of both the trait and 
state constructs as independent dimensions of anxiety. Gaudry, Vagg and 
Spielberger (1975); Gaudryand Poole (1975); Kendall, Finch et al (1976) 
and Barker et al (1911), all found that the 
consistently loaded on different factors 12 . 
trait and state scaler items 
The 
trait and state anxiety has been investigated by 
dimensionality of 
Endler et al (1916; 
1916a) and Loo (1919). Endler et al propose that there are three trait 
and three state factors, four of which are invariant across sex: emotive 
(affective) discontent and 'distress preoccupation' (cognitive) for the 
A-Trait scale. 'Emotive (affective) discontent' and 'agitated distress' 
for the A-State scale. Loo however, identified four factors for 
A-Trait, two of which, affect and cognition, were found to be invarient 
across sex. The remaining factors being 'insecurity' and 'neurotic 
depression' for females, and 'social insecurity' and 'fatigue' for males. 
Spielberger (1980) has questioned both the validity and reliability of 
these studies proposing that: 
"the resulting factors were, however, quite heterogeneous for males 
and females" (. p. 98). 
His criticism of both Endler's and Loo's results on the basis of gender 
seems paradoxical however, given that research conducted by Spielberger 
et al (see above) has discriminated between the sexes as to their 
predisposition toward anxiety. Consequently, although there are 
discrepancies between the above factorial studies, taken generally the 
results atest to the independence of the two affective constructs and 
their structural relationship to cognitions of the interpersonal 
environment. The important factor being as Endler (1980) contends: 
"Spielberger's state-trait theory of anxiety accurately describes 
the relationship between A-State, type of threat, and A-Traits. However, 
the STAI A-Trait measure is restricted to interpersonal A-Traits and 
ignores other facets of the domain of trait anxiety" (p.260). 
;rThe reliability and also validity of the STAI, is therefore, 
dependent upon its congruence with the type of threa~ a factor which will 
be elaborated in the final section of this chapter. 
The second area of research has concentrated upon the relationship 
between personality and trait-state anxiety disposition. In general 
terms Spielberger summarises this relationship when he contends that high 
A-Trait persons are self-depreciatory, and concerned with "fear of 
failure". As a consequence they perceive a wide array of situations as 
threatening to their self-esteem and they respond to this threat with 
high levels of A-State. More analytical research has elaborated upon 
this link between ego-strength and affective arousal. Jackson (1967) 
administered an early form of the STAI along with the Personality Research 
Form to 162 students attending a university counselling centre. These 
students had either Bducational-vocational'problems (n=124), or 'emotional' 
problems (n=38). For both groups there was a negative correlation 
between dominance, as measured by the PRF and trait anxiety:-.07 for 
the 'educational' sample and-.32 for the emotional sample, (unfortunately 
the result for the former failed to reach significance; the latter was 
significant at the .05 level). Interestingly, the students with 
educational problems manifested a significant correlation between 
'social recognition' and both trait and state anxiety; r being 
equal to .38 and .28 respectively, a result which links the STAI 
with its proposed interpersonal factor structure. 
using the STAI and the 'Mooney Problem Checklist' 
Similarly, research 
(1950) emphasised the 
influence of the interpersonal environment on trait and state anxiety. 
92. 
Although A-Trait was found to correlate with all eleven items of the MPC 
for a group of 77 psychology students, an analysis of the size of these 
correlations gives some interesting results. The two problem areas with 
the highest correlations both involved an interpersonal referrent; 
social-psychological relationships, r = .509 and personal psychological 
relations, r = .623. The results for state anxiety were significant 
on seven of the eleven items but again the highest correlation was given 
by personal-psychological relations, r = .458. Using the Edwards, , (1954) 
EPPS, Spielberger again emphasised the relationship between trait anxiety 
and low ego-strength when he found a significant correlation (r = .42) 
between this relatively stable affective dimension and abasement. However, 
perhaps the most interesting findings resulted from correlations between 
the STAI and the MMPI using two groups of hospitalised patients. It 
will be remembered that Leary (1957) also used the MMPI to profile his 
eight generic interpersonal themes. (Table 4 overleaf illustrates the 
relationships between the STAI, Leary's personality system and the MMPI). 
The correlations listed in Table 4 illustrate the relationship, 
proposed by Leary, between the generically weak interpersonal themes ~G, 
HI, JK and anxiety, and the dominant themes characterised by AP, BC and. NO, 
and 1011 general or situation specific affective arousal.. The three 
former octants ~hich are all situated about the 'submission' pole of the 
vertical 'Dom' axis are aSSOCiated, either jointly or independently, with 
the D, PE, Sc and ~ scales of the MMPI. All of which correlate highly 
with both trait and state anxiety; mean13 r's being .59, .73, .72 and .61 
for trait anxiety respectively; and .51, .62, .59 and .45 for state 
anxiety. Indeed the obsessional 'PE' scale, which Leary proposed as being 
characteristic of octants HI and JK has the highest trait correlations 
for both experimental samples. Moreover, it will be remembered that both of 
these interpersonal themes have a high predisposition toward anxiety; the HI 
individual is "overtly anxious and unhappy" (p.286), and the JK subject 
manifests "overtly free-floating anxiety" (p.296). Conversely, the dominant 
interpersonal themes, specifically AP, BC and NO, which are all situated 
about the apex of the 'Dem' axis have high scores on the MMPI Mania scale, 
(which was designated by Leary as reflecting the 'Dom' axis) and 
correspondingly low correlations with trait and state anxiety; Mean 'r's 
being equal to .30 and .32 respectively. 
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Table 4: 
OCTANTS C.LA.i\KS8uR6 C.OltkELATIOM$ (iULFPORT CORRELP.TIONS 
DESt~IPTIO"S 
HI~H 5COA.ti LOW SCORE TRAIT STATE TR"IT STATE 
NOHCONFOAI"\'1'Y! (OR.Ru.aMII 
TO 'HATS' POLE ON C,A.CUMPLEJI, Fe:. DE LM NO ·60 ·56 ·61 '3~ 
DENIALOF PSVCMOPATHOL06Y: 
-·61t - ·60 -·46 (O""UPONDS WITM'\.4V,'PoLE LMNOAP -·63 
DEPRESSION: ANXIETY j 
·61 SUa.MISSION; LOW E60-STAElI6b FG HI J'K NO AP 8C ·57 '57 '44 
H'1STERIA 
J'K LM '26 ·26 '21 '23 
PS'fCHOPATHI( DEVIANT! FG DE .~q '52 '60 ·1t8 
RI81LUOUS OISIOEMTIFICATION 
MASCULINE - FEMININE ~ 
PASSIVITY 
HI ·28 ·20 '25 '16 
OBSESSIONAL; HI J'K NO AP BC ·81 ·H '65 ·~S 
WORRIED. FEARFUL 
SC.HI'10ID TENDENCIES; 
ALIENATION; ISOLATION 
FG DE LM NO ·75 '71 ·68 ·4-6 
~ ~ HYPERA(T'VITY: AP BC ·31 '30 ·1t8 '33 
DOMINANCE 
n= ,q 
*( The above table was constructed from data reported by Leary (1957), 
and Spielberger et al. (1970). Three of the twelve MMPI scales, 
L.(Lie Scale), Hs. (Hyperchondriasis), and Pa. (Paranoia), have 
been omitted as there is no mention of them by Leary as 
corresponding with any of the eight generic themes ( see Leary 
(1957) pgs. 269-350 ). 
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Furthermore, both AP and NO have high scores on.the MMPI 
'K' scale (which Leary contends corresponds to the 'Lav' pole of the 
circumplex), which, as can be seen from the table, has a mean negative 
correlation of-.62 for trait and-.55 for state anxiety. The matching 
together of these three sources of results confirms the relationship 
between self-perception, ego-strength, anxiety and the other components 
of this multidimensional affective construct, r~minative worry, 
fearfulness, guilt and depression. Moreover, the importance of the 
interpersonal referent is established by the high correlations between 
the MMPI items of nonconformity, isolation, alienation and trait and 
state anxiety. 
3. Revision of th~ I~L and the STAr 
The strength of any self-report questionnaire lies in (i) its 
ability to make its contents understood to each and every respondent 
will little variability of meaning; and (ii) that its contents possess 
sufficient construct validity and reliability so as to ensure that 
there is an adequate bond between theory and method. 
Throughout this theSis the differences in individual self and 
environmental perceptions have been stressed, and of course the same 
vagaries of interpretation surround the linguistic items in any 
questionnaire. The instructions for completion 'set the scene' for the 
subject; however, if this 'scene' is not specified suffiCiently then 
one source of variability or contamination can occur. Similarly since 
both the ICL and STAI are American developments it is conceivable that 
the meaning of some items could be confusing and/or ambiguous for a 
British sample. Moreover, since their publication certain advances 
in trait psychology have posed questions as to the forms' validity and 
reliability as measures of self perception and anxiety. Finally, the 
interpretation of the results could be problematic, particularly for 
the ICL given its original orientation toward a psychiatric population. 
In the light of these questions a pilot study using friends, university 
students, civil servants and a random sample of the population was 
completed, and the modifications to the two tests which arose out of 
this study have been placed under three headings; (a) Linguistic 
Modifications; (b) Administrative and Completion Modifications; (c) 
Interpretive Modifications. 
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(a) Linguistic Modifications: 
In chapter one Schutz' (1962) proposals for ensuring a valid social-
scientific model were described and two of these are of importance 
here. Briefl~ postulates two and three, those concerned with subjective 
interpretation and adequacy, contend that the contents of any model, 
such as the ICL or STAI, should correspond to the individual's 
subjective meaning. And also that any act performed or emotion felt in 
the way indicated by the contents are understandable to the actor 
himself, and not the sole prerogative, of' the psychologist, sociologist 
or whatever. To ensure phenomenological validity therefore, the 
questionnaire's internal meaning must match, as closely as possible, that 
of the subject. The importance of the correct use of language in this 
consensual validatory process is, obviously, crucial. particularly as 
Leary defines as the basic data of personality, communication, or 
'protocol' language. Unfortunately, if the self is symbolised as a 
verbal edifice as Leary contends, then the indiVidual differences in 
the linguistic contents of consciousness mirror the different 
interpretations, inflections and misunderstandings which surround the 
use of words generally. As Leary (1957) states: 
"A~r may denote one thing to an individual patient, another 
in terms of general usage, and a third in the precisely defined 
SCientific discourse." (p.67) 
He concludes, as did Schutz, that to avoid misunderstandings the 
"scientific" meaning of words are kept as close to that of the general 
public, of the culture being stUdied, as possible. The pilot study 
revealed that in order to fulfil the above criteria several 
modifications would have to be made to questionnaire items which were 
seen as either obscure, confusing or unknown. 
Of the 128 items in the ICL the pilot study subjects had difficulty 
with three: 'Hardboiled when necessary'; 'Meek'; and 'Sociable and 
Neighbourly'. Many of the subjects found the exact meaning of 
'Hardboiled' difficult to ascertain, and its meaning was thought to 
be more widely understood in America than in Britain. As such, and 
bearing in mind that it comes from the 'moderate' part of the 
'Aggressive-Sadistic' octant scale (see Figure 2 above), it was replaced 
by stubborn. 'Meek' was thought by the subjects to be a rather 
antiquated term, and it was felt that as such this could prejudice 
its frequency of endorsement. As it falls toward the more 'extreme' 
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part of the 'Self-Effacing-Masochistic' scale, it was changed to submissive. 
The final item, 'Sociable and Neighbourly', was found difficult to 
answer as many subjects thought of themselves as 'sociable' but were 
not sure as to the adjunct neighbourly. Like' hardboiled', neighbourly 
was thought to have a more general usage in America, however, rather than 
drop neighbourly the two adjectives were split-up, and placed in 
different parts of the check-list. Consequently, if a respondent 
checked sociable, neighbourly or both, he would still only be attributed 
with one score. 
The item content of the STAI proved to be less ambiguous and only 
the meaning of the term 'I feel blue' on the trait inventory was found 
to be difficult. It was subsequently changed to 'I feel down'. However, 
a far more comprehensive difficulty was found in the clarity of the 
Likert scaling on the 'State' part of the inventory. The scale reads; 
not at all; somewhat; moderately so; very much so. Nearly every subject 
complained that they had great difficulty in using the terms 'somewhat' 
and 'moderately so'. A more extensive analysis of this finding was 
undertaken and a wide range of people were asked to describe the intensity 
of feeling which they would associate with each category. They were also 
given alternative categories so that, if necessary, replacement items 
could be found. A description of the method, samples and results obtained 
from this exercise are given in Appendix B. In brief however, the results 
revealed that the respondents had great difficulty in differentiating 
between Spielberger's original categories for 'somewhat' and 'moderately 
so'. Moreover there was found to be a significant difference between the 
perceived and proposed affective intensities of these two categories; 
p < .001. As a result of this study the replacement categories were 
chosen as a more reliable measure of affective intensity. The scale now 
reads; not at all; a little; quite a lot; extremely so. 
Theoretical and methodological advances in trait psychology since 
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both questionnaires' publication has entailed, that in order to ensure 
experimental validity and reliability, certain changes be made to their 
completion instructions. During the course,of the introduction to this 
final section the function of a set of instructions was described as 
being to 'set the s~ene' for the subject. Moreover it was stated that 
if this scene failed to be wholly accurate or lacked situational 
specificity, contamination of the results could, and in all probability 
would, occur. One of the major debates in trait psychology over recer.t 
years has concerned the stability or 'cross-situational' validity of 
personality traits. fhny theorists regard personality as being'the major 
determinant of behaviour, and although most do acknowledge the part 
played by the situation ( Cattell's specification equation for example), 
behaviQural consistency is seen in ternks bf stable , internal personality factors. 
Conversely, social psychologists such as Cooley (.1912), Mead (1934) 
and Cottrell (1942) stressed that it was the Situation, and the norms 
and roles inherent in that situation, 'which was the basic determinant 
of behaviour (Endler 1980). A third view takes advantage of both 
perspectives,'therefore instead of asking whether, it is traits or 
situations which are the basic determinants of behaViour, a less 
sectarian position asks: 
"HOW do persons and situations inter<!ct in determining behaviour" 
(Endler,' 1980 p250) 
One of the: earliest proponents of ,interactionism was Kurt Lewin (1935) 
who proposed that: 
"a person's behaviour in any situation is jointly determined by 
the characteristics of that situation as he perceives them, and by the 
particular behavioural disposition of which he is prone at that time " 
(Carson 1969 p.9). 
Lewin, believing that mathematics were the 'proper language of 
scientific discourse', represented the above in terms of a functional 
notation; B = f (P,E): Behaviour is a function of a person-situation 
interaction. Empirical evidence for this situation specific perspective 
of personality has been provided by Argyle and Little' (1972) and Bowers (1973), 
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Mischel (1968) and Endler (1973; 1975>". All evaluated the trait stability 
hypothesis and noted that there was little empirical support for the 
cI'Oss-situational stability of personality qispositions. Adopting the 
interactionists theoretical perspective entails that the instructions 
for the completion of any personality inventory should stipulate the 
situation in which the behaviour under scrutiny takes place. Therefore, in 
terms of the ICL and STAI there must be congruence between a specified 
situation, the interpersonal stimulus qualities of that situation, 
and the response, to this stimulus with differing perceptions of self' 
and also levels of affective arousal.' How this need for stimulus-
response congruence affects the two sets of instructions which accompany' 
each of the questionnaires will be discussed below. 
The instructions for completing the ICL Simply require the 
respondent to check all 128 items as either being true or false 
descriptions of him or her self (La E'orge and Suczek (1956». The problems 
• inherent in this approach are two-fold'. Leary (1957) himself proposes that 
personality is subject to' situational variability', which "refers to 
differences in cultural and environmental factors" (p.245). 
However, the instructions which accompany the ICL have no such situational 
specificity. As a consequence the instructions which accompany the 
questionnaire used in this thesis have been mOdified, and the subject 
is asked to 'describe the sort of person ,that you think you are 
when you are playing with your team-mates during the course of the 
game! Inherent in this statement is the specification of the Situation, 
the game, and the stimUlus of its interpersonal cOhtent, 'playing with 
your team-mates'. The need for stimulus-response congruence has been met. 
The second problem area involves the 'true' or 'false' dichotomous 
scale. As it stands the perceptual variance inherent in the two 
categories is obviously low. Moreover merely , designating an item as 
'false' cannot be taken as a wholehearted rejection of the contents of 
that item. The subject may not kno~', or he may feel that it is not 
applicable to himself. Consequently, the 'true' or 'false' scale could 
lead to a false, self and not-self, profile. Because of this it was 
decided to expand the scale to 4-points; Like Me; Not Like Me; Not 
Applicable; Don't Know. Using this scale the subject has 
to make a specific choice as to the ite~ relevance to his self. 
In terms of the instructions which accompany the STAI, although 
they have a far greater degree of specificity than those for the ICL, 
slight amendments had still to be made in terms of the A-State scale. 
For the A-Trait scale Spielberger et al (1970) state that: 
"the instructions for the A-Trait scale should be those 
printed on the test form" (p.4). 
Conversely, research should always specify the stressful stimuli 
that evoke different levels of A-State (Spielberger, 1972). 
Consequently, in terms of the former the subject is asked to describe 
how he generally feels in terms of the twenty inventory items. In 
terms of the latter the subject is asked to describe 'how you feel 
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right now, that is, at this moment, about the forthcoming game' (see 
Appendix A, page 6). As with the instructions which accompany the ICL, 
the situation, interpersonal stimulus and self's response are congruent. 
An affinity which would not exist if the original instructions which 
simply ask you to indicate 'how you feel right now', with no regard for 
the influence of the situation, were left unaltered. 
(c) Interpretive Modifications 
One of the major criticisms directed at much of the contemporary 
research into athlete personality disposition has concerned their use 
of clinically oriented psychometric techniques. Martens (1975), 
summarises the debate as follows: 
"Many scales that have been used for measuring normal athletes 
were not developed for measuring normality but for identifying 
abnormali ty" (in Carron 1980 p. 31) • 
Further support for Martens has been provided by both Kroll (1970), 
and Rushall (1975), who specifically condemn the use of the MMPI. 
However, although Martens is correct in identifying a possible source 
of experimental invalidation, it is rather his preoccupation (as this 
thesis contends) with concepts of normality and abnormality which 
are chiefly at fault, not necessarily the structure of any particular 
inventories. Moreover, reference to A.R. Beisser's (1977) 'The Madness 
of Sports' or Carmen, Zerman and Blaine's (1968) observation that: 
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"athletes of all ages and levels of participation are subject to the 
same mental conflicts as non-athlete's but may be less likely to seek 
psychiatric help" (in Yaffe 1983 p.224). 
indicate that 'abnormality' is not the sole prerogative of the non-
athlete. In order to minimise the possibility of any extraneous 
variabili ty arising out of the use of cEnically oriented techniques, 
what is needed is a sensitivity both to the aims and restrictions of the 
instrument, and caution in any. ihte.rpr~tation of the results •. Of the 
two inventories to be used in this thesis it is only.the ICL whose use 
falls into Marten's critical ambit. 
It will be remembered that the objective of Leary's (1957) personality 
system was to understand and also predict a person's interpersonal 
behaviour in the specific setting of a psychiatric clinic. Conversely, 
the authorS (in brief), is to analyse athletes' perceptions 0:' self whilst 
performing and relate these perceptions to their level of ~ffective 
~ arousal. However, the two are by no meaas mutually incom!Jatible. The 
major 'problem' areas both in Leary's system and in the circumplex, 
is fir~tly their concern with the 'intensity' of a per8on's. interpersonal 
perception~ and secondly the reliability of the interpersonal reflex; 
the former will be considered first. 
The intensity dimension of the circ~~plex w~s introduced by Leary 
et al so that the content of a person's interp~rsonal perceptions could 
be 'diagnosed' as being either 'normal' or 'abnormal'~ J"he criteria 
being based upon the extremity and appropriateness of the person's 
interpersonal behaviour. The scalar continuum which evaluates a person's 
level of adjustment is borrowed from Sullivan's(1956) concept of psychopathology: 
"Everything that can be found in mental disorder can be found in 
anyone, but the accent, the prominance, the misuse, of that which is 
found in the mental patient is more or less characteristic" (p. 77). 
On the circumplex this shift from adaptive to maladaptive is marked by 
the circumference of the inner circle, whose parameter lies one standard 
deviation away from the mean interpersonal behaviour of a sample 
population of 800 clinic inpatients. Therefore, if a person's inter-
personal perceptions fall in the outer ring (1 sigma above the mean), 
an intense or maladaptive degree of behaviour is indicated. If they fall 
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below this statistical deviation a moderate or adaptive degree is 
indicated. Therefore, taking octant AP as our example, A,the managerial 
theme and ~ the autocratic/are the moderate and extreme dimensions of 
the power octant respectively. In essence the further one's interpersonal 
summary point is from the centre or mean of the circle the more 
maladaptive and extreme your perceptions of self are thought to be. 
Similarly, the items on the Check List have been weighted so as 
to account for the different intensities of the adjectives which make 
up the eight generic themes. Using a four-point scale there is one 
intensity 1 item which reflects "a mild or necessary amount of the trait"; 
three intensity 2 items which indicate "a moderate or appropriate 
amount of the trait"; three words reflect intensity 3 "a marked or 
inappropriate amount of the trait"; and one word expresses intensity 4, 
"an extreme amount of the trait". An example of this weighting scale 
is given below: 
Interpersonal theme Aj 
Able to give orders 
Forceful 
Good leader 
Likes responsibility 
Bossy 
Dominant 
Manages others 
Dictatorial 
'mild or necessary amount of the trait' 
'moderate of appropriate amount of the trait' 
'marked or inappropriate amount of the trait' 
'extreme amount of the trait' 
Both Wiggins (1961), and Bentler (1963) have observed that using this 
weighting scheme can distort the 'Dom' and 'Lov' dimensions of the 
circurnplex. Moreover, there is a danger inherent in most questionnaires 
that the subject will fail to understand the meaning of the variables 
listed. This danger is increased many many times if one assumes that every 
single respondent would attach the same linguistic level of intensity to 
the items contained in the ICL. For this reason the weighting system 
will not be used. 
As far as the intensity dimension of the circurnplex is concerned, 
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its use will be restricted to simply differentiating between the two 
levels of interpersonal behaviour where applicable. In general 
however, octant scores will be used as the source of statistical 
data, with no reference to extremity. Similarly, where description of 
a particular interpersonal theme is given the more pathological self-
referrents have been omitted, and descriptions of the 'maladaptive' 
interpersonal themes have concentrated upon their general characteristics 
only. Should the reader wish to familiarise him or herself with the 
full range of the interpersonal themes it is suggested that reference 
is made to Leary (1957) pages 269 to 351. 
The second problem area concerns the validity and reliability of 
Leary's concept of the 'interpersonal reflex'. Leary defines the reflex 
as being the observable, expressive units of face-to-face social 
interaction. These units include the content of verbal communication, 
but are chiefly comprised of the tone of voice, gestures, carriage 
and external appearance. Of chief interest here is the way in which the 
particular 'content' of the reflex provokes particular responses from 
the other. It is obvious that the 'content' of any reflex i~ by definition, 
idiosyncratic, however Leary contends that their effect is specifiable. 
He states that a person's interpersonal reflex provokes a reciprocal 
interpersonal response from the 'other' person in the interaction that 
in turn leads to a repetition of the original reflex. An example of 
this cyclic relationship would be the 'managerial-autocratic' individual 
who provokes others to obedience and respect, the other responds with 
dependent helplessness which stimulates the managerial person to 
provide strong, helpful leadership and so on. 
Unfortunately Leary provides no empirical support for his patterns 
of reciprocal relations, however they will be used in the course of this 
thesis but only as a general indication as to the effect which the 
different generic themes have upon one another. They will of course 
have no statistical significance. The concept of reciprocal relations 
is important to consider as it provides an idea as to the motive 
behind a person's particular interpersonal perceptions, and it is 
hoped that by dealing with it in this manner it is possible to 
avoid any accusations of 'unscientific' conduct. 
It is thought that the above structural and interpretive 
modifications should enable both the ICL and the circumplex to be· used 
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with confidence, outside the setting of the psychiatric clinic. 
Indeed since their'publication they have been used to assess the inter-
personal perceptions of college students, medical students and as an 
aid to marrt~ge counselling. 
SlJl!l!!)gCY: 
In general terms the use of these two psychometric techniques allow 
individual praxis to be extracted from the bonded group process. More 
specifically the ICL and the interpersonal circumplex allow quantification 
of the athletes self-perceptions with regard to patterns of conformity, 
motive and rejection- with particular reference as to·the effect that 
perceptual deviations from the stereotypes engendered by the bonded 
group process have upon the general, and game specific,affective 
disposition. Consequently, the two questionnaires not only have a 
high degree of methodological complementarity, but together they provide 
an empirical representation of the way in which the self links the 
two psychological conditions of cognition and affect(Smith 1980). 
The following chapter will describe how the experimental sample 
was chosen, and how the above questionnaires were administered. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1. The study by Lorr and McNair was designed to test and extend the 
theory of a circumplex ordering of interpersonal behaviour 
categories. Using Guttman's multiple-group factoring technique 
(1952), they analysed the ICL and found three central factors which 
accounted for the correlations between octants: Factor A, Dominance; 
Factor B, Affiliativeness versus Detachment; and Factor C, Compliant 
Abasement. These results are illustrated below. 
Variable A B C 
'Managerial' .75 -:03 .06 
Competitive J3 .00 -26 
Aggressive .52 .20 -il1 
Rebellious J7 ']0 -60 
Self-effacing -32 .65 .02 
Dependent -;04 iiO 23 
Cooperative .05 .09 .56 
Responsible .03 .02 .60 
The authors also noted that the results above link Leary's circ~plex 
with the orderings suggested by Stern (1958), and Campbell (1959). 
2. The use of four systematically related variables with which to 
classify personality disposition is by no means a new phenomenon. 
Leary suggests that the four quadrants given by the intersections 
of the poles of the 'Dom' and 'Lov' axes, closely resemble the 
classical 'humors' of Hippocrates; and the Freudian notion of a 
'Compass of Motives' based upon the points of love and hate, and 
power and weakness. Similarly, the work of Stagner (1937), 
Parsons (1953), and Lodge's use of the Haskell Coaction Compass (1953) 
are other, more contemporary conceptualisations for the four-fold 
classification of human motives. 
3. The descriptions of the interpersonal properties of self associated 
with each of the eight generic themes are much abbreviated forms 
of how they appear in Leary's 'Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality'. 
This is because much of Leary's description concentrates upon the 
pathological aspects of each interpersonal theme, in particular 
their clinical manifestation and relationship to standard psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
4. The other three levels which complete Leary's interpersonal 
personality system are level 1, the level of 'public 
communication'; level 3, the level of 'private symbolization' 
(dreams, fantasies etc); and level 4, the level of 'the unexpressed 
unconsciousness' (interpersonal themes which are cdmpletely 
avoided) • 
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5. The psychologist Gordon Allport emphasised that psychological 
investigation can choose to study behaviour in terms of general 
principles, involving large numbers of people; or it can focus on 
the individual. person. Borrowing from the German philosopher 
Windelbard he termed the former nomothetic (universal), and the 
latter ideographic (individual). 
6. Other extraneous variables described by Leary were the selection 
of an alternative meaning by the subject to the one implied, the 
general tendency to mark more or fewer words, and the tendency to 
check more or fewer 'positively' valued words. 
7. The 'centre of mass' or reference point for the moderate inter-
personal themes was found using the following formula: 
where x and y are points along the abcissa and ordinate, and s 
is the area integrated over region R. However, the problem of 
finding a point to represent the extreme intensity was more difficult 
as "there can be no centre of mass because each outer area is 
infinite" (La Forge 1957). La Forge decided therefore to consider 
the meaning of relative discrepancies and concluded that a change 
in the same octant should be less than the change, even at the 
least intensity, between two octants. With this in mind she 
arbitrarily selected a set of points by which to represent the 
extreme intensities for the eight octants. 
The interaction of each of these arbitrary points with the x (Lov) 
and the y (Dom) axes was established, and the continuum of these 
points was assigned values from +56 to -56, with zero at the 
centre of the circl~. It was then possible to establish vertical 
and horizontal components of each discre ancy. The geometric 
. distance given by the formula cl.} + dJ" is taken as the measure 
of discrepancy (where dx is the vertical discrepancy and dy the 
horizontal). By taking the square roots to the closest whole 
number fourteen possible discrepancies were obtained, (see Table 2). 
8. Rycroft (1968), defines a neurosis as a condition,in an otherwise 
healthy person, which is characterised by the presence of anxiety. 
The condition of 'neurotic-anxiety' is used to describe all 
people whose symptom is predominantly anxiety itself, its chief 
characteristic being that the anxiety is free-floating, in that it 
is not connected to any specifiable external source. Conversely, 
anxiety hysteria "is specifically connected with a special situation" 
(Fenichel 1945). Moreover, it is usually associated with a 
physiological complaint where in reality none exists. 
9. The STAI was again correlated with the IPA1" Anxiety Scale, and the 
Taylor MAS. 
10. After the administration of both questionnaires had been completed 
I became aware that a new format of the inventory, the STAI-Y Form, 
had been produced. This revision being the direct consequence of 
the conflicting research conducted into the factor structure of 
the inventory items. Spielberger et al (1980), report that there 
are six items on the A-State scale which are questionable as 
measures of anxiety: "I am regretful", which appears to have a 
depressive content; "I feel over-excited" and "I feel joyful" which 
seem to be more closely related to mania and elation than anxiety; 
"I feel rested" which is related to an absence of fatigue, and 
fatigue is equally characteristic of depression and anxiety. Two 
other items "I feel anxious" and "I feel 'high strung'" were 
dubious measures of A-State given their low item-remainder 
correlations, (see Ross 1978; Tomalesky 1977). 
Similarly, there were six A-Trait items which were considered 
questionable due to their content being primarily depressive: 
"I feel like crying"; "I feel down"; "I tire quickly"; "I feel 
rested"; "I take things hard"; ""I avoid· a crisis". 
A comparative analysis of the item-remainder coefficients for the 
original and replacement items for both the trait and state scales 
revealed that all the replacement items had equal or superior 
psychometric properties than those of the originals. As such the 
following changes were made: 
Item 
I am regretful 
I feel rested 
I feel anxious 
I feel 'high strung' 
I feel over-excited 
I feel joyful 
And for the A-Trait scale: 
I tire quickly 
Feel like crying 
Losing out on things 
Take things hard 
Avoid crisis 
Feel blue 
Replace with 
I feel strained 
I feel satisfied 
I feel frightened 
I feel indecisive 
I feel confused 
I feel steady 
Nervous and Restless 
Feel satisfied 
Feel like a failure 
Disturbing thoughts 
Make decisions easily 
Feel inadequate 
11. The relationship between the STAI and the psychological components 
of anxiety rather than the fear component of physiological injury 
is a distinction of importance to this study given the violent 
nature of rugby football. 
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12. For a more detailed account of the findings of these factorial 
studies please see Spielberger et al (1980) pgs. 95-98. 
13. Mean scores were used as Spielberger et al(1970) administered the STAI 
to two psychiatric samples; 129 from Clarksburg psychiatric hospital 
and 79 from Gulfport hospital. 
Kerlinger (1977), defines the function of sampling as being that" 
of: 
"taking any portion of a population or universe as representative 
of that population or universe" (p.118). 
Inherent within this process there are two important considerations, one 
theoretical, the other methodological, both of which affect the choice 
of the sample population; the latter directly, the former indirectly. 
These are; (i) that the sample is co~3idered to be, and not specified 
as representative,of the larger population to which it belongs; and 
(ii) that the sample possesses a sufficient number of those characteristics 
relevant to the research population in question. 
The problem of finding an experimental sample whose members would 
fulfil th.e theoretical criteria imposed by the propositions of this 
thesis, and in so doing implement point two above, was not difficult 
however, as the research conducted into athlete personality has not 
been limited to anyone specific section of the sporting population. 
Indeed the 'sports-type', by definition, has been used to encompass 
most if not all of the different sports, (see Kane 1978). As a 
consequence it was possible to choose virtually any sport, bearing in 
mind the limitations imposed by access, control~ sufficient numbers 
and so on. The eventual choice was to use a sample of student rugby 
football players and four universities and one college of education 
were contacted; as a result 96 players aged between 18 and 24 were 
assembled. It must be noted at" this point however that the choice of 
both this particular sport and also the sample population was not 
entirely arbitrary. Indeed it was thought that together they would 
possess a number of characteristics which would make the influence of 
the bonded group process upon individual praxis more acute. The 
reasoning behind this particular proposition can best be explained 
by reviewing firstly the historical traditions of the game of rugby; 
secondly, the results of the research conducted into the rugby players 
personality; and thirdly by describing the properties of the five teams 
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whose members made up the experimental sample. 
It has been proposed that the origins of modern ball sports 
such as football and rugby emerged from the far less demanding Roman 
sport of Harpastum, which was a primitive form of rugby used to 
toughen up the Legions. The game was introduced into Britain as one of 
the many effects of the conquest, and over the years it was gradually 
modified into inter-village brawls called 'fote-ball'. By 1175 this 
'ball' game had become an annual event in London, where the 'players' 
would fight over a rolled-up canvas or leather, the severity of this 
game being reflected in its East Anglian name of 'savage camp ball'. 
The popularity of the game flourished until the demands of the industrial 
revolution curtailed workers' leisure time. It was during this 
period however that the game was adopted by the Public Schools1 and 
integrated into their ethos of 'Muscular Christianity,.2 
The football field was regarded by many as being the ideal arena 
for moulding character. Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby public 
school, saw it as fostering a whole range of manly qualities such as 
bravery, chivalry and self-sacrifice. Indeed E.D. Sewell wrote at the 
turn of this century that: 
"No other game if it is played seriously, in the highest company, 
equals Rugger in its combined call on its players for courage, self-
control, stamina and sticking-it."(in Atyeo 1979). 
This concern with the masculine nature of rugby is not without 
contemporary support. Danie Craven (1975), former Springbok and now the 
head South African rugby coach states that: 
"Rugby is a game of power. Because rugby is a power game it is 
also said that rugby is a man's game" (p.9) 
Although it is not my intention to become involved in the polemics 
of the current feminist debate, the existence of a pervasive patriachal 
ideology within rugby, from its origins as a game for toughening up 
the legionnaires to its traditional and contemporary function for 
inculcating manly qualities, provide, and has provided the male 
athlete with a supportive solidarity based upon the traits of power, 
dominance and aggression, (see Riesman1967 and Millet 1976). Tiger (1968) 
---------
11<J • 
contends that this group solidarity is a manifestation of the male 
'bonding instinct', however it is a bond which appears to control 
behaviour by enforcing stereotypes based upon rigid, gender based, 
norms. The current research into the rugby players personality confirms 
this element of the bonded-group process. Indeed it is interesting 
to note that the profiles of the players are extremely similar to the 
description offered by Sewell above. This similarity is illustrated 
in Figure 6 overleaf which summarises, graphically, the research 
completed by Sinclair (1968), and Hardman" (1968); both of whom used 
the Cattell 16 P.F. In order to aid the reader should he or she wish 
to interpret the diagram, Cattell (1970), states that 'normal' or 
'average' scores on the factors are represented by stens of 5 or 6, and 
that it is only when scores reach the stens of either 4 or 7 that a person 
could be thought of as departing from the average on a particular trait 
or traits. Using Cattell's comments as a criterion it is apparent 
from the diagram that there is a move toward high scores on the factors 
of aggressiveness (E); impulsiveness (F); self-confidence (L); shrewdness 
(N); and self-control (Q3), (in fact the results for the sample of 
county and first class players and those for the junior club players 
fall above the sten of 7 for F, L, Nand Q3). Conversely there is a 
move toward low scores on the profiles of (I), indicating tough-
mindedness and (0) indicating self-assurance, (again the samples 
listed above fall below the sten of 4 signifying a significant departure 
from the mean on these two particular traits). A more interesting 
finding, in terms of the proposed self-schema emerges when the interactive 
nature of these personality traits is considered. In chapter 2 the 
work of Ohnmacht and Muro (1967), was cited as they reported that low 
self-acceptance was associated with low scores on the factors of 
C, Hand Q3, and high scores on 0 and Q4, results which, when trans-
posed onto the rugby players profiles suggest that they have a high 
degree of satisfaction with self. 
The results of the above profiles, with their evident concentration 
about stereotypical personality characteristics, endorse, whether 
directly or indirectly, the traditional notions as to the character of 
a rugby player. Thus the bonded rugby group controls a members sense 
of self through a combination of historical and also contemporary 
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Figure 6: 
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Key: 
Results of a sample of 32 international rugby players.* 
.-. _. -. - Results of a sample of 48 county and first class players. * 
..•............ Results of a sample of 52 junior club players. * 
---- Mean levels for 161 players.$ 
-------.- Mean level for population as a whole.1I 
A; Sociability. B; General Ability. C; Ego-Strength. 
~ 
E; Dominance. F; Surgency. G; Conscientiousness. 
H; Adventurousness. I; Sensitiveness. L; Protension. 
M; Bohemianism. N; Shrewdness. 0; Insecurity. 
Q1 Radicalism. Ql : Self-Sufficiency. Q3 ; Willpower. 
Q4 ; Tenseness. 
* Sinclair (1968): $ Hardman and Sinclair (1968): 
IICattell (1970) 
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factors; the rugby personality like the sports-type, is therefore 
a mythological abstraction from historical precedent. As a consequence 
the sport of rugby makes an ideal criteria from which to assess the 
validity of the sports-type, given the games intrinsic masculine 
nature and the evident pressure to conform i.e. manifest certain 
personality traits. 
The choice of a stUdent population to represent both the rugby 
population as a whole, and the sports-type in general, was, in many 
ways, eclectic. It was thought, as has been described above, that 
student rugby would not only reflect the games traditional 'personality' 
bias, but the manifestation of this historical precedent,in terms of the 
influence of the bonded group process, would be exacerbated by the 
privileged position that rugby occupies in university life. More-
over, as student rugby is generally under the control of a member of 
staff, it was also thought that it would be easier to exercise restraint 
over the sample members when administering the questionnaire, and so 
avoid the contaminating influence of unnecessary talking or levity. 
In most universities therefore, rugby union is regarded by both 
student and faculty member alike as being the most prestigious student 
sport; a factor which probably has direct lineage in the game's 
public school origins. As such the pressure, particularly on the first 
team player, is magnified not only by his prestigious position, but 
also because the Parameters of the student population are extremely 
small, and one tends to interact with many who are interested in the 
sport on a day-to-day basis; a factor which does not occur in any other 
,setting to such a degree. However the choice 3 of the five student 
first fifteens also reflected a gradation of performance, in an attempt 
to assess whether the 'normal-abnormal' approach to athlete personality 
profiles, inherent in the philosophy of the sports-type, transcend 
levels of skill. As a consequence two of the teams, Loughborough 
and Durham, are generally regarded as the best student teams in the 
country; the Newcastle and Freshers fifteens are an example of the 
average or middle ground; the York fifteen an example of a very 
'junior' or below average side. The following, brief descriptions 
of the teams will elaborate upon these points. Loughborough University 
has perhaps the most successful tradition of all five teams having 
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won the prestigious 'University Athlete Union' championship on 
numerous occasions as well as the Middlesex Sevens title. As 
Loughborough University itself is regarded as the foremost physical 
education establishment in the country, there is a great deal of pressure 
on the athletes to succeed and so maintain this level of achievement. 
The rugby clubs fixture list, against some of the best teams in 
England, reflects the clubs and, by association, the University's 
status. Moreover, the club has been regarded over the years as a 
breeding ground for both county and international players, as such 
there is pressure on students to either maintain or achieve first 
team status. The club itself is run on a highly organised basis with 
a democratically elected committee running its affairs; a member of the 
University staff supervises the twice-weekly training sessions, where 
attendance is compulsory if selection for any team, particularly the 
first fifteen is required. Durham University rugby club has, in 
recent years come to the fore in student rugby, and as the university 
itself is run on Oxbridge lines, the sport is given pride of place. The 
club's rise to form can be attributed, at least in part to its policy, 
borrowed from the American collegiate system, of approaching players I 
students with an offer to attend, and obviously play, for the university. 
Like L.oughborough it has an impressive fixture list against most of 
the best sides in the north of England, similarly it has a highly 
organised club structure, with training being organised and also 
monitored by ex-England international Peter Dixon; again attendance 
is compulsory •. The Newcastle University club, unlike the two above, has 
only. been in existence since the 1960's. In the past rugby in the 
university was comprised solely in terms of intra-mural competitions 
and even now the club relies heavily upon a 'constituent' club basis4 
Because of this factor the pressure on first fifteen places is not so 
acute as many second fifteen players prefer to play for one of the 
four 'constituent' clubs. The club has had no real success and this 
is reflected in a mediocre fixture list consisting of local 'junior' 
sides. However, like the two clubs above, there is a committee to man-
age its affairs, and a member of staff organises training sessions. The 
pressure to attend these sessions is not as great as Loughborough or 
Durham however, given the existence of the 'constituent' clubs. The 
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Loughborough Freshers XV, although sharing many of the attributes of the 
first fifteen, were included in an attempt to assess whether its 
members perception of self would differ significantly from the other 
teams given that they had only been attending the university for a 
short time, most coming straight from school rugby. The team itself 
comes under the aegis of the club committee and it is coached on a 
twice weekly basis by a member of the university staft. Attendance is 
compulsory if selection for the team is required. Similarly, like 
Loughborough and Durham above, the existence of another team, in this 
case the Freshers 'Bl puts pressure on the players to maintain or 
attain Freshers 'A' places. The Saint John's College York rugby club 
appears to be the most disorganised of all the five teams. As an 
institution the college had a strong tradition as one of the foremost 
physical education teacher training centres in the country, however 
this tradition is now in decline and appears to be reflected in the 
status of the college rugby team. The club as a whole has no official 
bureaucracy, and most of all the decisions concerning organisation 
and training are taken by the club captain. There is no member of staff 
concerned with the running of the club. The general status of the club 
is reflected in a mediocre fixture list containing very junior local 
sides. 
The administration of the questionnaire to the above teams took 
place on two separate occasions, once prior to the Christmas Vacation 
(1980), and again just before the end of the rugby season. The reason 
for this longitudinal design was that the results from the first 
administration, obtained when the influence of the bonded group process 
is most Significant, could be compared with those from the second, 
administered at a time when the influence of the group is, in all 
probability, at its lowest, at the end of the season. Consequently, by 
using this particular method, it is possible to assess whether the 
influence of the sports-type, and the bonded group of Which it is part, 
is variant or invariant with the demands of the season. 
The questionnaire itself consisted of three separate parts; 
biographical details such as age, pOSition on the field, previous 
honours and so on; the trait state anxiety inventories; and two 
interpersonal check lists, one for self,.another for the ideal self. 
The Questionnaire is shown in full in Appendix A. The actual administration 
of the questionnaire, to the five teams, although fundamentally 
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similar on both occasions, differed in terms of the testing conditions. 
A limitation imposed by time and locational factors, and as such the 
administration of the questionnaire to the tearns,will be described on 
an individual basis. 
The questionnaire was administered to the Loughborough 1st XV 
squad on the first occasion in mid-November; 23 players were 
questioned in total. Although the questionnaires are self-explanatory 
the players were instructed that should any problem arise they should 
indicate this by raising their hands and not in any circumstances shout 
out. Similarly, they were instructed that upon completing the 
questionnaire they should leave the room immediately, (these instructions 
were given to every team on both administrative occasions). The 
testing session took place in one of the skill laboratories where I 
was able to separate the players from one another by the use of 
screens, thus minimising the possibility of contamination. Prior to 
the particular administration the team had had a satisfactory series of 
results winning six games and losing three. The second administration 
took place in late February, one week prior to the University Athletic 
Union's rugby championship final. On the way, they had met and beaten 
Newcastle University and were to face Durham in the final. As before 
the testing took place in the skill laboratory with all 23 players 
present. 
The Durham team were given the first questionnaire in early 
December; fourteen players being questioned in total. The administration 
took place in the rugby 'headquarters' and, although no screens were 
available, every attempt was made to ensure that there was an adequate 
space between each one of the respondants. Prior to the administration 
the team had won seven of their eight matches. The second 
administration took place in mid-March and nine of the original 
fourteen completed the questionnaire. Prior to this date the team had 
beaten the Loughborough students 6 - 3 in the U.A.U. final, and had 
only two games of the season remaining. The administration took place 
under the same conditions as before. 
The Freshers XV were first tested in early December and twenty 
players completed the questionnaire. As with the first fifteen the 
skill laboratory was used as the experimental setting. Prior to this 
date the Freshers were probably the most successful of the five teams 
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having won every game by a considerable margin. The second administration 
took place in late March, two days before the final game of the season 
against the England Colts, a fixture regarded as the highlight of the 
season. Fourteen of the original twenty completed the questionnaire 
under the same conditions as before. 
The Newcastle squad were first tested in late November and twenty 
players completed the questionnaire. The administration took place in 
a changing room prior to the team's training session. The same conditions 
prevailed as for the Durham administration and again, every attempt was 
made to separate the players and so minimise contamination. Prior to 
this date the team had had a disappointing sequence of results losing 
many of their matches by a narrow margin. The second administration took 
place in early March with three weeks of the season remaining, fourteen 
of the original twenty players completed the questionnaire. On this 
occasion the administration took place in a lecture room which, in 
terms of environmental conditions, aided the control of contamination. 
The performance of the team up until this point was described as 
'disappointing' with the team losing fourteen of their matches and 
winning only nine. 
The York rugby squad were first tested in early December and 
nineteen players completed the questionnaire. The administration 
took place in the college bar5 , hired by the club captain for the 
occasion. As the seating in the bar area was in the form of a number 
of separate booths, I was able to separate the members of the team from 
one another. The second administration took place in late April, three 
weeks into the close season, nine of the original nineteen completed the 
questionnaire under the same conditions as above. 
The time taken to complete the questionnaire ranged form forty 
to eighty minutes, the average time being approximately fifty-five 
minutes. 
It is evident from the above description of the administrative 
procedure that certain anomalies arose as a consequence· of the 
longitudinal research design. One concerned the reduction in sample 
size between the first and second administration; the other, the 
proposal as to the difference, between 
influence of the bonded group process. 
first. 
the administrations, in the 
The former will be considered 
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Between the first and second administrations there was a reduction in 
the size of the sa~ple from 96 to 69 players respectively; a reduction 
of 28%. Part of this decrease can be attributed to players who were 
either dropped from the squad after the first administration or became 
injured and therefore ceased to play in any more games. However, by 
far the biggest proportion were those who refused, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, to turn up to complete the second administration. 
Indeed, in some cases just trying to finalise the dates for the 
administration of the questionnaire took many weeks of correspondence 
and ineVitably frantic telephone calls. By far the greatest difficulty 
was created by the York rugby club where there was no member of the 
college staff or recognised committee with which to make contact. 
This had the effect of pushing the second administration into the 
close season, a factor which meant that the state part of the STAI 
had to be dropped from the questionnaire format, as its inclusion 
would violate Spielberger's theoretical concept of this situation 
specific effect6 . In short therefore, although every effort was made 
on the part of "myself and the four coaches to ensure that all the players 
turned up to complete the second questionnaire, one basically could not 
force an" individual's attendance and therefore relied upon their 
'goodwill'. 
The second anomaly arose as an indirect consequence of the above. 
It was originally proposed that the influence of the bonded group 
process would diminish the longer the season progressed, however it is 
evident that the second administration coincided with two of the teams' 
most important games; Loughborough's against Durham in the final of 
the U.A.U., and the Freshers XV against the English Colts. However, 
this was not as problematic as it appeared, as the question as to the 
invariant nature of the bonded group process could still be analysed 
by simply inverting the original proposition. Moreover a further 
comparison could be made between the results from these two teams 
and those from the other three, two of which had nearly completed their 
season and one who indeed had. 
The way this and the other aspects of the self-schema were 
statistically analysed is described in full in the following chapter. 
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Footnotes 
1. Rugby was adopted by many but not all the public schools, the others 
preferring soccer. 
2. Muscular Christianity was a vigorous combination of Christian 
living with athletic enjoyment. 
3. It must be pointed out that having been an undergraduate student 
at Loughborough University, there was a certain degree of 
convenience in using both the Loughborough and Freshers XV in my 
experimental sample. 
4. The constituent clubs were those who played in the university 
intra-mural competitions and were made up of students from the 
Agricultural Department and the Castlereigh, Henderson and Armstrong 
Halls of Residence. 
5. The bar was hired for the morning as it had a number of booths 
which could be used to separate the players. 
6. As York were tested in the close season it was decided to drop the 
A-State scale as there was no forthcoming game. It was felt that 
to ask the players to imagine how they would feel would affect the 
validity of the study. 
Chapter 5 
The self-schema has been described as the composite of three 
independent yet inter-related phenomenal percepts; self, not-self and ideal 
self perceptions. As a consequence of this structure, and in keeping with 
the initial objectives of this study, it is felt that the analysis of the 
results should take place in two parts: the first accounting for the 
players' interpersonal perceptions of self as isolated variables; the 
second considering their interactive properties, and the way in which the 
products of these various interactions influence personal adjustment and 
also the levels of trait and state anxiety experienced by the players. 
It is hoped that by using this 'building block' approach the way in 
which the bonded group process affects the praxis of each of the players' 
self perceptions will be quantifiable in statistical terms. Moreover, 
once these analyses have been completed the influence, if any. of the 
sports~type can be assessed, with specific reference to the way in which 
it effects both the players' degree of self-acceptanc~and also their 
levels of general and situation specific anxiety. In essence, measures 
of personal adjustment will be related to patterns of depersonalisation. 
Initially therefore, the questionnaire results for self, not-self 
and ideal self will be analysed. In each case the analysis will consider 
firstly the results for the sample as a whole, a separate test being 
conducted for each administration, and secondly the existence of any between 
group differences. 
Each analysis will be presented in a similar manner; the research 
hypothesis (eses) will be introduced followed by a brief description of 
the statistical technique(s) to be used and reasons for its/their choice 
described. A summary of the results and a brief discussion of the findings 
complete each section, ( a more detailed discussion of the findings will 
take place in chapter 6). 
, The raw data to be used in the analyses will consist of the players' 
questionnaire responses transformed into either alphabetical or numerical 
octant notations, standardised discrepancy units, and/or trait and state 
anxiety scores. However, the particular form or (orms of data used will 
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be specified within each individual analysis. 
la: ~_Analysis of th~ Distribution of_the Pl~y~~' ~per.ceQti9ns of Self. 
Research Hypotheses: 
Hl: There is a significant difference in the distribution of the 
player~perceptions of self around the interpersonal circumplex. 
H2: There is a significant difference between the two test admini~ 
strations in the distributions of the players' perceptions of self. 
Experimental Measures: 
In order to analyse the initial hypothesis proposed above, a 
statistical measure which can assimilate data when it is both nominally 
ordered, and also grouped into eight discrete categories, is required. 
The test chosen which fulfilS these criteria is the one sample chi square 
test. This technique is used in order to measure whether there is a 
significant difference between the actual number of responses falling in 
each particular category, and the expected number; a figure which is 
derived from the proposal made by the null hypothesis: in this case that 
there will be no significant difference in the distribution of the players' 
perceptions of self around the interpersonal circumplex. For this 
analysis, as N is equal to ninety-six for the first administration, and 
sixty-nine for the second, and as there are eight categories, the expected 
frequency, based upon the hypothesis of no differences, will be twelve 
and eight point six players per octant respectively. 
In essence, if the difference between the observed and expected 
frequencies is small, chi square will be small, if large then chi square 
will be large. Siegal (1956), concludes that: 
"Roughly speaking, the larger X 2 is, the more likely it is that the 
observed frequencies did not come from the population on which the null 
hypothesis is based." (p.43) 
The formula for computing chi square is as follows: 
X2 = f{Oi _ .. E:U2 L Ei 
1-1 
Where, Oi = the observed number of cases in ith category. 
and, 
Ei = the expected number of cases in ith category. 
~ directs one to sum over all K categories. 
~ 
The_ significance of the resu}.t is detennined by comparing it, in 
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conjunction with the respective degrees of freedom, to the appropriate 
sampling distribution of chi square. The corresponding degrees of freedom 
are given by the formula K - 1, where K is equal to the number of categories. 
The second research hypothesis was advanced in order to analyse the 
possible effect the temporal nature of the research design had upon the 
distribution of the players'perceptions of self. 
A statistical measurement of this 'effect' had to comply with two 
factors, both of which were contingent upon the-distribution of the 
available data; a reduction in the sample size, which occurred between 
the two tests, from ninety-six to sixty-nine, (a disparity which pre-
cluded the use of a correlated groups statistical measure), and the need 
to concentrate upon the whole distribution of the player/octant frequencies, 
as opposed to analysing possible differences in central tendency. 
With the above restrictions determining statistical choice it was 
decided to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test, as it can contrast 
whole distributions of unequal size. 
are summarised by Siegal( 1956) when 
The advantages of this technique 
he states that this test: 
"Is sensitive to any kind of difference in the distribution from 
which the samples were drawn - differences in location (central tendency), 
in dispersion, in skewness, etc." (p.127) 
K, the product of the distributional comparison, is formulated using a 
step-wise progression which essentially converts the observed scores into 
a series of cumulative frequency proportions. The largest difference, 
'D', between these proportions, is then found by using the following 
formula in conjunction with each interval: 
D = ICP1 - CP2 I : Max 
Using 'D', K can be found: 
K = D Nj x N2 
Nl + N2 
Where, Nl = the number of players from the first administration, 
and, N2 = the number of players from the second administration. 
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The significance of K is established by comparing it with the expression 
given in a pre-determined table. If K is equal to, or larger than this 
critical value, then the research hypothesis is accepted at the given level 
of significance. 
Results: 
Tables 5 and 6 below indicate the number of players, for both observed 
and expected frequencies, who fall in each particular octant: 
Table 5: First Questionnaire Administration. 
Octants 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 21 26 11 3 6 9 10 10 
Expected 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Putting this data into the formula described previously, a chi square 
of 34.3 results. Using seven degrees of freedom this result exceeds the 
value of 24.322 obtained from the chi square distribution table, and is 
therefore significant at beyond the .001 level. 
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Table 6: Second Questionnaire Administration. 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 19 21 11 2 1 1 5 9 
Expected 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
The above data gives a chi square of 51.64. Using seven degrees of 
freedom, this result exceeds the value of 24.322 obtained from the chi 
square distribution table, and is therefore significant at beyond the 
.001 level. 
The observed frequencies in the two chi square tables above give 
the following cumulative proportions and 'D's, for use in the Kolrnogorov-
Srnirnov test. 
Table 7: 
AP 
First Administration (CFl ) 21 
CPl (CF .;. N) .219 
Second Administration (CF2) 19 
CP2 (CF2 .;. N) .275 
D = CPl - CP2 .056 
Using the formula D = I CPl - CP2 I 
D Max. = .135 
Therefore, K = .135 x 9Q_~~ = .855 
96 + 69 
BC DE 
47 58 
.490 .604 
40 51 
.580 .739 
.09 .135 
Max. ; 
Octants 
FG HI JK LM 
61 67 76 86 
.635 .698 .792 .896 
53 54 55 60 
.768 .783 .797 .870 
.133 .085 .005 .026 
The value of .855 falls below the .05 expression of 1.36, indicating that 
there is no significant difference between the two distributions. 
NO 
96 
1 
69 
1 
-
Analysis: 
The results of the two chi square statistical analyses 
established that there is a significant difference in the distribution 
of the players' perceptions of self around the interpersonal circumplex; 
p < .001 for both test administrations. This distributional difference 
was then confirmed as being the same across both questionnaires; K 
failing to reach significance at any level. 
However, although these results indicate that there is a distributional 
difference, they do not determine the direction that this difference 
takes. Referring back to tables 5 arid 6 it is clear that AP, the 
Managerial-Autocratic, and BC, the Competitive-Narcissistic octants, are 
most representative of the players' perceptions of self. Together these 
two generic themes account for forty-nine per cent of the overall total 
for the first administration and fifty-eight per cent for the second. 
In essence the frequency of these two distributions indicate that the 
players are concerned with a phenomenal self which stresses power, 
dominance and respect. 
Although these two octants indicate the trend in the 
direction of the frequency distributions, there is a more fundamental 
difference which establishes a basic dichotomy in the overall distribution 
of the players' self perceptions. This can be shown generally by using 
the horizontal 'Lov' axis as an interpersonal parameter, and more 
specifically by looking at the poles of the vertical 'Dom' axis; the 
former will be considered first. 
If the octants are divided into two groups of four, using the 'Lov' 
axis as described above, then those octants above this line; AP, BC, 
DE and NO, account for seventy-two per cent of the overall total for the 
first administration and eighty-seven per cent for the second. 
Ignoring the basic differences in the self's presenting operations, 
these octants taken together indicate the importance of an apparent 
display of 'strength'. Conversely, the four remaining octants, FG, HI, 
JK and LM, which make up the remaining twenty-eight and thirteen per cent 
of the respective totals, are all characterised by a lack of the 'strength' 
inherent in the interpersonal themes above. This 'weakness' denotes a 
low ego-strength and a weak dependent self. 
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A more specific representation of the structure outlined above can 
be illustrated by referring to the vertical 'Dominance-Submission' axis. 
At the apex of this axis are AP and BC, whose characteristics have already 
been described; at the base are FG, the Rebellious-Distrustful, and 
HI, Self-Effacing-Masochistic octants, which, over the two test 
administrations, are the least used interpersonal themes. The significance 
of these uneven bi-polar distributions takes two forms. Firstly the concern 
with presenting a self which is independent and auth0ritative, and secondly, 
when the frequencies for FG and HI are'placed in the team dynamics 
framework, distrust, rebellious non-conformit~ and critical passivity are 
traits which appear to be regarded by the players as having a negative 
valence. 
1b: A Between Grougs AnalY§is of the Homogen~ity Qf the Players' 
Pergegt10ns of Self. 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference between tf,e teams in the 
, homogeneity of their player~ perceptions Qf self. 
H2: 'The temporal nature of the research d~sign will have a significant 
'effect upon a team's level of homog~neity. 
Experimental Measures: 
An analysis of the initial hypothesis entails that some modifications 
have to be made to 'the data in order to comply with, (a) the assumptions 
inherent in statistical me'thodology, and (b) the need for a measure which 
would, in itself, represent the homogeneity of a players perception of 
self. 
The initial problem arose when the playeri perceptions were allocated 
to their respective octants, and also segregated upon the basis of team 
membership. When this process was completed it was found that there was 
an insufficient number, (in some cases none), to fulfil the statistical 
requirements mentioned above, (see the description of the statistical 
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properties of chi square given in the previous analysis). 1 One way around 
this problem was to 'collapse' certain, adjacent octants into one another, 
therefore giving a sufficient number of players in each new category to 
allow statistical analysis. This method was rejected however as firstly 
it was felt that an amalgamation of what are, by definition, discrete 
interpersonal typologies, would ensue a loss in much of the.overall 
sensitivity of the circumplex. And secondly, the lack, or in some cases the 
complete absence of players from some of the teams in certain octants was, 
in itself, an important factor to be taken into account. 
The second proviso precluded the use of the numerical notations 
formulated by Leary to represent each octant, i.e. AP being one, BC two ••• 
••• NO eight. As they do not, in themselves, comprise a measure of 
homogeneity which could be used as would a vector, to represent both the 
magnitude and direction that a 
away from some central point: 
, players 
.l.n this 
particular self perception was. 
case the interpersonal theme which 
represents the mean of his team's octant scores. 
With these criteria in mind it was decided that what wa', needed was 
a measure which would both take into account. the octants that the 
players were positioned in, and also the degree of deviation these 
positions were from their respective team means. This ~easure would thus 
afford·an index of homogeneity which would encompass b~th direction, and 
magnitude, and also be amenable to statistical analysis. 
The methodology used which fulfilled all of t!le above criteria 
was to initially determine the mean of each teaIr.'s player/octant 
frequencies,· thus obtaining a measure of central tendancy, which would 
represent the interpersonal behaviour of· each group. This method was 
accomplished by summing the number of times each octant was used by each 
player from a particular team. The mean of each octant frequency was 
computed and then converted, via Leary's .standardised formula, into 
a 'Dem/Lov' summary score which could then be plotted onto the inter-
personal circumplex! Usin~ this summary point a measure, representing 
the index of homogeneity proposed above, could be computed by interpreting 
the distance a player's self falls fl'om his particular group mean; this 
distance being established using Leary's discrepancy scores! Consequently, 
a player, (depending upon the position of his perception of self ~round 
the interpersonal circumplex), could score between zero, which would 
indicate no deviation from the mean, and one hundred and fourteen, 
indicating the maximum possible deviation. By using this method each team 
will have a series of scores which can be compared to see if there are 
any significant differences between them. 
The Kruskall-Wallis One Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks will be 
used to determine the presence.of between group significance. This method, 
rather than its parametric counterpart, was chosen as a homogeneity of 
variance check revealed that there was a significant difference in the 
team's sub-variances, for both test adminstrations; F Max: being 2.549, 
(p < .05), and 4.692, (p < .01) respectively.4 
Cohen and Holliday (1978), report that: 
"The power efficiency of the Kruskall-Wallis test relative to the 
parametriC F test is reported as 95.5%" (p.214). 
'H', the statistic used in this test, is given by the formula: 
H = __ 12K __ - 3 (N - 1) 
N (N + 1) 
With the folllowing correction for tied ranks: 
H 
Where, K = the total of the squared sum of ranks in each of the teams, 
divided by the total number of players, . 
N = the total number of players combined, 
and, T = t 3 - t, where t is the number of tied observations in a tied 
group of scores. T directs one to sum over all groups of ties. 
As there are more than five cases in eacq of the teams, the significance 
of 'H' is determined by referring to the chi square distribution table. 
The corresponding degrees of freedom are given by the formula K - 1, 
where K is equal to the number of teams. 
If the result of the Kruskall-Wallis test indicates that there is 
a significant difference between the teams, then a method has to be used 
to determine which of the teams do in fact differ. Because the teams 
have both unequal sUb-variances and differing sizes, (particularly in the 
second test administration), the independent 't' test could not be used 
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to analyse the data with atly confidence. Consequently the Mann-Whitney 
~U' was chosen,as an alternative, as the assumptions made by this 
statistic are not as rigid as its parametric counterpart. 
The Mann-Whitney 'U' is computed by r~ing all the scores, from 
both teams under analYSis, as though they belong to one group. Once 
completed, the ranks for each group are summed and then used in the 
following formula to find 'U': 
U = N1 N2 + N1 (N1 + 1) - R1 
2 
and, 
U = N1 N2 + N2 (N2 + 1) - R2 
2 
Where, R1 = the sum of ranks for group with N1 subjects, 
and, R2 = the sum of ranks for group with N2 subjects. 
For small samples (N2 < 20), the significance of 'U', is determined 
by establishing whether the value of 'U' in a pre-defined table is 
larger than the smaller estimated value, computed from the formula above", 
for the particular size of samples. 
For larger samples (N2 > 20) in order to interpret significance, the 
'U' value is converted into a Z score; using the following formula: 
Z = 
U - N1 NZ 
2 
lli12 iNZ} iN1 + NZ + 11 
12 (Cohen and Holliday, 1978) 
A one-tail rather than a two-tailed distribution will be used to 
determine significance, as the experimental hypothesis implies a 
directional difference.5 
The second hypothesis will also be analysed using the above test 
due to its facility for evaluating differences in population distributions 
with unequal numbers. 
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Results: 
Tables 8 and 9 show how the players perceptions of self are 
distributed, around the interpersonal circumplex. when they are allocated 
to their respective teams. 
Table 8: First Questionnaire Administration 
Octants Group Mean 
Teams AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO Mean Homogeneity 
Loughborough 6 7 3 1 0 0 2 4 AP 39.24 
Freshers~- XV 6 4 3 1 0 1 2 3 AP 43.13 
Durham 4 5 1 0 1 2 0 1 AP 45.50 
York 2 5 2 0 3 3 1 3 AP 56.10 
Newcastle 3 5 2 1 2 3 4 0 AP 59.10 
When the above player/octant frequencies are converted into 
indices of homogeneity, the data gives an 'H', corrected for ties, of 
8.079. Using four degrees of freedom this value is significant at beyond 
the • 10 level. 
The Mann-Whitney 'U' test established that the following teams 
have significant differences in their degree of homogeneity, at the levels 
indicated. 
Loughborough 
Freshers XV 
Newcastle York 
.012 
.05 
.026 
Table 9: Second Questionnaire Administration. 
Octants 
Teams AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Loughborough 7 10 4 0 0 1 0 1 
Freshers XV 3 4 2 0 0 1 0 4 
Durham 5 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
York 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Newcastle 2 3 3 1 0 2 0 3 
Group Mean 
Mean Homogeneity 
BC 28.39 
AP 41.07 
AP 34.00 
AP 46.50 
AP 40.50 
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The above player/octant frequencies, when converted, give a 
Kruskall-Wallis 'H', corrected for ties, of 20.20. Using four degrees 
of freedom this result is significant at beyond the .01 level. 
The Mann-Whitney 'u' test established the significance of the 
following team combinations, at the levels indicated. 
Loughborough 
Freshers XV 
.047 
Newcastle 
.015 
York 
.017 
Using the same technique to analyse the second research hypothesis, 
the Mann-Whitney 'u' results indicate that the temporal research design 
has no significant effect upon the homogeneity of the players'perceptions 
of self; H2 is therefore rejected. 
Analysis: 
The results of the Kruskall-Wallis analysis of variance leads to an 
acceptance of the proposed hypothesis; there is a significant difference 
between· the teams in the homogeneity of their players self perceptions: 
p < .10 and < .01, respectively. The results of the Mann-Whitney 'u' 
established the direction of this difference; Loughborough and the Freshers XV 
having a significantly more homogeneous distribution than Newcastle and 
York, (P = .012 and .026), and Newcastle respectively, (p = .05), for 
the first administration. Loughborough being significantly more homogeneous 
than the FreshersXV, Newcastle and York, for the second, (p = .047, .015 
and .017). 
The homogeneity of the players'self perceptions was also found to 
be a stable construct, 'u' failing to reach significance at any level, 
and for any team comparison; the second experimental hypothesis is 
therefore rejected. , 
Inherent in the initial findings of this analysis is that there appears 
to be a significant degree of association between octant choice and team 
membership. The homogeneous nature of this relationship is clearly 
illustrated for the first administration in Table 8 above, where 
Loughborough, the Freshers, and to a lesser degree Durham, all display 
similar concentrations of player/octant frequencies about the same area 
on the interpersonal circumplex, octants AP and BC. 
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The two rema~1TIg teams, Newcastle and York, are much more hetero-
geneous, with any themes of strength being countered by weakness, self-
depreciation and dependence, (octants HI and JK). 
For the second administration there is again a clear concentration, 
particularly by Loughborough and Durham, of players in octants AP and BC, 
(see Table 9). Unfortunately the heterogeneous nature of the other three 
teams is not as unequivocal due to the smaller number of players involved. 
However, it is apparent that Newcastle again has the most diffuse distrib-
ution of any of the teams. 
2a: An Analysj,s __ of the DistriRlJtiQn of the Not-Self' 
Research Hypotheses: 
Hl: There is a significant difference in the distribution of the 
players'perceptions of not-self around the interpersonal circumplex. 
H2: There is a significant difference between the- two-test 
administrations in the distribution of the not-self. 
H3: The players'perceptions of self and not-self are diametrically 
opposed across the interpersonal circumplex. 
Experimental Measures: 
The statistical techniques used to analyse both H1 and H2 above, and 
the methodology behind this choice, have been extensively reviewed in the 
first of these series of analyses on pages 120 to 122. It is suggested 
therefore that should the reader need additional clarification of the 
following brief discussion, reference should be made to these cited pages. 
The initial experimental hypothesis will be analysed using the 
one sample chi square test. The formula for computing chi square is: 
I< 
X 2 = \ (Qi _ Ei)2 L Ei 
J:1 
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The between administration significance will be.determined using 
the Kolrnogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test; K, the result of which, is given 
by the formula: 
K = D 
The significance of the third.and final hypothesis proved difficult 
to assess as no conventional measure of association could be used given 
the particular form of the data; eight categories ordered·around a Circle. 
As such neither the Pearson 'r' nor the Spearman rho could be used as the 
data did not conform to the restrictions . imposed by the former, and the 
latter is.not sensitive to the ordered relationship between the eight 
. generic themes; i.e. rho would interpret a player with a self of 1 (AP) 
and a not-3elf of 7 (LM) as being six ranks apart, when in fact there 
is only one octant between them. It was decided therefore to dispense 
with an 'omnibus' measure of association and instead to present the data 
in the form of an 8 x 8 contingency table. From the table the difference 
between the observed and expected not-self perceptions, in each cell, can 
be computed in the form of a percentage.· Where this percentage is greater 
than ten percent the difference between '0' and 'E' is taken to be 
'Significant'. The results of this measure will be represented diagram-
atically in the form of a series of c~rcumplexes. 
Results: 
Tables 10 and 11 below indicate the number of players, for both 
observed and expected frequencies, who fall in each particular octant. 
Table 10: First Questionnaire Administration. 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 5 14 16 33 11 10 4 2 
6 12 Expected 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Putting the above frequencies into the formula described previously 
a chi square of 42.438 results. Using seven degrees of freedom this 
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figure exceeds the value of 24.332 obtained from the chi square distrib-
ution table, and is therefore significant at beyond the .001 level. 
Table 11: Second Questionnaire Administration. 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 1 4 15 25 15 6 1 2 
. Expected 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
This data gives a chi square of 67.235. Using seven degrees of 
freedom this figure exceeds the value of 24.322 obtained from the chi 
square distribution-table, and is therefore significant at beyond the 
.001 level. 
The observed frequencies from the two chi square tables overleaf, 
give the following cumulative proportions and 'D's for use in the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
Table 12: 
First Administration (CF1) 5 21 35 68 79 89 93 
CP1 (CF1 + N) .053 .221 .368 .716 .823 .937 .979 
Second Administration (CF2) 1 5 20 45 60 66 67 
CP2 (CF2 + N) .014 .072 .290 .652 .870 .957 .971 
D = CP1 - CP2 .039 .149 .078 .064 .047 .02 .008 
Using the formula D = I CP1 - CP2 I Max:, 
D Max = .149 
Therefore, K = .149 x 92-~ 29 = 
.942 
95 + 69 
The value of .942 falls below the .05 expression of 1.36, indicating 
that there is no significant difference between the two adminstrations. 
The relationship between the players' self and not-self perceptions 
for the first administration are presented in the form of a contingency 
95 
1 
69 
1 
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table below. The figure above the diagonal in each cell represents the 
observed frequencies or not-self associated with each octant/that 
below,the expected frequencies. 
Table 13: First Questionnaire Administration 
NOT SELF 
AP BC DE FG HI JK NO 
When the percentage difference between the observed and expected 
frequencies is computed for each one of the above cells, those greater 
than 1~~ are represented by the shaded portion within the eight circum-
plexes illustrated below; one for each respective generic theme. 
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Figure 7: First Questionnaire Administration. 
The results of the players'self and not-self perceptions for the 
second administration are presented in Table 14 below. As before the 
figure above the diagonal represents the observed frequencies of not-self, 
that below, the expected frequency. (See next page). 
When the percentage difference between the observed and expected 
frequencies above are computed the following patterns emerge: 
Figure 8: Second Questionnaire: Administration, 
The shaded areas above again represent those differences between the 
observed and expected frequencies of not-self which are greater than 10'/0. 
· T36. 
Table 14: Second Questionnaire Administration 
Nar SELF 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
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Analysis: 
The results of the two chi square statistical analyses have 
established that there is a significant difference in the distributions 
of the players'concepts of not-self, around the interpersonal circumplex; 
p < .001 for both administrations. The direction of this difference was 
found to be the same for both tests, K failing to reach significance at 
any level; H2 is therefore rejected. 
The disproportionate nature of the player/octant frequencies centre 
upon FG, the Rebell~ous-Distrustful octant, which alone accounts for over 
one-third of the total distribution for the first and second administrations. 
The concentration of the players upon this particular interpersonal theme 
identifies the importance placed upon the constructs of conformity and 
trust, as FG is characterised by distrust and an inability to maintain, 
or indeed establish close relationships with others, (Leary 1957). 
A more general analysis of the frequency distributions reveals that 
for both administrations there is a rejection of the interpersonal themes 
of hostility, whether characterised by strength, octants BC and DE, 
or weakness, octants FG and HI. Conversely octants AP, NO and LM, which 
all have as their generic theme the traits of expressive authority, 
(AP and NO), and cooperation (AP, NO and LM),are hardly used at all as 
indicators of the not-self. 
The patterns which emerge from the analysis of the players'self and 
not-self perceptions (see figures 7 and 8) tend, in general, to support 
the proposal made by H3, that the two self percepts are diametrically 
opposed across the interpersonal circumplex. The results also lend 
support for Leary's theory as to the nature of the relationship between 
the generic themes: 
"For example, adjacent variables on the circular continuum are more 
closely related than non-adjacent, and the relationship between two 
variables is a monotonic decreasing function of their separation. " 
(La Forge 1957 pgs.461-462): 
In general the illustrations above support La Forge's statement as 
those players whose self perceptions are concerned with expressive 
strength (AP and NO) reject hostile weakness (FG and HI); hostile strength 
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(BC and DE) rejects any weak generic theme (FG, HI and JK); conversely 
friendly weakness (JK and LM) rejects hostile strength (BC and DE). These 
relationships are the same for both questionnaire administrations. 
When the above pattern of results is transposed onto the self and 
not-self distributions for the sample as a whole, although it indicates 
the existence of an inverse relationship between self and not-self 
perception, the distribution of the not-self appears to be a more complex 
and discriminatory amalgam of self referents. There is a clear rejection 
of interpersonal hostility, whether characterised by strength or 
weakness. However, this transposition also reveals that there is a 
cognitive dualism operating, which, when identified goes some way to 
explain the variegation of the two distributions; a self which stresses 
expressive strengths and independence and a not-self which stresses 
hostility, distrust and self-rejection. 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the teams in the 
homogeneity of their players'not-self perceptions. 
H2: The temporal nature of the research design will have a 
significant effect upon a team's level of homogeneity. 
Experimental Measures: 
The concept of homogeneity, and the methodology which enabled it 
to be statistically analysed, has been extensively discussed in the 
second section of this series, on pages 125 to 128. As the following 
discussion will only involve a brief description of the statistical 
formulae to be used, the reader is advised to review the cited reference 
above should additional clarification of the techniques be required. 
Between groups significance will be determined using the 
Kruskall-Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks, as the sub-variances of 
the teams, for the second administration, were found to be unequal; 
"P~9 . 
r Max being 6.282, p < .01, (it must be noted however that although 
r Max failed to reach significance for the first administration, in order 
to maintain consistency, the non-parametric test will be used on both 
distributions). 'H', the product of this statistic, is given by the 
following formula: 
H = 12K - 3 (N - 1) 
N(N + 1) 
With the following correction for tied ranks: 
H 
1 - __ I'1'_ 
N3 - N 
If the results of the Kruskall-Wallis tests indicate that there 
is a significant difference between the teams, the teams which differ 
can be identified using the Mann-Whitney 'U'. This statistic is computed 
using the following formula: 
U = N1 N2 + N1_{N1 + 1} - R1 
2 
and, 
U = N1 N2 + NZ fN2 ± 1} - R2 
2 
The second hypothesis will also be analysed using the above test, 
due to its facility for evaluating differences in population distributions 
with unequal sizes. 
Results: 
Tables 15 and 16 below show how the players'not-selves are distributed 
around the interpersonal circumplex when they are allocated to their 
respective teams. 
Table 15: First Questionnaire Administration 
Octants Group Mean 
Teams AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO Mean Homogeneity 
Loughb?rough 0 2 3 11 3 3 1 0 FG 29.39 
Freshers XV 0 3 2 5 4 3 2 0 FG !; 1 .79 
Durham 2 2 1 5 2 1 0 1 FG 37.93 
Newcastle 3 2 6 6 1 2 0 0 DE 38.60 
York 0 5 4 6 1 1 1 1 DE 39.16 
. 
When the above player/octant frequencies are converted into indices 
of homogeneity, the data gives an 'H', corrected for ties, of 3.514. 
Using four degrees of freedom this value fails to reach the .10 expression 
of 7.779. 
Table 16: Second Questionnaire Administration 
Octants Group Mean 
Teams AP BC rE FG HI JK LM NO Mean Homogeneity 
Loughborough 1 1 4 10 4 1 0 2 FG 34.65 
Freshers XV 0 1 3 3 4 2 1 0 HI 46.07 
Durham 0 0 3 4 1 1 0 0 FG 20.22 
Newcastle 0 2 5 3 4 0 0 0 FG 33.86 
York 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 0 FG 35.22 
The above player/octant frequenctes, when convert.ed, give a 
Kruskall-Wallis 'H', corrected for ties; of 4.895. Using four degrees 
of freedom this value fails to reach the .10 expression of 7.779. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney 'U' indicate that the temporal I 
research design has no significant effect upon the homogeneity of the 
players' not-selves. 
Analysis: 
The results of the Kruskall-Wallis statistical analyses indicate 
that there is no significant difference between the teams, in the 
homogeneity of their players/not-self perceptions: 'H' failing to reach 
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any given level of significance for either test administration. 
Consequently, H1 is rejected, The results of the Mann-Whitney 'U' 
establish that the playersJperceptions of not-self are stable over time, 
regardless of team affiliation; 'U' failing to reach any given level of 
significance for any team comparison; H2 is therefore also rejected. 
It is evident from the above frequencies in tables 15 and 16 that 
starting from AP there is a monotonic increase in the player/octant 
frequencies, which centres upon the 'hate' pole of the horizontal 'lov' 
axis; octants DE and in particular .FG. After this point there is then 
a decrease in the octant frequencies, with LM, NO, and AP hardly being 
used as indicators of the not-self. As regards more specific individual 
differences, for the first administration both York and Newcastle 
have a higher number of players rejecting AP and BC respectively, than 
any of the other teams. However, the trend of their players'perceptions 
is still toward the aggressive-rebellious octants. 
The disproportionate nature of the distributions indicates that 
irrespective of team-membership there is a shared concern in rejecting 
punitive aggression.- (DE) ,rebellious-distrust (FG),and self-criticism 
(HI). The common factor inherent in these three generic themes being 
interpersonal hostility, whether directed at the self, or at the others 
with whom one interacts. 
The rejection of hostility is also a stable phenomenal construct, 
as there is no apparent change over-time in the direction of the players' 
perceptions of not-self. 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference in the distribution of the 
players) ideal selves around the interpersonal circumplex. 
H2: There is a significant difference between the two test 
administrations in the distribution of the ideal self. 
Experimental Measures: 
The statistical techniques to be used to analyse both of the 
above proposals and the methodology behind this choice have been 
extensively discussed in the first of this series of analyses, and can 
be found on pages 120 to 122. As the following discussion will only 
present the formulae. used to process the data, it is suggested that, 
should the reader require additional clarification, reference should be 
made to these pages. 
T,he initial research hypothesis will be analysed using the one 
sample chi square test. The formula used to compute this statistic 
is: K 
11" . ~ (0' ;;Eil' 
1=1 
The between administration significance will be determined using 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test; K, the result of which, is given 
by the formula: 
K = 
Results: 
Tables 17 and 18 below indicate the number of players, for 
both observed and expected frequencies, who fall into each particular 
octant. 
Table 17: First Que:3tionnaire Administration. 
Octants 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 59 22 0 0 1 0 0 14 
Expected 12 12 12 12 12 12 12., 12 
Putting the above frequencies into the formula described previously, 
a chi square of 250.85 results. Using seven degrees of freedom this 
figure exceeds the value of 24.322 obtained from the chi square distribution 
table, and is therefore significant at beyond the .001 level. 
Table 18: Second Questionnaire Administration. 
Octants 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
Observed 43 17 1 0 0 0 0 8 
Expected 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
This data gives a chi square of 186.96. Using seven degrees of 
freedom this figure exceeds the value of 24.322 obtained from the chi 
square distribution table, and is therefore significant at beyond the 
.001 level. 
The observed frequencies from .. the two chi square tables above give 
the following cumulative proportions and 'D's, for use in the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. 
Table 19: 
AP BC DE FG HI JK LM NO 
First Administration (CF1) 59 81 81 81 82 82 82 96 
CP1 (CF1 .,. N) .614 .844 .844 .844 .854 .854 .854 -
Second Administration (CF2) 43 60 61 61 61 61 61 69 
CP2 (CF2 .,.·N) 
.623 .870 .884 .884 .884 .884 .884 -
D = ep1 - CP2 .009 .026 .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 
Using the formula D = CP1 - CP2 Max: 
D Max = .04 
= .04 9~x 69 
96 + 69 
= .253 
The value of .253 falls below the .05 expression of 1.36, indicating that 
there is no significant difference between the two administrations. 
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Analysis: 
The results of the two chi square statistical analyses establish that 
there is a significant difference in the distribution of the players' 
ideal selves around the interpersonal circumplex; p < .001 for both 
administrations. The direction of this distributional difference was 
confirmed by the result of the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test as being the 
same for both administrations; K failing to reach significance at any level. 
From tables 17 and 18 it is evident that the disproportionate nature 
of the player/octant frequencies centres upon the apex of the vertical 
'Dom' axis; octants AP, and to a smaller extent BC and NO. 
The AP octant is unequivocally the most popular interpersonal theme 
used by the players to represent their phenomenal ideal. However, of 
the 59 players from the first administration, and the 43 from the second, 
whose ideal is represented by this particular octant, every single one 
from the first, and 98% of the second, display the more autocratic form 
of this generic code (P). Leary (1957) states that: 
"The key factor in this type is the complete avoidance of weakness 
and uncertainty, and the compulsive desire to appear competent, organised 
and authoritative." (p.324). 
In terms of the 'principle of reciprocal relations' advanced by Leary, 
AP 'pulls' IJ, or the person who manifests control and independence is 
respected and valued by those with whom he interacts. 
Of the two remaining octants which were used to any significant 
degree, BC and NO act as more extreme (BC), and less extreme (NO), versions 
of AP. They therefore form an interconnected triad based upon self-
confidence, authority and expressive responsibility. 
This pattern of results, perhaps more than any other so far, indicates 
the influence that the bonded group has in terms of shaping the values 
and ideals of its members in the direction of the sports-type. The 
interpersonal traits represented by both AP and BC being similar to those 
of the stereotypical athlete reported by Kane et al. 
The only deviations to the above discussions were HI in the first 
administration, and DE in the second. The significance of these 
players'perceptions will be discussed in a later analysis. 
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3b: A Between Groups Analysis of~~ Self. 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the teams in the 
homogeneity of their players'ideal self perceptions. 
H2: The temporal nature of the research design will have a significant 
effect upon a teams level of homogeneity. 
Experimental Measures: 
The methodology behind the use of 'homogeneity scores' as measures 
of perceptual dispersion, and the statistical techniques used to analyse 
these measures have been extensively discussed in the second section (1b) 
of this series on pages 125 to 128 • As the following discussion will only 
involve brief descriptions as to the properties of both the concept of 
homogeneity and the statistical tests used to establish between group 
differences, the reader is advised to review the cited reference above 
should additional clarification of either theoretical or statistical 
methodology be required. 
In brief, players'homogeneity scores are obtained by firstly computing 
each team's mean interpersonal ideal. This is achieved by allocating the 
players to their respective teams and then converting, via Leary's (1957) 
standardised formula, these groups of raw octant scores into Dom and 
Lov indices, the intersection of which represents the 'teams' .interpersonal 
ideal. Each player~ homogeneity score is then computed by assessing how 
far his particular ideal is away from the t~. Size being expressed in 
terms of leary's discrepancy scores. 
Using these discrepancy scores as raw data, between groups' significance 
will be determined using the Kruskall-Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks, 
as the sub-variances of the teams scores, for the first administration, 
were found to be unequal; F Max. being equal to 2.70, p < .05, (it must 
be noted however that although F Max. failed to reach significance for 
the second administration, in order to ~intain consistency, the non-
parametric technique will be used on both distributions). 'H', the product 
of this statistiC, is given by the following formula: 
H = 12K-- _ 3(N -1) 
N(N + 1) 
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With the following correction for tied ranks: 
H 
If the results of the Kruskall-Wallis tests indicate that there is 
a significant difference between the teams 
be identified using the Mann-Whitney 'U'. 
using the following formula: 
U = N1 N2 + NJ lNL+ 1) - R1 
2 
and, 
U = N1 N2 + N2-.lli2 + 11 - R2 
2 
, the teams which differ can 
This statistic is computed 
The second hypothesis will also be analysed using the above test, 
due to its facility for evaluating differences in population distributions 
with unequal sizes. 
Results: 
When assessed all five teams were found to have the same mean ideal 
for both administrations; 'AP' the Managerial-Autocratic interpersonal 
theme. All the players'homogeneity scores are therefore expressions as 
to the size of their deviation from this point. Tables 20 and 21 below 
show how the players'ideal selves are distributed around the interpersonal 
circumplex when they are allocated to their respective teams. These 
frequencies formed the raw data from which the team means described above 
were computed. 
Table 20: First Questionnaire Administration 
Octants Group Mean 
Teams *AP BC HI NO Mean Homogeneity 
Loughborough 16 7 0 0 AP 13.13 
Freshers 'i:V 12 5 0 3 AP 17.6 
Durham 10 2 1 1 AP 17.57 
York 10 3 0 6 AP 19.8 
Newcastle 11 5 0 4 AP 20.84 
* (The reader will have noticed that only four of the eight generic 
themes are listed •. This is because only those themes which were 
actually used by the players have been reported). 
When the above player/octant frequencies are converted into indices 
of homogeneity, the data gives an 'H', corrected for ties, of 2.459. Using 
four degrees of freedom this value fails to reach the .10 expression of 
7.779; Hl is therefore rejected for the first administration. 
Table 21: Second Questionnaire Administration 
Octants Group Mean 
Teams AP BC DE NO Mean Homogeneity 
Loughborough 14 8 1 0 AP 18.69 
Freshers XV 9 3 0 2 AP 17.36 
Durham 5 3 0 1 AP 19.2 
York 5 1 0 3 AP 12.36 
Newcastle 10 2 0 2 AP 19.56 
The above player/octant frequencies, when converted, give a Kruskall-
Wallis 'H', corrected for ties, of .855. Using four degrees of freedom 
this value fails to reach the .10 expression of 7.779; Hl is therefore 
rejected for the second administration. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney 'U' statistic indicate that the 
temporal research design has no significant effect upon the homogeneity 
of the players'ideal self perceptions. (see page 188). 
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Analysis: 
The results of the Kruskall-Wallis statistical analyses indicate that 
there is no significant difference between the teams in the homogeneity of 
their players'ideal self perceptions: 'H' failing to reach any given level 
of significance for either test administration. Consequent~y H1 is rejected. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney 'U' tests establish that the distribution 
of the players'ideal perceptions are also stable over time, irrespective 
of team affiliation; 'U' failing to indicate any significant change in 
the teams levels of homogeneity. As a consequence H2 is also rejected. 
It is evident from the player/octant frequencies in tables 20 and 21 
that, regardless of team affiliation, the most frequent ideal percept is 
AP, the Managerial-Autocratic octant. Each team therefore has a majority 
of players whose predominant concern is behaviour which: 
n(I)nvolves a dominant orientation shaded with elements of positive 
affect or friendliness." (Carson 1969 p. 107). 
The only minor differences between the teams occurs in the proportion of 
players who have either competitive independence (BC), or responsible 
friendliness (NO), as their phenomenal ideal. For both administrations 
Newcastle and York transpose the more expressive ideal of NO onto their 
AP distribution. Conversely, the three-remaining teams tend to gravitate 
from AP toward the more competitive BC profile. 
4a: 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: Self perception has a significant effect upon the level of 
self acceptance. 
H2: Not-self perception has a significant effect upon the level of 
self acceptance. 
H3: The self and not-self perceptions have a significant interactive 
effect upon the level of self-acceptance. 
Experimental Measures: 
The distribution of the data available for the above analyses 
precludes the use of a standard multiple regression technique by which 
to assess the significance of any of the proposed effects, as it assumes 
a curved, rather than a linear regression between the independent and 
dependent variables. 
An alternative method which overcomes this limitation is a factorial 
analysis of variance. Although this statistic does have a great 
methodological and conceptual affinity to regression analysis, the major 
difference between them is in the latterS ability to process non-linear 
regressions. Kerlinger (1977) states that the two techniques: 
"(A)re in essence the same. They both express relations. They are 
both sets of ordered pairs with the independent variable or variables 
defined." (p.633). 
However, ignoring the fundamental similarities between the two 
techniques, it is the shape of the regression which led to the preference 
of the factorial analysis which is of initial importance, both practically, 
and,as will be discussed later, conceptually, as it begins to relate the 
three aspects of the self schema under analysis to the generic themes of 
the interpersonal circumplex. The data's departure from recti linearity 
is illustrated in Tables 22 and 23 below: 
Table 22: The Self 
Unadjusted Mean Deviation 
Octants First Administration Second Administration 
AP -29.83 -20.05 
BC -11.78 -5.90 
DE 16.49 14.66 
FG 22.22 40.48 
HI 40.89 55.48 
JK 42.55 48.48 
LM 17 .62 27.68 
NO -9.78 2.26 
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Table 23: The Not-Self 
Octants First Administration Second Administration 
AP 26.82 -35.52 
BC 26.86 32.48 
DE 13.47 6.54 
FG -11.63 -7.66 
HI -32.32 1.10 
JK -15.38 -7.86 
LM 20.97 -13.52 
NO 41.72 6.14 
The figures in both tables above represent the mean self acceptance 
score associated with each octant, expressed as a deviatior. from the sample 
means of 43.78 for the first administr'1-tion, and 35.52 fOl' the second. 
For example, in the first administration the mean self a.cceptance score 
associated with the self for octant AP is 13.95 (-29.83 plus 43.78), . for 
BC 32, and for HI 84.67. The unadjusted notation me&ns that the results 
of each independent variable, i.e. the self and not-self preceptions, 
are taken separately, without adjusting. them for the effects of the other, 
(this technique will be developed in more deta:i.l later on in this discussion). 
The fundamental purpose in using the factorial analysis of variance, 
apart from its facility for establishing the effects of a non-linear 
regression, is summarised in toe following statement by Kerlinger (1977): 
"Factorial analysis of variance is the statistical method that 
analyses the independent and interactive effects of two or more indepeildeIit 
variables on a dependent variable." (p. 644). 
The alethodology used by this technique i_nvolves segregating the variations 
associated with each of the experimental variables so that any significant 
differences will emerge in the form of an F ratio. Furthermore, as a 
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result of segregating the sources of variation it is possible to determine 
whether the differences between the means owe their divergencies to the 
self, not-self or both. There is also the fur~her possibility of 
'interactive variance' which are those variations in the dependent 
variable attributable to the effects of the two independent variables 
acting together. 
The two-way analysis of variance to be used to determine the 
significance of the experimental hypothesis is shown schematically in 
the following formula: 
x = Xt + da + db + dab + er 
Where, Xt = the grand mean of the self acceptance scores, 
da = the deviation in X due to the self, 
db = the deviation in X due to the not-self 
dab = the deviation in X due to the interactive effects of the 
self and not-self perceptions. 
and, er = the random error contribution. 
The information given by the results of the analysis of variance 
is three-fold, and each aspect will now be discussed in some detail. 
The initial products of this statistic are a series of F ratios, each one 
pertaining to the significance a particular effect has upon the dependent 
variable. These can be summarised as: a) the main effects; the effect 
that the self and not-self perceptions have, independently, upon self 
acceptance. b) the joint effect; the effect the two self perceptions 
together, have upon self acceptance. c) the effect the interaction of 
the two independent variables have upon the dependent variable. 
The significance of each one of these F ratios is determined by 
using the appropriate number of degrees bf freedom in conjunction with 
Snedecors table. The source of these values are summarised overleaf. 
1?~. 
Source Degrees of Freedom 
Between Rows r - 1 
Between Columns k - 1 
Interaction (r - 1) (k - 1) 
Within Sets N - rK = rk(N - 1) 
Total N - 1 
A further series of statistics given by this method are a number 
of eta and beta correlation coefficients. The former, known as the 
correlation ratio, represents the unadjusted effects each independent 
variable has upon the variance in self acceptance score~ The latter 
gives a standard partial regression coefficient, where the effect of the 
variable, other than the one to which the Beta weight applies, is held 
constant. A comparison of the products of these coefficients affords an 
indication of the separate effect of the two self perceptions. 
Finally, the coefficient of determination (or R';l is given. The size 
of this figure indicates the proportion of the variance in self acceptance 
explained by the additive effects of the . self and not-self perceptions. 
Results: 
Table 24 below summarises the effect the different sources of 
variation have upon self acceptance for the first administration of the 
questionnaire. 
Table 24: 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Variance ~ 
Main Effects 64535.149 14 4609.654 12.371 
Self 24370.825 7 3481.546 9.344 
Not-Self 7875.658 7 1125.094 3.020 
Interaction 1420.114 12 118.343 0.318 
Residual 25337.096 68 372.604 
Total 91292.359 94 971.195 
Interpreting the F ratios as they are listed above, using fourteen 
and sixty-eight degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 12.371, given by the 
joint effect of the two self perceptions, is significant at the .001 
level. Similarly, taking the individual main effects, using seven and 
sixty-eight degrees of freedom, the F ratios of 9.344 and 3.020 are both 
statistically significant; p < .001 for the effect of self perception, 
and p = .008 for the effect of the not-self. Finally, the F ratio of 
.318, representing the interactive effect of the two self perceptions, 
fails to reach significance at any given level. 
A more detailed analysis as to the effect of the self and not-self 
perceptions is given by the following eta and beta correlation coefficients. 
Eta (unadjusted) Beta (adjusted) 
Self .79 .68 
Not-Self .66 .32 
Analysing the eta coefficients first; for the self the, of .79 indicates 
that 6~/o, (eta2 ) of the variance in the self acceptance scores is accounted 
for by the effect of self perception. Similarly the~ of .66 indicates 
that 44 % of the variance is accounted for by the effect of not-self 
perception. 
The significance of the beta coefficient is in its ability to indicate 
the presence of any difference in effect the two self perceptions may 
have upon self acceptance. The two results establish that the influence 
of the self is only slightly diminished, (.79 to .68) when the effect 
of the not-self is controlled. However, the influence of the not-self 
is markedly reduced, (.66 to .32) when the effect of the self is controlled. 
Finally, an R2 of .707 is given as a summary measure of the effect 
the self and not-self perceptions have upon self acceptance. In essence 
the result means that 70.7% of the variance in self acceptance is accounted 
for by the effect of the two self perceptions. 
Table 25 below summarises the effects that the different sources 
of variation have upon self acceptance for the second questionnaire 
administration. 
Using fourteen and forty-six degrees of freedom,the F ratio of 
4.618, given by the joint effect of the two self perceptions, is significant 
154. 
at the .001 level. Similarly, using seven and forty-six degrees of 
freedom,the F ratio. of 6.276, given by the individual effect of the self 
is also significant; p < .001. However neither the F ratios of 0.888 
or 1.106, given by the not-self and interactive self perceptions, are 
statistically significant at any given level. 
Table 25: 
Source of Variation Swn of Squares D.F. Variance F 
Main Effects 25792.261 14 1842.304 4.618 
Self 17524.303 7 2503.472 6.276 
Not-Self 2478.725 7 354.104 0.888 
Interaction 3529.635 8 441.204 1.106 
Residual 18349.320 46 398.898 
Total 47671.216 68 701.047 
A more detailed analysis of the effects indicated in the above table 
is given by the following eta and beta coefficients. 
Eta (unadjusted) Beta (unadjusted) 
Self .70 .72 
Not-Self .42 .25 
Interpreting the eta coefficients first; for the self the", of .70 
indicates that 49% of the variance in the self acceptance scores is 
accounted for by this particular perception. Similarly, the~ of .42 
given for the not-self establishes that it accounts for 18%. 
The beta coefficients indicate the disproportionate nature the 
effect of the respective self perceptions have upon self acceptance, the 
influence of the self increasing when the effect of the not-self is 
controlled, (.70 to .72). However, there is again a marked reduction 
in the influence of the not-self when the effect of the self is controlled 
( .42 to .25). 
The coefficients of determination, R2, swnmarising the effect the 
two self perceptions have upon the self acceptance scores when they are 
taken together is .541. Consequently 54.1% of the variance in self 
acceptance is accounted for by the effects of the self and not-self 
perceptions. 
Analysis: 
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The results of the two factorial analysis of variance indicate that 
for both administrations the joint effect and main effect of the self, 
are statistically significant; p < .001 for all cases. The effect of the 
not-self was found to be significant but only for the first administration; 
p = .008. However the interactive effect of the two self perceptions 
failed to reach significance for either test. 
The results established that the perception of self is an extremely 
important construct in determining a players level of self acceptance •. 
The magnitude of this relationship can be seen in the size of the 
correlation ratios, .79 for the first administration and .70 for the 
second. Referring back to table 22 it will be remembered that the 
relationship established is curvilinear; there is a monotonic decrease 
in the level of self acceptance for both test administrations, AP being 
the most self accepting interpersonal theme with a mean divergence of 
-29.83 and -20.05 for each respective test. Conversely JK for the first 
administration and HI for the second are octants associated with self 
rejection, with mean divergencies of 42.89 and 55.48 respectively, (to 
give some indication of the magnitude of these results the maximum 
possible mean discrepancy is 70.22) • 
. The results of the effect of not-self perception, for the first 
administration at least, establish a relationship which is the inverse 
to that described above. Referring back to table 23 it is clear that 
the monotonic relationship centres upon HI and JK, these generic themes 
being associated with a high level of self acceptance, each theme having 
a mean deviation of -32.32 and -15.38 respectively. However NO, and 
to a smaller degree AP and BC, are now the least self accepting themes 
with NO having a mean deviation of 41.72. The failure of the 
significance of this effect to be repeated in the second administration 
may have something to do with the critical component of the not-self 
perception, however a full discussion of this factor will be deferred 
until the next chapter. 
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Finally, looking at the additive effects that the two self perceptions 
have upon self acceptance, the R2 for both administrations, 70.7% for 
the first and 54.1% for the second, indicate. that together they account 
for a very large proportion of the variance in the self acceptance scores. 
As such they should be taken into account when any evaluation is made 
of this particular aspect of a players phenomenal cognition. 
4b: A 6etMeen Group~ Analysi~9f Self Acceptance 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the teams in their 
players' levels of self acceptance. 
H2: There will be a significant difference between the two test 
administrations in the players' levels of self acceptance. 
Experimental Measures: 
~he properties of the statistical methOtls which will be used to 
determine the significance of the above proposals have been extensively 
reviewed in the second of these series of analyses and can be found on 
pages127 to 128. As only the formulae involved in the computation of 
each method will be presented in this discussion, it is suggested that 
should the reader require clarification of either the methodology behind, 
or the assumptions made by these statistics, reference should be made 
to the above cited pages. 
Between groups significance will be determined using the Kruskall-
Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks. This non-parametric method was 
the chosen alternative to the parametriC F test which could not be used 
as the teams sub-variances were found to be unequal; F Max being 
2.513, p < .05 for the first administration, and 4.706, p < .01 for the 
second. 'H', the product of this statistiC, is given by the formula: 
H = 12k 
N (N + 1) 
With the following correction for tied ranks: 
1 - ET 
N' - N 
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If the results of either of the Kruskall-Wallis tests indicate that 
there is a significant difference between the teams, the teams which 
differ can be identified using the Mann Whitney 'U'. This statistic 
is computed using the following formula: 
U = Nl N2 + N1 iNl + 12 Rl 
= 
2 
and, 
U = N1 N2 + N2 iN2 + 1) R2 
-
2 
The between administration significance will also be analysed using 
the above statistic as it has the facility for evaluating differences 
in population distributions with unequal sizes. 
Results: 
For the first questionnaire adminstration when the players'self 
acceptance scores are allocated to their respective teams the data gives 
an 'H', corrected for ties, of 10.756. Using four degrees of freedom 
this value is significant at the .05 level. Analysing this result in 
more detail, the Mann Whitney 'U' established that the piayers from. the 
following teams have significantly different levels of self acceptance 
at the expression indicated. 
Table 26: 
Newcastle York 
Loughborough 
-
.0217 
Freshers XV .05 .01 
The data for the second administration glves an 'H' corrected for 
ties, of 8.28. Using four degrees of freedom this value is significant 
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at beyond the .10 level. The Mann Whitney 'U' established the significant 
difference of the following team combinations, at the levels indicated. 
Table 27: 
Freshers Durham Newcastle 
Loughborough .002 - .0281 
York 
-
.05 
-
The same statistic revealed that only the ~layers from Loughborough 
had any significant difference in their levels of self acceptance for 
the two administrations; p = .0133. 
Analysis: 
The results of the Kruskall-Wallis analyses of variance entail that 
the initial research hypothesis is accepted. There is a significant 
difference between the tea:ns in their players' levels of self acceptance 
for both test administrations; p < .05 and .10 respectively. The Mann 
Whitney 'U' established the source of these differences; For the first 
administration the players from Loughborough and the freshers XV were 
found to be significantly more self accepting than either York (p = .0217), 
or Newcastle and York respectively, (p = .05 and .01). -for the second 
administration the player·s from LoUghborough and York were significantly 
more self accepting than either the Freshers and Newcastle (p = .002 and 
.281), or Durham respectively (p = .05). This statistic also revealed 
that only the Loughborough XV showed any significant difference between 
the two test administrations; the players becoming more self accepting 
p = .0133. 
Inherent in the above findings is that there is an apparent 
relationship between self acceptance and team membership. 
can be briefly explained by reviewing the results obtained 
This proposal 
from the 
analyses of the between groups self and not-self perceptions, (see pages 
125 and 138 ). 
The players' perceptions of self were shown in the previous analysis 
to have a significant effect upon self acceptance, transposing this result 
onto the players' perceptions when they are controlled for team membership, 
there is a consistency of effect. For the first administration, as above, 
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the between groups analysis revealed that the players from Loughborough 
and the Freshers XV were significantly different to either Newcastle or 
York; their players'perceptions of self being more homogeneous around the 
'self accepting' octant of AP (for clarification of this term please see 
the previous analysis). Similarly, for the second administration 
Loughborough was, as above, significantly different to either the Freshers 
or Newcastle in its players'degree of perceptual homogeneity. 
The results of the not-self, though not as clear-cut, nevertheless 
reveal that for the first administration both Newcastle and York had a 
higher proportion of their players rejecting the 'socially acceptable' 
octants of AP, BC and NO, than any other team. The rejection of these 
themes was found in the previous analysis to be connected with low levels 
of self acceptance. 
It is evident from the above discussion that there is a transference 
of effect from the sample population as a whole down to the individual 
group, in terms of the relationship between self perception and self 
acceptance. The delineator appearing to be the homogeneity of a teamS 
player self perceptions. A more detailed analysis of these 
factors will be deferred until the next chapter. 
5: An AnalYsis of Trait gnd State Anxiety 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the teams in their 
players'levels of trait anxiety. 
H2: There is a significant difference between the teams in their 
players"levels of state anxiety. 
H3: Trait anxiety is by definition a stable construc~consequently 
there will be no significant difference, between the two test 
administrations, in each teams trait anxiety levels. 
H4: There is a significant difference between the two test 
administrations in each teams levels of anxiety state. 
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H5: There is a significant relationship between the players'levels 
of trait and state anxiety. 
Experimental Measures: 
Most of the statistical techniques which are to be used to determine 
the significance of the above proposals have been extensively described 
in previous sections. Consequently only the formula involved in the 
computation of each method will be given here, however page references 
will accompany each brief description, and should the reader require any 
additional information it is suggested that (s)he review the 
appropriate cited reference. 
The initial research hypothesis will be analysed using a one way 
analysis of variance for independent groups. This test takes as its 
basic premise that the population, estimated from the sample means, 
"should be essentially the same as that estimated from the single 
observations", (Guilford and Fruchter, 1950, p.225). Therefore: 
"(T)he expected value of a SaMple mean x will be the population 
mean Similarly the expected value for the sample variance will 
be the population variance". (ibid). 
Consequently: 
E (xi) =)1., for all k treatments, and 
E (Si 2 ) = 6 2 , for all k treatment variances. 
In order to establish the truth of the above proposal, the 'F' statistic 
is computed using the following formula: 
f = ~§b 
Msw 
Where, Msb = the between group variance of the players'trait anxiety scores, 
and, Msw = the within group variance of the players'trait anxiety scores. 
The result of the between group variance is given by the formula: . 
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Msb = (2XJ) + (IJ(2) + (E]{k) - GT 
n1 n2 nk 
Where, X = the sum of the scores in each of the groups, 
n = the number of players in each of the groups, 
XI< = the sum of the scores in the Kth group, 
and GT = the grand total; (~Xl2 
N 
~here, X = the sum of all raw scores. 
The result of the within group variance is given by the formula: 
Msw. = Xi2 - i_Xi}2 + •••••••• to ith group 
ni 
Where, Xi 2 = the sum of X in the ith group, 
Xi = the sum of Xi in the ith group, 
and, ni = the number of players in the ithgroup. 
In order to establish the significance of 'F', two separate degrees 
of freedom have to be considered. For the numerator of 'F', the 
corresponding degrees of freedom are given by the formula K - 1, where 
K is equal to the number of groups. Similarly, for the denominator of 
'F' the number of degrees of freedom are equal to N - K, where N equals 
the number of players and K the number of groups. 
Using these two values reference is then made to Snedecor's table 
in order to establish whether the computed 'F' exceeds the tabular value, 
found at the intersection of the respective degrees of freedom. 
Should the result of either one of the analyses of variance indicate 
that there is a significant difference between the groups, then a 
method has to be used to identify the source of this difference. The 
technique which will be used should this eventuality occur is the Tukey 
test, 'T', the product of which, is given by the following formula: 
T = (q) x Vgr Within 
N 
Where, q = a tabular value found using the total number of means and the 
degrees of freedom associated with the denominator of the 'F' 
test. 
Var With = the within group variance of the 'F' test, 
and N = the number in each group or the number of scores from which 
each mean is calculated. 
If the resulting 'T' value is smaller than the difference between the 
two means under scrutiny, then the means can be said to be significantly 
different, (Cohen and Holliday op cit). 
The between group significance of state anxiety will be determined 
using the Kruskall Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks ( see pages 127 
and 128 ). This non-parametric method is used as the teams sub-
variances were found to be unequal for "the second administration; F Max 
being 4.03, p < .05, (it must be noted however that although F Max 
failed to reach significance for the first administration, in order to 
maintain consistency, the non-parametric method will be used on both 
distributions). 'H', the product of this statistic, is given by the 
formula: 
H = 12k 
==== 
= 3 (N - 1) 
N (N + 1) 
with the following correction for tied ranks: 
H 
1 _ rT 
N3 - N 
Should the results of either of the Kruskall Wallis analyses indicate 
that there is a significant difference between the teams, the source of 
these differences can be identified using the Mann Whitney 'U', 
(see page 128 ). This statistic is computed using the following formula: 
U1 = N1 N2 + NI iNL±_.1.l 
2 
R1 
and, 
U2 = N1 N2 + ~(N2 + 1) 
2 
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R2 
This method will also be used to determine the stability of the 
teams trait and state anxiety scores. 
The final proposal will be investigated using a coefficient of 
correlation. The product of this statistic, usually written as 'r', is 
a summary measure which indicates both the strength and direction of an 
association between two variables. In different situations 'r' can vary 
from between plus one, which would indicate that there was a perfect 
association between the two variables, through zero, indicating the 
absence of any relationship, to minus one, which would indicate a perfect 
negative, or inverse relationship between the two variables. 
The correlation method to be used here is the Pearson Product Moment 
correlation coefficient, the result of which is given by the formula: 
r = nIXY =-ifXl~Y2 
jn'IX2 _ (n)2 nrY2 _ (1 y)2 
Where, r = the correlation coefficient, 
n = the number of pairs of scores, 
X = each of the scores on the first variable, (A-Trait) 
and, Y = each of the scores on the second variable, (A-State). 
·The meaning of 'r' can be interpreted in two ways: (i) is it 
significant; and (ii) how much confidence can one have in the strength 
of the relationship indicated? The significance of 'r' is established 
using the appropriate degrees of freedom, given by the formula N - 2 
(where N equals the total number of pairs of scores), in conjunction with 
pre-defined tabular values. 
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The strength of the relationship can be judged using the guide 
proposed by Cohen and Holliday, (1978): 
r 
0.00 - 0.19 
0.20 - 0.39 
0.40 - 0.59 
0.69 - 0.89 
0.90 - 1.00 
Meaning 
A very low correlation. 
A low correlation. 
A modest correlation. 
A high correlation. 
A very high correlation. 
Inverse or negative correlation coefficients are interpreted in exactly 
the same manner. 
One additional statistic will be computed which, although not directly 
related to anyone of the research hypotheses listed above, will mean 
that a more detailed analysis of each teams trait and state anxiety scores 
is possible. 
Normative data will be computed by converting both sets of anxiety 
raw scores into T-Scores, both for the sample as a whole and for each of 
the respective teams. The purpose of this transformation is three-fold; 
(i) comparisons can be made with Spielberger et ai's (1970) published norms, 
(ii) comparisons between teams can be made, and (iii) comparisons between 
test administrations can be made. 
The raw scores will be converted into T-Scores using the formula: 
T = 10 LX --X1 + 50 
S.D. 
Where, X = a players trait or state anxiety score, 
X = the mean of the distribution to which that player belongs, 
S.D. = the standard deviation of the distribution. 
The effect of the T-Scale is essentially one of normalising any 
distribution so enabling comparisons to be made. However, the additional 
advantage of this particular scale is in its sensitivity to extreme scores. 
In a normal distribution 99.74% of the scores lie between: 3 standard 
deviations from the mean; the T-Scale however has a r&nge of : 5 standard 
deviations, with a fixed mean of fifty. It is therefore sensitive to 
the extremes within any population, (Cohen and Holliday, 1978). 
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Results: 
Tables 27 and 28 below summarise the results of the two analyses 
of variance which measured the between group significance of trait anxiety. 
Table 27: First Qw5tionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Variance F 
Between Groups 352.252 4 88.063 1.768 
Within Groups 4531.408 91 49.796 
Total 4883.660 95 
Using four and ninety-one degrees of freedom the 'F' ratio of 1.768 
falls below the tabular expression of 2.46 and so fails to reach significance 
at the .05 level. 
Table 28: Second Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Variance F 
Between Groups 359.26 4 89.815 1.968 
Within Groups 2921.552 64 45.649 
Total 3280.812 68 
Using four and sixty-four degrees of freedom the 'F' ratio of 1.968 
falls below the tabular expression of 2.51 and so fails to reach 
significance at the .05 level. 
The players state anxiety scores, when allocated to their respective 
teams, gave an 'H', corrected for ties, of 11.532, for the first 
questionnaire administration. Using four degrees of freedom this value 
is significant at the .05 level. Analysing this result in greater 
detail the Mann Whitney 'U' test established that players from both the 
Loughborough and Freshers XV had significantly lower levels of state 
anxiety for the following team combinations, at the levels indicated. 
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Table 29: 
Loughborough Durham York 
Freshers XV .018 .05 .01 
Loughborough 
- - .068 
The player.sstate anxiety scores for the second administration gave 
an 'H', corrected for ties, of .537. Using three degrees of freedom 
this value fails to reach the .10 tabular expression of 6.251. 
The stability of trait anxiety as a psychological construct was 
indicated by the results of the Mann Whitney test. 'U' failing to indicate 
the presence of any significant differences, between the two test 
administrations, in the teams'levels of trait anxiety. 
Conversely, both Loughborough and Newcastle had a significant 
difference between the two test administrations, in their players'levels 
of anxiety state; p = .024 and .01 respectively. 
Th~ results of the Pearson correlation established that there is 
a strong, positive relationship between the players'trait and state anxiety 
scores for both test administrations; 'r' being equal to .557 (p < .01), 
and .556 (p < .01) respectively. 
Finally, tables 30 and 31 overleaf illustrate the normalised 
T-distributions of each teams trait and state anxiety scores for both 
administrations. The results for an undergraduate sample, taken from 
Spielberger's published norms, has been included as a comparative measure. 
This particular group was chosen as it has a close affinity with the 
background of the experimental sample.' 
Analysis: 
As the F ratios obtained from the two analyses of variance failed 
to reach significance at any level for 
experimental hypothesis is rejected. 
either administration, the initial 
Consequently there'is no significant 
difference between the teams in their players'levels of trait anxiety. 
Conversely, the Kruskall-Wallis test established that there was a significant 
difference between the teams in their players'levels of state anxiety 
for the first administration; p < .05. The Mann Whitney 'U' indicated 
Table 30: STAr Normalised Trait and State T-Scores for the First 
Administration of the Questionnaire 
Raw Sample Pop. Undergrads.* Loughboro' Durham Freshers 
Score Tr St Tr St Tr St Tr St Tr St 
20 - 31 23 21 - - - - - 32 
21 
- 32 26 26 - 33 - - - -
22 - 33 _ 27 29 - 34 - - - -
23 35 30 32 - 35 - 33 - - -
24 31 36 32 35 35 - - - - 38 
25 32 38 35 38 36 - - - - 39 
26 34 - 37 40 36 - - - - -
27 35 39 38 40 38 40 - - - 42 
28 37 40 39 40 40 - - - 34 44 
29 38 41 41 43 41 42 36 - 36 45 
30 39 42 43 44 42 43 37 - 38 47 
31 41 43 44 46 44 44 39 - - -
32 42 44 46 47 45 - 40 42 42 50 
33 45 46 47 48 46 46 - - 44 51 
34 45 47 48 49 48 - - 44 46 53 
35 46 48 49 50 49 - 44 45 - 54 
36 48 49 50 51 50 49 45 46 - 56 
37 49 50 51 52 51 50 - 47 52 -
38 51 51 51 53 53 51 47 - 54 59 
39 52 52 52 54 54 52 49 49 56 60 
40 53 53 53 54 55 - 50 - 58 62 
41 55 54 54 56 57 54 - - 60 -
42 56 54 55 57 58 56 - - - -
43 57 57 56 58 59 57 54 - 64 -
44 59 - 57 59 61 - - - - -
45 60 59 58 60 62 - - - 68 -
46 62 60 59 60 63 - - - - -
47 63 61 60 61 65 - - 57 - -
48 64 62 61 62 - 60 - - - -
49 66 - 62 63 - - - - - -
50 67 64 62 63 69 64 - 61 - 76 
51 69 65 63 64 - - 64 62 - -
52 70 - 64 65 - - - - - -
53 71 68 65 66 - - - - - -
54 73 69 66 66 74 68 68 - - -
55 74 - 67 67 - - - - - -
56 76 71 68 68 - - - - - -
57 77 72 69 68 - 71 - 68 - -
63 - 79 70 71 - - - - - -
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Newcstl. York 
Tr St Tr 
- 30 -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- 35 -
- - -
- - -
35 
- -
-
40 -
38 41 -
40 
- 37 
-
44 38 
43 45 40 
44 46 41 
- - -
47 49 43 
49 50 -
50 52 46 
52 53 47 
53 54 48 
65 - 50 
- - 51 
-
58 -
59 59 -
- - -
- - -
63 63 -
- -
58 
66 
-
60 
- - -
- - -
- - -
72 
- -
- -
66 
-
- -
- - -
-
76 70 
- - -
- - -
*These figures were obtained from Spielberger' et al's (1970) published norms 
(n = 253). 
St 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
36 
-
-
36 
-
41 
-
43 
-
-
-
47 
48 
-
50 
-
-
54 
-
-
57 
-
59 
-
-
62 
63 
-
-
-
72 
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Table 31: STAr Normalised Trait and State T-Scores for the Second 
Administration of the Questionnaire 
Raw Sample Pop. Undergrads.* Loughboro' Durham Freshers Newestl 
Score Tr St Tr St Tr St Tr St Tr St Tr St 
20 - - 23 21 - - - - - - - -
21 - 31 26 - 34 - - - - - - -
22 - 33 27 29 - - - - - - - 34 
23 - 34 30 32 - 36 - - - - - -
24 32 
-
32 35 34 - - - - - - -
25 - 37 35 38 - - - - - - - 38 
26 35 38 37 40 36 - - - 36 36 34 39 
27 
-
40 38 40 - - - 36 - 37 - 41 
28 38 - 39 41 - - - - 40 - 38 -
29 40 - 41 43 41 43 35 - - - - -
30 41 44 43 44 42 44 - 43 43 - - -
31 42 45 44 46 - - - " 45 43 42 - , 32 44 46 46 47 - - 39 47 47 44 47 -
33 45 48 47 48 47 48 - - - 46 46 48 
34 47 49 48 49 - 49 42 - 51 47 47 50 
35 48 50 49 50 50 50 - 54 - - 49 -
36 50 52 50 51 51 51 - 57 54 50 - 52 
37 51 53 51 52 - 52 - 59 56 - 52 -
38 53 54 51 53 54 53 - - - 53 54 55 
39 54 56 52 54 55 54 - 64 60 - 55 56 
40 55 - 53 55 57 - - - - - - -
41 57 58 54 56 58 - 51 - 63 57 - -
42 58 - 55 57 - - 52 - - - - -
43 60 61 56 58 - 59 - - - - 61 -
44 61 62 57 59 - - 54 - 69 - - 63 
45 63 64 58 60 64 61 - - - 63 - -
46 64 65 59 60 66 - - - - - 66 65 
47 65 66 60 61 - 64 - - - - 68 -
48 67 - 61 62 - - - - - - - -
49 68 - 62 63 70 - 61 - - - - -
50 - - 62 63 - - - - - - - -
53 74 74 65 66 - - 66 - - 75 - -
54 76 - 67 67 - - - - - - - -
57 - 80 69 68 - 75 - - - - - -
* These figures were obtained from Spielberger et al's (1970) published 
norms (n = 253) 
York 
Tr 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
40 
-
-
43 
45 . 
-
47 
-
-
51 
-
54 
-
-
-
-
-
61 
-
-
-69 . 
-
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the source of these differences; the Freshers XV having a significantly 
lower level of anxiety state than either Loughborough (p = .018), Durham 
(p < .01) or York (p < .01), similarly Loughborough was found to be 
significantly lower than York (p = .068). The results for the second 
administration failed to reach significance at any level. 
The results regarming the stability of trait and state anxiety as 
psychological constructs were found to be in keeping with Spielberger's 
theory. There was no significant difference between the two test admin-
istrations in any teams level of anxiety trait, however both Loughborough 
and Newcastle had significantly lower levels of state anxiety; p = .024 
and .01 respectively. The fundamental difference in the temporal 
properties of the two constructs can be further illustrated by looking 
at the reliability of the measures. Using a Pearson 'r', test-re test 
reliability for the players'anxiety trait was found to be .744, for 
anxiety state .436 (p < .01 for both results). The lower 'r' for anxiety 
state was expected as it: 
"should reflect the influence of unique situational factors existing 
at the time of testing". (Spielberger et al 1970 p.9). 
The final statistical analysis established that there was a 
significant relationship between the players levels of trait and state 
anxiety for both questionnaire administrations; 'r' being equal to 
.557 (p < .01) and .556 (p < .01) resrectively. Moreover, the size of 
both coefficients are in keeping with those reported by Spielberger et al 
who found that the trait-state correlations "for males varied between 
.37 and .67, with a median 'r' of .47" (1970 p.12). 
The illustration, by the two T-Scales, of the distribution of the 
anxiety scores gives a graphic representation of the initial findings 
of this analysis. 
For the first administration it is apparent from table 30 that the 
experimental sample as a whole have a higher elevation in both trait and 
state anxiety, than Spielberger et aI's undergraduate norms, however there is 
a high degree of similarity between these two samples anxiety scores, 
upto and around the mean of fifty T-points, for the second administration, 
although after this point the two distributions diverge. 
The between team differences are more discern1ble; for the first 
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adminstration the Freshers XV and Loughborough have the lowest means 
for both trait and state anxiety, corresponding in fact to the under-
graduates for trait anxiety. Also both of these teams have a number of 
players who fall in the lower extremities of the anxiety distributions, 
with a series of scores beginning at -1.7 and -1.8 standard deviations 
from the mean respectively, a situation which illustrates why these two 
teams were shown to have significantly lower levels of state anxiety by 
the Mann Whitney 'U'. The upper-limits of the two anxiety distributions 
however, are heavily populated by both York and Durham, with York having 
the more extreme distribution of T-Scores. 
In terms of the Newcastle players, although not significantly 
different to any of the other four teams, their trait and state 
T-distributions represent something of a 'middle ground' between the 
concentration, particularly about the lower extremities of the A-trait 
and A-state scales, of the Freshers XV and to a lesser extent Loughborough, 
and the more diffuse distribution, centred about the far higher scores, 
of both Durham and York. In general the Newcastle distribution is centred 
about the middle range of anxiety scores (between 30 and 40, plus and 
minus one standard deviation from the mean) although there is a difference 
between the trait and state T-Scores: the players having a far greater 
deviation in terms of their state scores a distribution which, as can 
be seen from table 30, represents the full range of affective disposition. 
For the second administration both Loughborough and Newcastle have 
the lowest mean anxiety T-scores, with their trait and state T-distributions, 
up to the fifty T-point mean, being almost identical to that of the under-
graduates. Again both York and Durham are characterised by a more extreme 
range of T-scores for trait anxiety, although there is a reduction in 
the range of Durham's anxiety state scores. 
6: An Analy§is ~tb~ect the PhenomgnQI Self-Schema has uQQn the 
~latiQn~iR B~en IrQit~~Qt~z1etJ 
Research Hypotheses: 
H1: -There is a significant relationship between the perception of 
self and trait anxiety. 
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H2: There is a significant relationship between not-self perception 
and trait anxiety. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between self-acceptance 
and trait anxiety. 
H4: The phenomenal perceptions of the players'self-scherna2 will 
have a significant effect upon the relationship between trait 
and state anxiety. 
In order to establish the significance of H4 above it is necessary to 
analyse the following subsidiary hypotheses: 
Hi: The relationship between trait and state anxiety is significantly 
affected when the influence of the players'self perceptions 
are controlled. 
Hn: The relationship between trait and state anxiety is significantly 
affected when the influence of the players/not-self perceptions 
are controlled. 
Hjii: The relationship between trait and state anxiety is significantly 
affected when the influence of the players'levels of self-
acceptance are controlled. 
Experimental Measures: 
The significance of the relationships between the phenomenal self-
percepts and trait anxiety will be determined using a correlation 
statistical technique. However, due to the distribution of the data 
available for the first two hypotheses, in that it assumes a curved rather 
than a linear regression between the variables, two different methods 
will be used, H1 and H2 will be analysed using a correlation ratio, H3 
a Pearson correlation. 
The concept of the recti linearity of regression has been extensively 
discussed in a previous section in relation to the use of factorial 
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analysis of variance; consequently no detailed account of its effect upon 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables will 
be given here. However, should any additional information be required 
it is suggested that reference is made to pages 149 to 150. 
The correlation ratio, or eta, overcomes the limitation of linearity 
by using mean deviations as the method by which to process the regression 
between two variables. It assumes that the best prediction of trait 
anxiety in any given octant, is the mean level of trait in any octant 
column. Consequently, if there were no correlation between trait anxiety 
and self perception, the mean octant deviation would be the same as that 
of the sample mean. It follows therefore that what is of interest is how 
far these mean octant values of trait anxiety deviate from the grand 
mean. For example, using part of the data available for the correlation 
between the players/perceptions of self and trait anxiety the following 
values emerge. The grand mean of the samples A-1rait scores is 37.50, 
and it is from this figure that the mean octant deviations used for the 
computation of eta are obtained. The players are grouped on the basis 
of their respective self perceptions and every octant's mean level of 
A-1rrait computed. These figures are then compared with the grand mean 
and any differences used to represent the degree of mean deviation. For 
instance taking the anxiety scores associated with octant AP, 21 players 
have this interpersonal theme as representing their perception of self. 
The mean level of A-Trait associated with this group of players is 33.36 
which, when compared with the grand mean, gives a deviation of -4.14. 
This process is completed for each generic theme until eight deviations 
are obtained, the size of these deviations determining the degree of 
association between the two variables. 
The product of these series of deviations is given by the formula: 
'tl\Yx 
Where ,t!,\yx = 
y' 
= 
y 
= 
1:nc = 
[nc (y' - Y}2 
N - 1 
the regression 
the mean level 
of trait anxiety 
of trait anxiety 
the mean of all octant columns, 
on self/not-self perception, 
in each octant column, 
the sum of squared deviations multiplied by the number of 
cases in that octant column, 
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N = the number of players involved in the analysis. 
The significance of the result of the correlation ratio is determined 
by using its methodological affinity to the analysis of variance. The 
figure given by Inc (y I _ y)2, represents the between group sum of squares, 
since its computation is based upon the sum of the squared deviations 
from the grand mean. The total sum of squares is given by the product 
of the formula (N - 1) Sy2, where N equals the total number of players 
and Sy2 the standard deviation of the Whole sample. The within group 
sum of squares can be calculated by simply subtracting the total from 
the between group sum of squares. 
The corresponding degrees of freedom are given by the formulae: 
DfB = K - 1, where K.is equal to the number of.octants, and; 
DfW. = N - K, where N is equal to the number of players and K the 
number of octants. 
By using the above process it is possible to construct an analysis 
of variance summary table; the significance of the obtained F ratio being 
equivalent to that of eta. 
The Pearson correlation, which will be used to establish the 
significance of the relationship between self acceptance and trait anxiety 
(H3), has been extensively described in a previous analysis, and the reader 
is advised to refer to pages163 and 164 for a detailed account of its 
statistical properties. Briefly r, the product of this linear correlation 
coeffiCient, is given by the formula: 
r = n_)CY_-_(IX)_(~X) ___________ _ 
j(n'iX 2 - (H)2) (NlY _ (1Y)2) 
The significance of each one of the subsidiary hypotheses will be 
determined using a single statistical technique, an analysis of 
covariance. However, in order to understand how this particular 
statistical technique quantifies the effect the self-schema has upon the 
relationship between trait and . state anxiety, it is necessary to discuss, 
in some detail, the methodology which led to its use. 
Initially the main experimental hypothesis was to be analysed using 
a four-way factorial analysis of variance, the properties of which have 
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been extensively discussed previously ( see pages 149 t0151). Using this 
design the effect each independent variable has upon state anxiety is 
assessed independently, and in a hierarchical manner. However, this method 
was rejected for two reasons, the first computational, the second 
conceptual. 
The computational anomaly arose when the number of players in each 
of the cells, partitioned by the effect of this particular factorial 
design, were analysed. 
empty or contained one 
It transpired that 
player at the most. 
many of these cells were either 
Consequently the effect of 
these empty or 'almost empty' cells was to reduce, artificially, the 
within-group error term, i.e. a cell which only contains one player will 
have a deviation from the mean within that cell of zero. The implication 
of this situation is summarised by Ferguson(1976) when he states that: 
"One object of experimental design is to ensure that the results 
observed may be attributed ~ithiD.limits_9f_~rror to the.treatment 
variable and to no other causal circumstances." (p.346, emphasis added). 
Consequently, as this design minimalised the 'limits of error' by 
default, the resulting F ratios and coefficients of determination, although 
significant, could not be used and interpreted with any degree of 
confidence. 
The second reason for the rejection of this method, and which 
led to the preference of the covariance 
between trait and state anxiety itself. 
this as: 
design, involved the relationship 
Spielberger et al (1970), describe 
"(A)nalogous ••• • •• to the concepts of kinetic and potential energy 
in physics. State anxiety, like kinetic energy, refers to an empirical 
process or reaction taking place at a particular moment in time ••• 
Trait anxiety, like potential energy, indicates differences in the strength 
of a latent disposition to manifest a certain type of reaction •••••• In 
general it would be expected that those who are high in A-Trait would 
exhibit A-State elevations more frequently than low A-Trait individuals 
because they tend to react to a wider range of situations as dangerous 
or threatening." (p3). 
It is evident from the above statement that it is important to 
conceptualise the two temporal components of anxiety as an inter-related 
unit: The degree of anxiety state elicitation being the product of a 
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person by situation interaction. However, using a factorial analysis of 
varianc,e, which assesses the independent effects that firstly the components 
of the self-schema and secondly that A-Trait have upon the intensity of 
. . . 
A-State,would violate the trait-state relationship proposed by Spielberger et al 
above, as the effect that the players' self perceptions have upon A-Trait 
and as a consequence A-State are ignore~ Thus one half of the affective 
pairing, the 'latent disposition' to respond, is lost. Because of this 
situation it was decided to analyse the relationship between trait and 
state anxiety when the components of the self-schema were statistically 
controlled. In essence this experimental design generated a hypothesis of 
no differences which proposed that the regression between trait and state 
anxiety would be homogenous for all the generic themes around the inter-
personal circumplex and for any degree of self acceptance. The technique 
which could accommodate this proposal was an analysis of covariance, and 
its use ensured that there would be a sufficient number of players in 
each of the' cells to establish accurate error limits. 
The function of a covariate analysis is summarised by Kerlinger (1973)in 
the following statement : ' 
"What an analysis of covariance does is to test the significance 
of the differences among means after taking into account or controlling 
initial mean differences between the experimental groups on a so-called 
covariate, a variable that is correlated lIith the dependent variable", 
(p.647). 
The analysis of covariance therefore, will correct the trait anxiety 
measures for the effect of the self-schema by removing the variance due to 
either self or not-self perception, or self acceptance. The removal of 
variance being dependent upon which aspect of the phenomenal self percept 
is being controlled. However, due to the complexity of this computaUon, 
the data for this design will be processed using the Manova multivariate 
8 
analysis offered by the SPSS computc~ programme. This particular 
statistic gives the following results: F' ratios are given for each 
analysis, from which it is possible to establish the significance that 
controlling a particular aspect of the self-schema has upon the 
relationship between trait and state anxiety. Similarly, because the 
Manova design normalises the intercept (the point where the regression 
line intercepts the state anxiety axis) of'trait on state anxiety, a series 
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of beta coefficients, one for each octant or self acceptance discrepancy 
unit, is given. It will be remembered that a null hypothesis was proposed 
earlier which stated in effect that Ho = B1 = B2 = ••• Bk, which assumes 
that the regression of trait upon state will not be affected by controlling 
anyone of the self percepts. A comparison of the coefficients (B1, B2 etc), 
affords a test of the homogeneity of the regression slopes. 
The final statistic, R2, is computed using the sum of squares given 
for each analysis; the size of this measure is found using the following 
formula: 
R = SSy - ~ru;rQr 
SSy 
Where, SSy = the total sum of squares, 
and SS error = the within and residual sum of squares. 
The product of this statistic indicates the proportion of the variance 
in state anxiety, explained, when the effect of the self schema, upon 
trait anxiety, is controlled. 
Results: 
Using eta, the correlation between the players.' perceptions of self 
and trait anxiety was found to be .535 for the first questionnaire 
administration, and .491 for the second. A more detailed illustration 
of the nature of these two octant/anxiety relationships is given in 
table 32 overleaf. From the table it is apparent that for both admin-
istrations, the relationship between the two variables assumes an inverted 
'U' shape. The significance of these two non-linear regressions are deter~· 
mined by referring to the analysis of variance summary tables, again 
illustrated overleaf. Using 7 and 88 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 
5.032 is greater than the tabular expression of 2.87, and is therefore 
significant at beyond the .01 level. (Table 33). 
177. 
Table 32: The Self 
Unadjusted Mean Deviations for A-Trait 
Octants First Administration Second Administration 
AP -4.14 .95 
BC -.38 -3.98 
DE .64 3.71 
FG -1.67 5.16 
HI 7.67 5.16 
JK 7.22 1.16 
LM 2.60 5.96 
NO -3.40 -2.39 
Table 33: First Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Squres F 
Between Groups 1384.43 7 197.776 5.032 
Within Groups 3458.632 88 39.303 
Total 4843.062 95 
Table 34: Second Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square F 
Between Groups 811.762 7 115.966 2.772 
Within Groups 2551.728 61 41.832 
Total 3363.490 68 
Using 7 and 61 degrees of freedom the F ratio of 2.772 is greater than 
the tabular expression of 2.17, and is therefore significant at beyond 
the .05 level. 
The relationship between not-self perception and trait anxiety gave 
a correlation ratio equal to .445 for the first questionnaire administration 
and .415 for the second. Table 35 overleaf illustrates the shape of these 
not-self lanxiety regressions. 
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Table 35: The Not Self 
Unadjusted Mean Deviations for A-Trait 
Octants First Administration Second Administration 
AP 4.05 -6.84 
BC 5.42 .16 
DE .85 1.41 
FG -2.78 
-.58 
HI -2.42 
-2.09 
JK -1.55 -.84 
LM 3.85 -.84 
NO 4.85 11.83 
The significance of the two 'eta' coefficients are determined using 
the analysis of variance summary tables given below: 
Table 36: First Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. I Mean Square 
Between Groups 956.827 7 , 36.690 
Within Groups 3871.567 8~ 44.5 
Total 4828.394 94 
Using 7 and 87 degrees of freedom the F ratio of 3.072 is greater than 
the tabular expression of 2.87, and is therefore significant at beyond 
the .01 level. 
Table 37: Second Questionnaire Administration 
~~urce of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square 
Between Groups 580.144 '7 82.817 
Within Groups 2783.346 61 45.629 
Total 3363.490 68. 
F 
3.072 
F. 
1.816 
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, 
Using 7 and 61 degrees of freedom the F ratio of 1.816 falls below the 
tabular expression of 2.17. and thus faBs to reach significance at the 
.05 level. 
The results of the relationship between self acceptance and trait 
anxiety gave a Pearson 'r' equal to .419 for the first questionnaire 
administration, and .590 for the second. Using 94 and 67 degrees of freedom 
respectively, the two coefficients are both significant at beyond the 
.01 level. 
The series of results obtained, when the relationship between trait 
and state anxiety is controlled for the effect of the self schema, are 
presented sequentially below. Covariance summary tables, the size of R2 
and the homogeneity of the beta coefficiP.nts are all given for each self 
percept by anxiety combination. 
Table 38: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Self Perception; 
First Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Me2.n Square F 
Within + Residual 5038.87947 86 58.59162 
. 
Constant 129685.26316 1 129685.26316 2213.375 
Trait Within Self 2692.85737 8 328.73217 5.611 
. Total 137416.99990 . 95 
Using 8 and 86 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 5.611 is significant 
at beyond the .001 level, the combination of the sum of squares give an 
R2 of .963 or 96.~f,; the homogeneity of the beta coefficients, associated 
with each octant, can be determined by referring to Table 39 overleaf. 
From the table it is evident that there is some disparity in the 
slopes of the regressions, represented by the difference in magnitude 
of the eight coefficients. This suggests that the effect of controlling 
the trait-state anxiety relationship for the influence of self perception 
is not homogeneous around the interpersonal circumplex. The results for 
the second administration follow table 39. 
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Table 39: 
Octant Beta Coefficient* 
AP .620 
BC .630 
DE .594 
FG .534 
HI .707 
JK .659 
LM .707 
NO .640 
* Three significant figures. 
Table 40: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Self Perceptionj 
Second Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square F 
Within + Residual 2116.70575 51 41.50403 
Constant 72732.01667 1 72732.01667 1752.408 
Trait Wi thin Self' 1164.27758 8 145.53470 
Total 76013.00000 60 
Using 51 and 8 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 3.507 is significant 
at the .003 levelj the sum of squares give an R2 of .972 or 97.2'kj the 
homogeneity of the beta coefficients can be determined by referring to 
table 41 below: 
Table 41: 
Octant 
AP 
BC 
DE 
FG 
HI 
JK 
LM 
110 
Beta Coefficient 
.594 
.567 
.643 
.449 
.511 
.594 
.588 
.536 
3.507 
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From the table, it is evident that there is some degree of discrepancy 
in the regression of state on trait anxiety: around the interpersonal 
circumplex. a factor which indicates the heterogeneity of the effect 
that self perception has upon the affective relationship. 
The effect on the trait-state anxiety relationship of controlling 
not-self perception is considered in Table 42. 
Table 42: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Not-Self Perception; 
First Questionnaire Administration 
Source of variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square F 
Within + Residual 4166.74804 86 48.45056 
Constant 129685.26316 1 129685.26316 2676.652 
Trait Within Not-Self 3501.98880 8 437.74860 9.035 
Total 137353.99990 95 
Using 86 and 8 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 9.035 is significant 
at beyond the .001 level; the sum of squares give an R2 of .969 or 96.9%; 
the homogeneity of the beta coefficients can be determined by referring 
to Table 43. 
Table 43: 
Octant 
AP 
BC 
DE 
FG 
HI 
JK 
LM 
NO 
Beta Coefficient 
.538 
.757 
.682 
.688 
.651 
.762 
.459 
.950 
From the table the difference in magnitude of the beta coefficients around 
the interpersonal circumplex, suggests that controlling the not-self has 
a heterogeneous effect upon the relationship between trait and state anxiety. 
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The results for the second administration are given below. 
Table 44: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Not-Self Perception; 
Second Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square F 
Within + Residual 2050.70809 51 40.20996 
Constant 72732.01667 1 72732.01667 1808.806 
Trait Within Not-Self 1230.27525 8 153.78441 3.825 
Total 76013.00001 60 
Using 51 and 8 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 3.825 is significant 
at the .001 level; the sum of squares give an R2 equal to .973 or 97.~;'; 
the beta coefficients associated with this particular covariate analysis 
are illustrated in Table 45 below: 
Table 45: 
Octant Beta Coefficients 
AP .500 
BC .540 
DE .518 
FG .546 
HI .592 
JK .507 
LM .561 
NO .741 
The difference in the regressions, indicated by the fluctuations in size 
of the beta coeffiCients, again suggests that controlling the not-self 
has a heterogeneous effect upon the relationship between trait and state 
anxiety. 
The effect upon the anxiety regression of controlling self acceptance 
is summarised in Table 46. 
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Table 46: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Self Acceptance; 
First Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares D.F. Mean Square F 
Within + Residual 4726.05096 83 56.94037 
Constant 129685.26316 1 129685.26316 2277.563 
Trait Within Self 
Acceptance 2942.68588 11 267.51690 
Total 127353.99990 95 
Using 83 and 11 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 4.698 is significant 
at beyond the .001 level; the sum of squares give an R2 equal to .966, 
or 96.6%; the beta coefficients are illustrated in Table 47 below. 
Table 47: 
Discrepancy Beta Coefficient 
0 .638 
23 .632 
26 .544 
41 .588 
44 .634 
66 .514 
81 .675 
84 .701 
91 .540 
105 .726 
114 .587 
From the above table the difference in size of the beta coefficients 
again indicates that the regression between trait and state anxiety is 
not homogeneous when the degree of self acceptance is controlled. The 
results for the second administration are given overleaf. 
Using 49 and 10 degrees of freedom, the F ratio of 4.489 is 
significant at beyond the .001 level; the sum of squares give an R2 of 
4.698 
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of .977, or 97.7%; the beta coefficients associated with this computation 
are illustrated in Table 49 below. 
Table 49: Trait Anxiety Controlled for the Effect of Self Acceptance; 
Second Questionnaire Administration 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares 
Between + Resdiual 1718.4084 
Constant 72732.01667 
Trait \~ithin Self 1568.57492 
Acceptance 
Total 76012.99999 
Tab le 49: 
Discrepancy9 Beta Coefficient 
0 .815 
23 .829 
- 26 .481 
41 .727 
44 .852 
66 .720 
- 68 .926 
81 .780 
84 .594 
91 .694 
D.F. 
49 
1 
10 
60 
Mean' Square 
34.94711 
72732.01667 
156.85749 
2081.203 
4.488 
From the table it is apparent that controlling the degree of self 
acceptance has, once again, a heterogeneous effect upon the regression 
between trait and state anxiety. 
Analysis: 
The results of the correlation coefficients, used to establish both 
the strength and direction of any relationships which exist between the 
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phenomenal percepts of the self schema and trait anxiety, all reached 
significance, apart from the coefficient which resulted from the second 
administration not-self. 
However, although the results indicate the significance of almost 
all of the relationships (for both administrations), proposed by the 
initial experimental hypotheses, the shape of the regressions associated 
with each coefficient were found to be fundamentaily different. 
The relationship between self perception and trait anxiety, (1\ being 
equal to .535, p < .01, for the first test administration and .491, p < .05 
for the second), revealed that the octant/anxiety regression followed 
an inverted 'U' shape around the interpersonal circumplex, with the level 
of trait anxiety increasing from AP, reaching its maximum at HI, and then 
reducing accordingly with each subsequent octan.t. Conversely, the 
relationship between the not-self and trait anxiety, (fl being equal 
to .445, P < .01, for the first administration), revealed that the 
octant/anxiety regression was 'U' shaped; the increase in trait anxiety 
beginning at HI and FG, reaching its maximum at NO, and then reducing 
with each subsequent octant. The final coefficients, the product of the 
relationship between self acceptance and trait anxiety, both established 
that there is a positive, linear relationship, between the two variables; 
'r' being equal to .419 for the first questionnaire administration and 
.590 for the second, both results being significant at beyond the 
.01 level. 
Due to the complexity of the results which emerged from the series 
of covariate analyses, for both administrations, discussion at this point 
will be kept to a minimum, and this somewhat brief analysis will 
concentrate on using the results, en masse, in an attempt to further 
illustrate the statistical methodology and its relationship to the 
self schema. 
The results of all the subsidiary analyses entail an acceptance of 
the proposed experimental hypothesis: the phenomenal perceptions of the play-
ers' self schemata do have a significant effect upon the relationship 
between trait and state anxiety. However, what is of major interest 
is the apparent heterogeneous nature of these effects. In everyanalys·is 
controlling the effect of each percept within the self schema resulted 
in a series of different beta coefficients. A factor which indicates 
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that both the octants around the interpersonal circumplex, and also the 
degree of self acceptance, have a non-uniform effect upon the anxiety 
regression, (it will be remembered that the size of the beta coefficient 
indicates the steepness of the regression slope, in essence the steeper 
the slope the higher are the levels of trait and state anxiety; as the 
intercept is normalised it is an easy matter to contrast the different 
betas). 
There is however a high degree of uniformity in the proportion of 
the variance in the state anxiety scores explained by trait anxiety, when 
the effects of the self schema were controlled. In each case R2 was found to 
be greater than 95%. 
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1. CoctWait (1954) recommends that forX- tests with df larger than 1, 
fewer than 20% of the cells should have an expected frequency of less 
than 5, and no cell should have an expected frequency of less than 1. 
The data available for this analysis could not fulfill either of these 
criteria. For example, using the data as presented in Table 5 (see 
'page 122 ), 85% of the expected frequencies fall below 5, and 6 below 
1, making the use of x: _ test impossible. Siegal (1956) states: 
2. 
3. 
"If these requirements are not met by the data in the form in 
which they were originally collected, the researcher must combine 
adjacent categories as as to increase the Eij's i,n the various cells." 
(p.178). 
The formula by which the raw octant scores derived from the I.C.L. 
are converted into Dom and Lov scores can be found on page 78. 
Once computed these two values are converted into standard scores 
using tabular values published by the Kaiser Foundation, (see 
Leary (1957) Table 55 p. 495). ' 
The method of establishing a players discrepancy score is 
explained in more detail on pages 80-81 or in Leary pag'"s 498-499. 
4. One of the assumptions to be met when using the param~tric analysis 
of variance is that the variance of the sample sub-gr'oups is equal. 
This can be checked by means of a test of the homogeneity of variance. 
This involves computing individual variances for e~ch of the sub-
groups, and then dividing the largest variance by the smallest. The 
result is treated as an F value, and interpreted in the usual way. 
Sub-group variance is given by the formula: 
Var :: r X2 - (~~)2 
n 
n - 1 
(Cohen arId !-!olliday, 1978) 
5. The meaning of a one-tailed rather than a two-tailed test of 
significance concerns an area of the sampling distribution known as 
the region of rejection. Siegal (1956), states that the position 
of this region is affected by the nature of H1: 
"If H1 indicates the predicted direction of difference, then a 
one-tailed test is called for" (p.13) 
As the second research hypothesis proposes that there will be a 
significant difference between the teams in the homogeneity of their 
members self perceptions, a directional difference is implied. 
The difference between a one-tailed and two-tailed test is in 
the location,. but not the size of the region of rejection; the former 
being entirely at one end of the sampling distribution, the latter 
being located at both ends. The size of the region of rejection 
is expressed by QC , the level of significance. Siegal comments that 
one-tailed tests are more powerful in that the probability of committing 
a Type 11 error is reduced. 
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6. During the course of converting the raw data from the questionnaires 
into their respective octants, a player from the F'reshers XV had to 
be dropped from the sample. His not-self score fell at the inter-
section of the Dam and Lov axes, which meant that an exact inter-
pretation of his not-self was impossible. It will be noted however 
that although the sample size has been reduced to 95, the expected 
chi square has remained at 12. It was felt that to reduce it to its 
correct value of 11.88 was unnecessary given the size of the chi 
squar.e resul t. 
7. Self acceptance has previously been defined as the degree of 
congruence between a players self and ideal self perceptions. 
Discrepancies between' these two percepts were obtained using the 
table of weighted scores provided by the Kaiser F'oundation on 
pages 498-499. Briefly the self and ideal self numeric octant 
scores being compared are entered into the table and standardised 
discrepancy scores read off. A more comprehensive description of 
this method is given on pages 80-81. 
8.. "SPSS" or "The Statistical Package for the Social Scientist" is a 
series of computer programmes available for processing large 
quantities of experimental data. Should the reader require more 
detailed information as to the properties of this particular programme, 
reference should be made to the SPSS Update, 7-9, pages 1-79, by 
Hull C. and Nie N. (McGraw Hill Publishing, 1981). 
9. The reader will perhaps have noticed that there are bot~ a different 
number of discrepancy units and also cl difference in t'le range of 
the self acceptance scores associated with each admi:listration. 
This is because only those units which have been used to explain the 
pl1!yers levels of self acceptance have been reporte,j. 
Mann-Whitney I U' 
Team U Sig. U 
Loborough z 681 2483 
F'reshers 140 83 
Newcastle 1125 83 
Durham 565 31 
York 83 38 
CWpter_9 
A .. Di~cusl?i(m.9f. tn~ Sj;atistica:Ulnillysis. of. the. S~lf :-;;co~.avc;l 
and itl?_Relilti90s0ip_witb_Trait.iln9_State 8nxiet y 
In the previous chapter the self-schema and its attendant methodology 
was empirically analysed in an attempt to quantify the players' interpersonal 
experiences of self, both connative and affective. 
The quantity of results alone indicate both the vagaries and 
complexities of the perceptual process, although many significant distrib-
utional trends and relationships linking both the cognitive and affective 
modes of experience were established. In that chapter however only a 
brief synopsis accompanied each set of results, and there was little 
structural continuity between the ten analyses apart from a loose 
sequential ordering, based upon what was thought to be a lc.gical pro-
gression in self perception. 
Although this design has the obvi·ous merit of being able to reduce 
large amounts of information into concise and coherent sections, it does 
perhaps suggest that the cumulative effect of the seJ.f percepts, both 
upon each other, and upon their relationship with crait and state anxiety, 
is additive, rather than interactive, a factor wr.ich reduces the self-
schema into a mechanistic rather than a dynamic concept. 
It is the purpose of this chapter therefore, to explain the findings 
associate1 with each element of the self-SChema, not only in isolatioD, 
but also in the way in which they interact with each other. In essence 
the product of these interactions can be regarded as a perceptual and 
affective Gestalt; person-specific, based upon certain self percept-
octant-anxiety configurations. Consequently: 
.. -
"The interactive effects of one element upon another (are) seen as 
changing the nature of those elements, and hence resulting in an impression, 
or Gestalt ••• • •• greater than the simple sum of the parts." (Hampson, 
1982; p.106). 
Before continuuing with the discussion, a brief review of this theoretical 
position in conjunction with the self schema will be given. 
For each of the elements within the self-schema, self, not-self and 
ideal self, the results in the previous chapter established that there 
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were significant perceptual distributions around the interpersonal circumplex. 
The full import-of these distributions however, only becomes apparent when 
they are placed in interaction with one another, self with not-self and 
self with ideal self. The former indicating which interpersonal traits 
a player experiences as being part of, or not part of himself in a 
particular situation: lhe latter giving an insight as to the players' 
degree of self acceptance. 
At this point, using regression techniques, the results established 
that certain self and not-self perceptual interactions mediated a . 
players'degree of self acceptance. Once the differing experiential terrain 
of the self-schema had been statistically mapped, it was then possible 
to establish how these perceptual interactions influenced an individuaYs 
predisposition to general and situation specific feelings of interpersonal 
anxiety. 
Although the above description is a somewhat simplistic theoretical 
representation of the actual process (and there are other variables not 
mentioned which have to be accounted for),it is hoped that it does convey 
to some extent, the methodological structure of the self-schema. The 
folowing discussion will however expand, in far greater detail, the 
statistical and conceptual points raised so far. 
The self was previously defined as: 
"The perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percept 
and concepts of self in relation to others and to the environment." 
(Rogers 1965 p. 138). 
A statistical interpretation of Rogers statement established that there 
was a significant distributional difference around the interpersonal 
circumplex in the players, "percept and concepts of self", (p < .001). 
A further analysis found that the direction of this distributional 
difference was the same for both test administrations. 
In the analYSis which accompanied these results the players' 
perceptions were explained generally and then more specifically, by 
referring to the direction of their distributions around the circumplex. 
Before analysing the results in detail it is worth reviewing this dis-
cussion. 
The generic theme which appears to influence the players'perceptions 
of self is that of 'strength'; either physical, intellectual or social. 
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This factor can be illustrated generally by using the horizontal 'Lov' 
axis as an interpersonal parameter, and more specifically by using the 
vertical 'Dom' axis of the interpersonal circumplex. The former will be 
considered first. 
The horizontal 'Lov' axis bisects the circumplex into two halves. 
The top half contains octants AP, BC, DE and NO, all four being designated 
by Leary as representing different variations of the generic interpersonal 
theme of 'strength'. The lower half contains octants FG, HI, JK and LM, 
each one being associated with some particular manifestation of interpersonal 
'weakness'. The difference between these two polar distributions becomes 
strikingly apparent when the numbers of players falling in each half are 
compared. For the first administration the four octants above the horizontal 
axis account for 72% of the players'self percepts, for the second 
administration 87%. The motivation for this concentration can perhaps 
be explained by using the poles of the 'Dom' axis. 
Although every octant around the circumplex was used by the players 
to represent their perceptions of self, (a factor of importance in itself 
as it indicates the variation in the players self perception), the most 
frequent and least frequent interpersonal themes centre about the base 
and apex of the vertical 'Dom' axis. The full import of these distributional 
concentrations will become more apparent when the other elements within 
the self-schema, and the two components of anxiety, are brought into the 
equation. However, at this point the reasons for this difference in 
distribution can be better understood by reviewing the perceptions which 
accord with the poles of this axis. 
At the apex of the axis are AP, the Managerial-Autocratic, and BC, 
the Competitive-Narcissistic octants. Together they account for 49% of 
the overall player perceptions for the first administration, and 58% for 
the second. After octant BC there is a marked decrease in the frequency 
of players falling in each subsequent octant, the numbers reaching a 
minimum at the base of the 'Dom' axis with octants HI, Self-Effacing-
Masochistic and JK, Docile-Dependent. Together they account for 16% 
of the overall player perceptions for the first administration, and only 
~~ for the second. After octant JK there is then an increase in the 
player/octant frequencies until AP is reached again, (should the reader 
require a graphic illustration of these player/octant frequencies he or 
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she should turn to tables 5 and 6 on pages 122: and 123). 
Octants AP and BC both share the same generic theme of 'strength', 
however the direction in which this construct is used makes them 
essentially different. 
The Mangerial-Autocratic octant (AP) reflects a self that is concerned 
with "strength, force, energy and leadership", (Leary 1957). However, 
there are many ways.in.which this strength can be manifested. Leary states 
that: 
"Physical strength, especially in the case of the male, is a means 
of winning respect". (page 323). 
The significance of this statement for the rugby player is obviously great, 
as it implies that psyche and soma act as joint influences upon the players' 
perception of self. A relationship duplicated by the game situation which 
itself emphaSises physical, as well as cognitive skill factors, afactor 
which goes some way to explaining the preponderance of this particular 
interpersonal theme. However, there are other, more subtle reasons, for 
having this particular self perception. 
A self which stresses power and leadership is usually 'rewarded' 
with feelings of being: 
"(D)efended and protected. (The player) wins awe, admiration, and 
obedience from others. He gains feelings of certitude and organisation 
which serves as an illusory buffer against the mysteries and uncontrolled 
possibilities of existence". (Ibid.. p. 325). 
The self-esteem of this player then is being continually fed, and also 
expects, a diet of "obedience, deference and respect" from the others 
with whom he interacts. 
The Competitive-Narcissistic.octant (BC) stresses similar themes 
but with a different interpersonal objective. The players who have a 
self which is based upon this octant act in a strong, arrogant manner, 
communicating the message that they feel superior to the "other one". 
They also appear independent and confident, (Leary). Leary states that: 
"These individuals depend for their self-esteem on the demonstration 
of weakness in others and competitive strength in themselves" (p.333). 
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It is felt that this octant is most representative of the rugby 
playing sports-type described by Hardman and the other trait theorists 
earlier. 
There is then both a fundamental similarity and difference between 
these two octants. They share the traits of independence, authority and 
confident control, but where as the,AP self uses these themes to direct, 
manage and lead others, BC uses them in an exploitative manner in order 
to provoke feelings of inferiority. 
The octants which comprise the opposing pole of the 'Dom' axis, HI, 
Self-Effacing-Masochistic and JK, Docile-Dependent, share, as did the 
octants above, a common theme, this time of interpersonal weakness. 
However, there is a fundamental difference in the way in which this 
weakness manifests itself. 
HI characterises a self which is critically hostile towards its 
own attitudes and beliefs, with a strong introjection of different patterns 
of self depreciation. Leary states that the 'effect' on others of a self 
which stresses these traits is to "pull depreciation and patronising 
superiority from them", (p.284). Of course this reciprocal interaction 
will not occur in every interpersonal transaction, as Leary states: "The 
phenomenon of reciprocity... is a probability statement". However, 
in his research Leary states that self-effacing individuals feel most 
secure when interacting with the competitive-narcissist, "the aggreSSive, 
exploitative character from the upper left part of the diagnostiC grid", 
(p.285). It is readily apparent therefore how these two seemingly 
disparate factions can operate in a functional and" productive manner 
within a dynamic group framework. 
The other octant which completes this combination, JK, stresses a 
more 'benign' weakness. Leary states that: 
"The interpersonal message it conveys to others is, "I am a meek, 
admiring person in need of your help and advice"", (j>. 292). 
Again using Leary's theory of reciprocal relations this attitude of self 
"pulls strong helpful leadership from others", i.e. JK pulls APi there 
is then the existence of a perceptual symbiosis which would seem to allow 
effective team functioning. With this criterion in mind the discussion 
can be expanded, and consequently made more comprehensive, by considering 
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the between group differences in player self perception. 
The results of the analyses into the homogeneity of the players 
self perceptions around the interpersonal circumplex revealed that, for 
both administrations, there was a significant difference between the teams: 
p < .10 and < .01 respectively. More specifically it was established 
that both Loughborough and the Freshers XV were-significantly more 
homogeneous in their players distributions than either Newcastle and 
York, (p = .012 and .026) and Newcastle respectively, (p = .05) for the 
first administration.. And Loughborough being significantly more homo-
geneous than either the Freshers XV, Newcastle or York for the second, 
(p = .047, .015 and .017). 
The concept of homogeneity is a statistical representation of the 
degree of deviation a players self is from his team mean. For the first 
administration every team had the same interpersonal mean centered about 
octant AP. For the second the situation was the same, except that the 
Loughborough mean had moved to BC. The actual differences between the 
teams, specified by the above results, indicates that both the players 
from Newcastle and York have a far greater variety of interpersonal themes 
than any of the other teams. And using the theory of reciprocal relations 
advanced above, any themes of power, authority or independence, existent 
in these two teams, (AP and BC~ are countered with self-effacing, dependent, 
cooperativeness (octants HI, JK and LM). In contrast the players from 
both Loughborough and the Freshers XV have a far greater degree of 
perceptual specificity, concentrated upon the AP and BC octants. The 
actual differences between the teams is perhaps most graphically 
illustrated by their mean levels of homogeneity. For Loughborough and 
the Freshers XV their mean levels were 39.24 and 43.13 respectively, 
(perfect homogeneity is equal to zero, perfect heterogeneity being equal 
to 114). For York and Newcastle the mean levels were 56.10 and 59.10 
respectively, Durham incidentally, fell midway between these two groups 
with a mean level of 45.50, and although there was no significant 
difference between its players'degree of homogeneity and that of any of 
the other teams, it has a far greater proportion of its players falling 
in AP and BC than either Newcastle or York. 
The results for the second administration are, unfortunately, not 
as unequivocal, due to the reduction in sample size. However, there was 
an increase in the homogeneity of both the Loughborough and Durham players 
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self perceptions. Their mean levels of homogeneity falling to 28.39 and 
34.00; both teams players'self perception centered upon AP and BC, (should 
the reader require to see an illustration of each teams player/octant 
frequencies he or she should see tables 8 and 9 on page 129). 
It is evident from the above discussion that there is some kind of 
relationship between team membership and self perception. This relation-
ship can best be explained as the influence generated by the players' 
perceptual "relation to... the environment", (Rogers1965). Such an 
influence is also relatively stable as the temporal research design had 
no significant effect upon any teams level of homogeneity. Therefore, 
in order to analyse the nature of, and propose causal factors for,-the 
existence of such-an influence, it is necessary to review the environmental 
and structural ideologies of the five teams, first discussed in Chapter 4. 
Both Loughborough and the Freshers XV are rugby clubs with a 
rigidly defined formal structure. Training is supervised by a member of 
the university staff, attendance being compulsory. There exists a full, 
democratically elected committee to run the clubs affairs, but perhaps 
the most important influence upon the players are (a) historical and 
(b) from their peer groups. Loughborough as an institution has a history 
for producing 'pedigree' rugby players, at club, county and national levels. 
Similarly to play for the rugby club is a prestigious affair which 
elevates one's status within the university. 
Durham is similar to the above with a very formal group structure. 
Training is again supervised with attendance compulsory. In recent years 
the club has enjoyed a great deal of success, both in terms of results 
and also in seeing its former players obtain both county and national 
honours. 
Conversely, both Newcastle and York, who have the most diffuse 
player perceptions, have very little formal organisation. Newcastle 
as a club has only been in existence for a short time and although there 
is some formal structure in terms of training and the existence of a 
cOmmittee, it is very loosely based. At the time of administering the 
questionnaire the Newcastle coach complained of the lack of interest in 
the club, both from a playing and spectating viewpOint. And it appears 
as though playing for the halls of residence in the very well organised 
intra-mural competitions, was regarded by the students as more desirabe 
than playing for the universi~y rugby club. 
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York however, appeared to have no discernible formal group structure 
at all. The club captain arranging fixtures, picking the team and 
organising training. The club has very little status both within and 
outside of the college. 
The brief review above establishes that there is a difference between 
the groups both in their degree of formal organisation,. and also in the 
extent of environmental influences, historical and social. It is proposed 
that it is these differences which account for the variation in the players 
perceptual distributions around the interpersonal circumplex. Consequently, 
where a formal group structure exists, as is the case for Loughborough, 
the Freshers XV and Durham, there is a perceptual contagion based upon 
the players shared belief in organisational and environmental norms. 
themselves being the product of the bonded group process, itself grounded 
in historical precedent. Carson (1969) summarises this relationship between AP 
and the apparent consensual validation in perception by the three teams, 
when he states that a concentration upon the Managerial-Autocratic octant 
indicates: 
"an impliCit or explicit assumption of leadership, power or expertise 
within an essentially collaborative context - that is, one in which there 
is presumed to be a correspondence in ggels amQ~rties tQ the inter-
action" Cp. 107. Emphas~s added). 
Before leaving this discussion there is one further point which needs 
to be mentioned. The reader familiar with univerSity rugby may be 
wondering why no overt reference has been made to the differences in skill 
and performance levels as possible influences upon the homogeneity of 
self perception. Particularly as Loughborough, the Freshers XV and Durham 
could be seen as being far more successful, both in terms of results and 
skill level, than either Newcastle or York. This was not an oversight 
however; it was felt that to attribute homogeneity to performance would 
be an extremely contentious matter as it is a difficult concept to 
quantify, particularly when the fixtures for each club are different. 
Moreover, performance is by 
as an historical influence. 
nature of its transitory effect, more important. 
Similarly, the difference in skill level is 
not that great as every team had a number of players with various 
representative honours. 
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It may appear te the reader at this point that an inerdinate ameunt 
.of time has been spent upon these particular results. Hewever, it was 
felt that the analysis and descriptien .of the players' self perceptiens 
merited such attentien fer the fellewing reasen. The self is cenceptually 
the perceptual criterien abeut which all the ether self percepts evelve. 
It is therefere .of necessity te give a detailed acceunt .of the players 
perceptual trends, net .only fer the sample as a whele but also fer the 
individual teams, as the discussien which will fellew will analyse the 
censequences .of these different individual and group based perceptiens. 
Moreever, it is heped that the reader will have discerned the numerous 
variatiens in beth the players'perceptions and experiences of self. It 
is the first step in dispelling the myth .of the rugby playing archetype 
se favoured by Kane ( 1978) and the other trait theorists. And although the 
results established that there was a significant distributienal difference 
in the players'perceptions of self, centred abeut the authcritative octants 
ef·AP and BC, this should net be interpreted as indicating the existence 
.of a rugby type for two reasens: (i) The analysis as a '"hele established 
that every octant around the circumplex was used by en~ er more players 
te represent their perception .of self, and (ii) no team had a perfect 
or near perfect degree of homegeneity, around these two generiC themes, 
a factor which a'c.test.'l to. t:-le nri2ty' Ol intc:--p2:,c;onal typelogies used 
by. the players. What is .of interest however i~ the implications which 
this asymmetrical distribution have for the other percepts within the 
self-schema and also the players levels of general and situatien specific 
anxiety. It is to these questi.ons that the following will be addressed. 
The net-self can be defined as representing the "Goals and ideals 
which are perceived as having... • •• negative valence", (Rogers, 1965) •. 
The statistical analysis of this statement established that the inter-
personal traits "perceived as having negative valence" were concentrated 
in one particular ·area of the interpersonal circumplex (p < .001 for both 
administrations). A further analysis revealed that the disproportionat~ 
nature .of the players'perceptions were the same fer both test administra~ions .. 
Reference back to tables 10 and 11 en page 132 and 133 illustrates the 
disparity in the not-self/octant frequencies for both administratiens. 
And it is clear that there is a concentration of players whe have a net-
self summarised by FG, the Rebellious~Distrustful octant, which alene 
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accounts for over one-third of the total frequencies for both administrations. 
A more general analysis indicates that for both administrations there 
is a rejection by the players of the generic theme of interpersonal 
hostility, whether characterised by 'hostile strength' (octants DE and 
to a lesser extent BC), or 'hostile weakness' (octants FG and HI). 
Conversely, the expressive octants, AP and NO(~xpressive strength), and 
LM and JK (expressive weakness), are only used infrequently as indicators 
of the not-self. These distributions will now be analysed in greater 
detail. 
The goals and ideals represented by FG, and which are so emphatically 
rejected by many of the players, are defined by Leary (1957) as being 
indicative of "attitudes of resentment and deprivation", (P.269). He 
states that individuals whose self stresses the interpersonal themes 
characterised by FG: 
"Manifest ••• reflexes of distrust and resentment. They 
involuntarily provoke rejection and punishment from others. They cannot 
tolerate durable relationships of conformity or collaboration." (p.269). 
Although FG, by frequency of use alone, is most representative of 
the players'perceptions of not-self, a more general analysis of the 
frequency distributions, based upon Leary's theory of complementarity can 
be used to indicate the possible cognition behind the players'perceptual 
concentration upon the generically hostile octants. Moreover, it enables 
the distribution of self perception to be compared and contrasted, in 
an attempt to further the discussion of the interactive nature of the 
self-schema • 
A cognition is defined by Coles (1982) as: 
"The perception and evaluation of one's ability to deal with the 
environment", (p.123). 
Inherent in this statement is the need to negotiate successful interpersonal 
transactions, as they are axiomatic in delineating one's ability to deal 
with the (social) environment. Leary's theory of complementarity, reviewed 
in chapter 2 and used in an earlier part of this discussion, essentiallY 
describes the ground-rules which structure one's dealings with the inter-
personal environment. Briefly he states that: 
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, ' "TIle' purpose <of interpersonal behaviour... .•. is to, induce, from " 
the other person behaviour that is complementary to the behaviour proffered". 
(Carson, 1969, p.112) 
This proposal of perceptual reciprocity was subsequently elaborated by 
Uriel Foa (1962) who concluded that there are three underlying "facets" 
which structure the interpersonal cognition of reality; content, object 
and mode (for a more detailed review of Foa's theory please see Chapter 3). 
He contends that these "facets" articulate with Leary's four 'hostile' 
octants in the following manner: the Self-Effacing-Masochistic octant (HI), 
indicates a social rejection of the self; the Rebellious-Distrustful octant 
(FG), an emotional rejection of the self; (DE), the Aggressive-Sadistic 
octant, an emotional rejection of the other; and (BC)1, the Competitive-
Narcissistic octant, the social rejection'of other. Each one being used 
not only to establish the relationship between self and other, but also 
between self, other and their larger reference group. 
Introducing the results for the players'perceptions of self establishes 
the import behind the use of Foa' s "facet" profiles. The results of the 
two contingency tables revealed that there was, in general, an inverse 
'relationship' between the player~ self and not-self perceptions. This 
is particularly in evidence when the relationship is 
of the octants proximity to the 'Dom' and 'Lov' axes. 
interpreted in 
Consequently 
terms 
expressive dominance (AP, NO) rejects hostile submission(FG, HI), 
instrumental dominance (BC, DE), friendly submission (LM, JK) and vice-
versa. Transposing this diametric relationship onto the two perceptual 
distributions for the sample as a whole indicates, in general terms, 
that the players have a self concerned with power, leadership and competitive 
independence (octants AP and BC) and a not-self which rejects rebellious' 
non-conformity, distrust and social distance (FG). The motivation 
behind these particular self perceptions can be understood by using Foa's 
theory. 
Foa proposed above that there is in essence a cognitive dualism 
motivating an interpersonal act; (a) the relationship between self and 
other and (b) the relationship between self, other and their reference 
group. The latter will be considered first. 
It is axiomatic to effective team functioning that there exists some 
degree of trust, and of course co-operation between its members, particularly, 
where there is a high degree of interactive dependence (Carron and 
Chelladurai, 1979). Similarly there must be effective leadership and a 
general consensus as to the goals and norms which influence group 
" 
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structure. Indeed Lenk (1969) states that: 
" A sports group performs a genuine group achievement which is only 
engendered in cooperation, that is, it is not summed up from single and 
individual performances... quality and efficiency of cooperation 
play a decisive role" (p.1). 
The players acceptance of the generically ·'strong' authoritative octants 
of AP and BC, and their rejection of the interpersonally hostile DE,FG 
and HI, would seem to suggest that the players see this combination as 
being necessary in allowing effective team interaction to take place. 
Particularly as the consequence of a large number of players within a 
team, which itself demands a high degree of task interdependence2, eschewing 
close or co-operative interpersonal relationships, would of course be 
potentially devastating. 
Therefore, a self which experiences reality in terms of AP and BC 
interpersonal behaviour, and a not-self which rejects FG establish "the 
social relationship between the self and the other with respect to the 
larger reference group", (Foa, 1962 p.350). 
However, there are other, more ego-centric factors, which complete 
the cognitive dualism proposed earlier. Using Foa's facet profiles the 
four 'hostile' octants have a common denominator; rejection, either of 
self or other. And it is this concept of rejection, which is the important 
factor. Foa informs us that HI and FG, are characterised by the rejection 
of the self and that DE and BC, rejection of the other. The consequence 
of·these rejections, in terms of complementarity "denies love and status 
to. the self" from the other, as any interpersonal transaction is based 
upon exploitative themes. These factors can be illustrated with greater 
clarity by referring to the reciprocal nature of the octants themselves. 
Leary (1957) describes the 'effect' of FG interpersonal behaviour as: 
"invariably establish(ing) distance from others, provoking them to 
ignore, condemn, or disaffiliate" (p.272). 
Similarly, in the case of aggressive-sadistic behaviour (DE): 
"Sadistic-critical behaviour pulls resentment, distrust, fear and 
guilt from "others"", (ibid p. 343). 
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And the effect of the HI interpersonal self is to: 
"tend to train others to look down on him and to view him with 
varying amounts of contempt" (ibid p.285). 
Inherent in all these descriptions is the absence of positive relations 
with others and consequently a loss of self-esteem, "the individual's 
beliefs as to how others evaluate him", (Burns 1979; p.56). 
The rejection of these particular interpersonal traits indicates 
therefore that the players, as well as being concerned with effective 
interpersonal relations within the team, are also concerned with 
maintaining or enhancing their self-esteem through pOSitive, expressive 
relations with others. 
There are however a number of players whose self stressed what have 
been established as 'non-desirable' interpersonal traits, and who also 
reject what appear to be the SOCially acceptable octants of AP and BC. 
It is therefore necessary to give a brief explanation as to the consequence 
of these particular self perceptions and in so doing attempt to explain 
the anomalous rejection of BC. 
It will be remembered that as a conclusion to the description of 
the players'perceptions of self, it was stated that although there was 
the presence of a significant distributional trend, centred about the 
apex of the vertical 'Dom' axis, it should not go unnoticed that every 
octant had been used by the players as a summary of their interpersonal 
notion of self. It is evident therefore that those players' whose self 
was represented by either FG, HI or JK would, using the inverse relation-
ships indicated by the contingency tables, have a not-self which rejected 
octants AP and BC. This is in fact the case, as an analysis of the 
individual results revealed that in most cases, a self at the base of 
the 'Dom' axis rejected those traits at the apex. 
This situation clarified what was, initially, an unexpected finding, 
the number of players rejecting the interpersonal themes of competitive-
narcissism (BC), particularly in the first administration. It transpired 
that the rejection of this interpersonal theme was, for the most part, 
by players whose self fell at the base of the 'Dom' axis. Consequently, 
although the BC octant involves "the social rejection of the other" it 
is, by virtue of its frequency, a valued interpersonal theme. And, although 
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it has been discussed in connection with the other three generically hostile 
octants, its inclusion mainly represents the not-self perceptions of those 
players whose self perception falls below. the horizontal 'Lev' axis. 
What is of interest however, is why BC rather than AP should be rejected. 
a factor which in all probability is attributable to its generically 
hostile nature. 
The inverse nature of self and not-self perception and its effect 
on both the major and minor distributional trends· can be further illustrated 
by analysing between group differences. The statistical analysis 
established that there were no significant differences between the teams 
in the .. homogeneity of their players' not-self perceptions, for either 
administration. However, there were some interesting findings when the 
between group self and not-self perceptions were contrasted. 
For the first administration Loughborough, the Freshers XV and Durham 
all had a mean not-self falling in the FG octant. York and Newcastle's 
however fell in the DE octant. For the second, all had FG as their inter-
personal mean, apart from the Freshers XV who had HI. The former 
administration will be considered first. 
The initial difference between the teams interpersonal means, FG 
compared to DE, is an interesting finding in itself as it re-introduces 
the notion of formal group structures. Leary designated the FG octant 
as being the non-conventional pole of a conformity-nonconformity axis, 
and as such it represents a specific "rejection of the established, the 
authoritative, the conventional", (Leary 1957 p.272). The rejection 
of these traits is of particular interest when compared to the 
acceptance of the authoritative themes (AP and BC), about which the Freshers, 
Durham and in particular Loughborough were so homogeneous. In 
Loughborough's case the high degree of homogeneity is replicated for the 
not-self with a mean of 29.39. Again, the influence on the three teams 
of their formal group structure appears to affect their rejection of the 
non-conventional. Indeed Hollander (1960) states that there is a 
dimension of conformity which is interrelated with status, competence 
and power. the very themes which are represented by AP and BC. York 
and Newcastle's rejection of DE however, indicates a concentration upon 
more expressive traits as it represents "the emotional rejection of the 
other". 
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The general not-self/octant frequencies indicate that both York 
and Newcastle have a high proportion of players rejecting either AP, 
BC,or both (approximately 25%). Durham too have players who reject these 
two interpersonal themes, a factor directly attributable to their players' 
more heterogeneous distribution of self perception. Conversely both 
Loughborough and the Freshers XV have no players rejecting AP although 
a small number do reject BC. However, in keeping with the other teams 
the main concentration is about octants DE, FG and HI. 
For the second administration there are some slight variations in 
the players not-self distributions, centred mainly about their degree'of 
homogeneity. It is interesting to note that all the teams-, apart from 
Loughborough and the Freshers XV, had an increase in their mean level 
of homogeneity. And although the decrease in the aforementioned teams 
was not statistically significant, it does pose some interesting questions 
as to the effect the situation has upon the critical acuity of the not-
self. 
One obvious reason which must be considered when attempting to 
propose reasons for the above temporal variation in team homogeneity 
is the effect that the reduction in sample size could have upon the not-
self/octant frequency distributions. However, given that the Loughborough 
sample size stayed exactly the same3, it is possible that there may be 
a more covert reason centred about the determinants of not-self perception. 
All the teams, Durham, Newcastle and York, who had effectively all 
but finished their competitive season at the second time of testing, 
manifest both an increase in homogeneity and a reduction in the numbers 
of players who had either AP or BC as summarising their not-self perceptions. 
Conversely, both Loughborough and the Freshers XV who were soon to face 
their sternest matches, had a decrease in homogeneity and in the case 
of Loughborough an increase in the number of players rejecting the 
"socially acceptable" octants of AP and BC. Similarly the Freshers mean 
not-self moved from FG to HI indicating a concern with the "social rejection 
of the self" (Foa 1965), or the appearance of weakness and self doubt in the 
presence of others. 
It is proposed therefore that the critical acuity of not-self 
perception is situation specific, and as such is sensitive to changes 
in environmental stress. This concept will be developed in greater detail 
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during the discussion of the relationship between the self schema and 
anxiety. 
The discussion so far has established in general that there exists; 
(a) a significant distributional consensus in the players'self and not-
self perceptions, the former situated around the authoritative octants 
of AP and BC, the latter the hostile FG, HI and DE octants, and (b) 
that although various octants around the interpersonal circumplex are 
perceived by the players as having a positive valence, both in terms 
of effective team interpersonal relations and in maintaining, or indeed 
enhancing levels of self-esteem, every octant has been used to summarise 
notions of self. Consequently perceptual variegation should not be lost 
in a concentration upon measures of central tendency. 
The introduction to the discussion of the third and final elemental 
part of the self-schema, the ideal self will enable a positive identificatio~ 
of the viability of the "socially acceptable" octants summaT'ised above. 
It will also indicate the motives/needs behind the players' particular 
perceptions of their ideals. The ideal was previously defined .as: 
"One of the important establishments of personali.{;y .•• an 
integrate of images which portrays the person at his "future best", 
realising all his ambitions:' (Murray and Kluckhohn, 1953, p.40). 
The statistical analysiS of the distributLm of the players' ideal 
self perceptions established that they were concentrated in the same three 
octants for both test administrations; . AP, BC and NO (p < .001). 
Similarly the results attest to the stability of this particular construct. 
as the direction of the players'perceptions were not significantly affected 
by the temporal nature of the research design. 
The emphatic concentration of the players/ideals about the apex 
of the vertical 'Dom' axis is illustrated in Tables 17 and 180n pages 142-143. 
It is evident from these player/octant frequencies the importance the 
playel's place upon interpersonal strength. However, the difference in 
the octant frequencies again indicates that there is some variation in 
this perceptual process. 
The AP octant is unequivocally the most popular interpersonal theme, 
accounting for 61% of the players/ideal ,perceptions for the first admini-
stration and 6~/o for the second. Of the two remaining octants that were used 
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with any degree of significance, BC and NO act as more extreme and 
less extreme versions of AP respectively. These results will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
Much has already been said about the traits associated with the 
Managerial-Autocratic interpersonal theme, and it is not proposed to 
repeat that discussion here. However what is of interest .(and this will 
supplement the above) is the particular distributions of the ideal self 
percepts within the octant. 
A detailed examination of the players AP perceptions revealed 
that all 59 players from the first administration, and 41 of the 43 from 
the second, had an ideal which stressed the more autocratic form of this 
generic code, (P). Leary (1957) states that: 
"The key factor in this ••• • •• type is the complete avoidance 
of weakness and uncertaintly, and the compulsive desire to appear 
competent, organised and authoritative" (p.324). 
It is evident therefore that the players' perceptions of reality 
are based upon an introjection of authoritarian ideals, not simply 
stressing powe~ but more specifically power over others (It is an interesting 
aside to note that this overwhe~ng concern with autocracy would, if 
realised, entail massive interpersonal conflict within the teams as the 
reciprocal effect of "power and control provokes others to obedience, 
deference and respect:' (Leary, p.323)). 
The next most popular ideal is represented by the BC octant, and 
as the reader will at this point be familiar with the nature of this 
interpersonal theme, no detailed account of this result will take place 
for the moment. 
After BC the only other octant used with any degree of significance 
was NO, the Responsible-Hypernormal octant. Leary states that: 
"Here we deal with the indiVidual who attempts to present himself 
as a "normal person". He presents himself as strong - but his power 
and self confident independence are used in an affiliative way. He 
strives to be close to others - to help, counsel, support and sympathize" 
(ibid p.315). 
The concentration of the players/perceptual frequencies around this 
particular area of the circumplex can be conceptualised as forming a 
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generically interconnected triad of interpersonal themes based upon self-
confident independence, authority and varying degrees of expressive 
responsibility; the major common denominator being power over others. 
This concentration is in fact very similar to the results of Leary's own 
work into the distributions of ~-patients' ideal perceptions reported in 
chapter 2. The following comparison indicates this similarity. Leary 
found that out of a-sample of 207 in-patients, 53% placed their ego-ideal 
in the AP octant, as compared to 61% and 62% for the two test administrations; 
37% had their ideal in the NO octant, as compared with the players'results 
of 15% and 28% respectively. Ta~ing the circumplex as a whole, less 
than 2% of the patients placed their ideal in the lower generically 'weak' 
half of the diagnostic Circle, a figure comparable to the players'results 
of 1% and 0%. 
Leary concludes that "this homogeneity is a cultural stereotype" (p.205), 
and as the ideal self is conceptually that part of the self schema which 
introjects external value systems, it would be expected that the players 
would have some distributional differences from Leary's particular 
'cultural stereotypes'. And indeed they do; with 2~~ and 24% of the players' 
perceptions being summarised by the 'hostile' BC octant. In order to 
account for the difference in effect of environmental influences it is 
necessary to discuss the probable motives behind the players'perceptual 
selections. Murray (1951), summarises the need for such an account when 
he states that: 
"The most important thing to discover about an individual •.• 
is the superordinate directionality (or directionalities) of his activities, 
whether mental, verbal or physical;' (p.276). 
In order to achieve an account of individual directionality it is 
necessary to borrow from Adlerian psychology (1930) and Murray's own 
"personology" (1938). Adler states: 
"I began to see clearly in every psychological phenomenon the 
striving for superiority... All our functions follow its direction. 
They strive for conquest, security, increase, either in the right or wrong 
direction;' (op ci t p. 398). 
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It is evident that the three octants perceived by the players as representing 
their ideals, all entail some form of interpersonal superiority over others, 
whether couched in expressive or hostile themes. However, although Adler's 
theory accounts for the general direction of the players' ideals his 
emphasis upon inferiority cannot be used as the sole criterion for 
perceptual choice. Murray however, evolved a far more complex theory 
which will be used to elaborate Adler's initial concept of 'striving for 
superiority'. Murray (1938)proposed that the 'need' concept is the 
basis of motivation. He states: 
"A need is a construct which stands for a force ••• which 
organises perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action. 
A need is sometimes provoked directly by internal process of a certain 
kind ••• Qyt WQr~ fregyeotly by the occurrance of one of a few 
commonly effective press (environmental forces)." (p. 124. Emphasis 
added) • 
Murray's definition establishes the way in which environmental forces 
affect the perception of needs, and in so doing he forges a link with 
Leary's theory of "cultural stereotypes". However, in order to fully 
understand the needs behind the players'ideal perceptions it is necessary 
to borrow further from Murray. Once he had defined the need concept, 
Murray offered a classification of twenty generiC needs, two are of 
interest here and their definition explains the probable motives behind 
the players'perceptions •. 
Murray defines need achievement as the need to: 
"Master, manipulate, or organise physical objects, human beings or 
ideas. To do this as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles 
and attain a high standard. To excel oneself. To rival and surpass 
others. To increase self-regard by the successful exercise of talent". 
(ibid p.152) 
and need dominance as the need: 
"To control one's human environment. To influence or direct the 
behaviour of others by suggestion, seduction, persuasion or command. To 
dissuade, restrain or prohibit." (ibid p. 226) 
There are obvious parallels with the needs described above and the 
interpersonal behaviour represented by octants AP, BC and NO. The 
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prevalence of the environmental pressure to 'need achieve' and 'need dominate' 
is illustrated by the fact that the between group analysis established 
that there were no significant perceptual differences between the teams, 
for either administration. Reference back to tables 20 and 21 on page -
147 illustrates the similarity between the teams player/octant frequencies. 
It is evident from the results that regardless of team affiliation or 
indeed the degree of formal structure, the players have a predominant 
concern with behaviour which: 
"Involves a dominant orientation shaded with elements of positive 
affect or friendliness" (Carson 1969, p.107). 
Indeed the fact that every team has a similar pattern of ideal 
perceptions begs the question as to what environmental forces produce 
this perceptual stereotype. An explanation could be that rather than being 
dependent upon structural or affiliative variables, the ideals are the 
product of a shared expectation as to what constitutes ideal behaviour 
for a rugby player. These perceptions are consensually validated both 
by previous research into personality traits, and also by the inter-
personal network of intra-team and coach/team interaction. It is 
interesting to note the similarity between the players'ideals and the 
Cattellian profiles offered by the trait theorists. Both Hardman. and 
Sinclair (1968) describe players as being high in sociability (A), dominance 
(E), conscientiousness (G) and willpower (Q3), and low in sensitivity (I) 
and insecurity (0). 
The ideal self therefore, unlike the other self-percepts, appears on the 
basis of these results, to be an immutable construct representing the values 
of the sports-type. Its function in controlling the players'perceptions 
by defining the parameters of acceptable/non-acceptable behaviour (sic), 
normal athlete/~roblem athlete, ensures that it transcends the boundaries 
imposed by formal group structure. It seems to be therefore the seminal 
'pledge' of the bonded group about which self and not-self perception 
are evaluated and controlled. 
The only slight difference between the teams which suggests that the 
degree of formal group structure may have a mediating influence upon the 
above process, is the proportion of players who have either BC or NO as 
their phenomenal ideal. For both administrations York and.Newcastle have 
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a number of players falling in the NO octant. These teams octant frequencies 
represent 71 per cent of the total NO perceptions for the first admin~ 
istration, and 62 per cent of the second. This concentration around AP and 
NO suggests the introduction of a further motive, need affiliation: 
"(The need to) draw near and enjoyably cooperate or reciprocate with 
an allied other"(Murray 1938; p. 162). 
The remaining three teams, Loughborough, the Freshers XV and Durham 
all have an ideal pairing concentrated about AP and BC. 
The discussion so far has established that the players'ide3l self 
perceptions are extremely narrow, all being based upon authoritarian 
themes •. (only two players deviated from this pattern, one from the first 
administration who had HI as his ideal and one from the second who had DE). 
It is apparent therefore that deviations from the above norm or 'pledge', 
in terms of either self or not-self perception, could engender intra-
psychic conflict. The consequence of which will now be discussed with 
reference to the construct of self acceptance. 
Self acceptance has been previously defined as the product of 
the degree of similarity between a players self and ideal self perceptions. 
A high degree of congruence would indicate a high level of personal self 
acceptance, a low level of perceptual congruence, a low level of self 
acceptance. The empirical analysis of this construct was structured so 
as to statistically quantify the effect the players'self and not-self 
perceptions had upon their degree of self acceptance. The factorial 
analysis established that for both administrations the joint effects of 
the two self percepts and the main effect of the players'perceptions of 
self were statistically significant. However, the effect of not-self 
perception on a players level of self acceptance was only significant 
for the first administration. 
An analysis of the main significant effects established that, for 
both self percepts, there was a curvilinear distribution around the 
circumplex. The essential difference between them being the shape of their 
respective regreSSions; an inverted 'U' for the self and a 'U' for the 
not-self. The implications of these results will now be discussed in 
detail. 
The effect of the self perception upon self acceptance is essentially 
monotonic, reference to table 22 on page 149 illustrates this relationship. 
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Using the mean deviations provided in the table it is evident that AP is 
the most 'self-accepting' interpersonal theme, with a mean deviation of 
-29.83 and -20.05 for each respective administration. Given the con-
centration of the players' ideals about this octant a result other than 
this would have been surprising. Indeed Leary (1957) states that: 
"The relation between self-satisfaction and power is confirmed by 
the empirical findings of the Kaiser roundation research. Managerial 
personalities are most closely identified (consciously) ••• • •• with 
their ego ideals. They are pleased with themselves." (p. 328-329) 
Similarly, the two other octants which have a high degree of self 
acceptance, BC and NO, are also described by Leary as being characterised by 
a high degree of self approval. He says of responsible-hypernormal behaviour 
that: 
"This mode of adjustment is close to the cultural ideal. It thus 
brings great conscious super-ego satisfaction." (ibid p.316). 
And of competitive-narcissism he states that: 
"Adaptively self confident individuals received considerable 
admiration and social approval." (ibid p.334). 
As a consequence of this positive feedback the competitive-narcissist 
would have a high degree of self acceptance particularly as his self 
perception stresses a high degree of ego strength. Sappenfield (1970), 
reviewed in chapter 2, summarised this relationship between self regard 
and self acceptance when he states that: 
"Persons having normal self-esteem tend to perceive themselves as 
having the characteristics that they attribute to the ideal personality" (p.976). 
An analysis of the circumplex as a whole confirms the truth of this 
statement. After AP the level of self acceptance aSSOCiated with each inter-
personal theme subsequently decreases; self rejection being the result 
when octants HI and JK are reached. Both of these octants have extremely 
high mean deviations; 40.89 and 42.55 for the first administration; 55.48 
and 48.48 for the second. (To give some indication of the low levels of 
self acceptance which ape associated with these octants, the maximum 
possible mean deviation is 70.22). 
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These results establish that the players whose self stresses either 
self-effacement or docile-dependency have a high degree of conscious 
self rejection. Leary (1957) states that: 
"The masochistic, guilty patient (HI) is generally obsessed with 
matters of right and wrong and measures himself (to his own disadvantage) 
against his own strict ideals. This point is clearly demonstrated by 
the finding that the sector of the Circle, which defines self-effacement 
is the fUrthest removed from the standard ego-ideal image of our culture. 
Their behaviour is rated in the HI sector of the circle - where as the 
ego-ideal is invariably located in the opposite sectors" (pgs. 286-287). 
Octant JK is similarly characterised by a concern over self, with 
behaviour related to ruminative worries, depreSSion, tension and 
indecisiveness, cognitions and affects far removed from the authoritative, 
independent ideals characterised by either AP, BC or NO. Indeed HI has 
been shown to have a negative association with dominance, the generic 
theme of all the ideals. Moreover, these results support Block and Thomas's 
(1955) findings, when they state that: 
"There is support for Rogers contention that a large discrepancy 
between one's perceived self and ideal self goes along with maladjustment, 
as maladjustment is defined on the conventional Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory scales. Thus the individuals expressing self-
dissatisfaction earn significantly higher scores on hyperchondriasis and 
depression" (p.255). 
Research conducted by the Kaiser Foundation using the MMPI established 
that HI behaviour had a profile of depression (D), and passive (mf) trends, 
and that JK was similarly related to depression and also ruminative worries. 
Although the MMPI was formulated by Hathaway and McKinley (1940; 1943) 
to be a psychometric device that would identify neurotic clinical 
syndromes (Coles 1982) (and it is not the contention that these players 
are neurotiC), it should be pOinted out that the common factors of depression 
are loss of self-esteem and confidence, guilt and a decrease in motor 
activities, (ibid p. 131). It is apparent therefore that this ego-
syntoniC cycle between self and ideal self perceptions is not satisfying 
to the player in any degree, Block and Thomas's theory of maladjustment 
being a source of tension and subjective unhappiness for these players. 
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The effect of not-self perception upon self acceptance establishes 
an octant/acceptance relationship which is the. inverse to that described 
above. Reference back to table 23 on page 150 illustrates that a rejection 
of either HI, JK or FG is indicative of a high level of self acceptance 
(these octants having mean deviations of -32.32,-15.38 and -11.63 
respectively). Conversely a rejection of either AP, BC or NO indicates 
a low level of self acceptance,. (these octants having mean deviations of 
26.82, 26.86 and 41.72). Indeed a rejection of these interpersonal themes 
indicates a conscious rejection of one's ideals, a situation which will 
be elaborated below. The fact that the not-self failed to have a 
significant effect upon self acceptance,for the second administration, 
again indicates the possible situation specificity of this construct. 
T·he joint effects of the two self percepts, summarised by the 
coefficient of determination, indicates both the validity and reliability 
of the self schema. The results of R2 established that the self and not-
self perceptual combination accounted for 70.7% of the variance in self 
acceptance for the first administration, and 54.1% for the second. However 
it must be noted here that the failure of the statistical interactive 
effect to reach significance should not in any way prejudice the proposal 
that the elements of the self schema have an interactive rather than 
additive effect. The following discusSio~ will propose the perceptual 
basis of the interactive effect. 
Taking the schema as a whole, a general perceptual pattern has been 
established whereby those player~who are most consciously identified 
with their ideals and therefore most self accepting, have a self which 
stresses independence, authority and dOminance,and a not-self which 
rejects either self depreciation, dependency or rebellious-distrust. 
Conversely the players who are most consciously dissatisfied with self 
are in a seemingly untenable position; a self which stresses self-
effacement or docile-dependency, an authoritarian, power oriented ideal 
which rejects self, and a not-self which rejects these ideals, a position 
. which would seem bound to engender psychological conflict. Yet it is an 
intriguing question as to why this intra-psychic conflict should be so 
overwhelmingly power oriented, and to answer this question one must return 
to the proposal of the ideal as representing the seminal group 'pledge'. 
The basic question is why these players did not set themselves a 
more realistic, attainable ideal, perhaps situated in LM, the cooperative-
---------
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overconventional octant, which Leary states "is probably the highest stated 
ideal of our Western civilization" (1957 p.303). 
Interestingly, not one of the players had this interpersonal theme as their 
ideal, even if it means, as is apparent from the results, a high level 
of self rejection. In order to understand the cognition behind this 
decision it is necessary to retrace some of our steps. During the discussion 
of the players'ideal selves, the motive for their particular concentration 
about AP, BC and NO was attributed to the need to achieve, and the need 
to dominate, ~hese needs in turn being the product of the bonded group 
process. However, there is evidently some further motive at work by which 
players with self-depreciatory and dependent selves should accede to those 
group ideals based upon purely authoritarian themes. The reason for this 
situation again appears to be confined to the ideal-as-pledge and its 
emphasis upon power themes. 
Syrnonds (1946) described a process by which an individual combats 
feelings of weakness and develops a feeling of omnipotence by taking, as 
models and values, those of the group. He states: 
"One looks for support by acceding to the wishes of society through 
its laws and customs, so that one feels secure as a member· of the group 
and derives power from the group." (in Leary 1957 p.202). 
However, a consequence of this quest for interpersonal security by 
adopting the values of others can be that: 
"The value system may play a destructive and unsettling role in the 
total personality structure ••• self conception may fall far short 
of a rigid demanding set of ideals, with a resulting feeling of guilt 
and self dissatisfaction" (Leary 1957 p.202). 
It is possible to see in Leary's statement the reasons why the self 
rejection, characteristic of octants HI and JK, arises out of the demanding 
set of ideals represented by AP, BC or NO. Although, by adopting this other 
centered value system the player still remains 'pledged' to the group. A 
position made worse by the fact that under the 'findings' of the trait 
theorists the self perceptions associated with octants HI, JK and LM do 
not exist! However, although we have addressed ourselves to the possible 
motive and consequence of other centered value systems, the role of power 
remains largely unexplained. 
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Alfred Adler (1930) specifically raised the whole question of inferiority 
and the urgent need to overcome or compensate for it. Part of his thesis was 
discussed in connection with the global description of ideal self perception, 
however his theory of achieving security through power indicates further 
the influence the values of the'bonded sports group have upon the HI and JK 
ideals. 
Adler states that feelings of weakness and dependency could be overcome 
by achieving a sense of power in some way which would be significant for 
the individual, either by overcoming his particular inferiority of by 
giving him value in the eyes of others in some alternative direction, 
(Guntrip 1973). It was Sullivan however who conceptualised the whole 
perception of power when he distinguished between the power motive and 
the power drive. The power drive is a neurotic over-compensation for 
repressed feelings of helplessness. The power motive: 
"is the primary, natural and healthy need to experience the feeling 
of power, ability, effectiveness, or capacity to do things, to carry out 
one's purpose" (Sullivan 1956 p. 143). 
The above discussion '~the p:ssibility'th3.tlthe1nee:ls:behirrl'tiB..p1ayers 
ideal perceptions, although based on power, fulfil different motives. 
The self-effacing or dependent players use the needs for achievement and 
dominance as a means of compensating for their apparent 'weakness' and 
low ego-strength. By adopting the narrow ideals of the bonded group they 
gain access to, and acceptance by, the group. However, the consequence 
of controlling individual praxis by the use of a power drive entails 
further self derogation and a lowering of self acceptance. Conversely, 
the players who have confirmatory ideals have much lower levels of intra-
psychic conflict, their power needs are also shaped by group expectation, but 
they have the facility to achieve their ideals and to faCilitate forms 
of psychological growth. 
The final statistic which emerged from the empirical analysis 
established that the influence on self acceptance of the two self percepts 
was not equivalent. Using the eta and beta coefficients the results from 
the first administration established that when the effect of the not-self 
was controlled, the influence of the self upon self acceptance was only 
slightly diminished; the eta of .79 was reduced to a beta of .68. Controlling 
the influence of the self however resulted in a marked reduction in the 
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effect of the not-self; the eta of .66 reduced to a beta of .32. The 
results for the second administration confirmed this trend. Controlling 
the respective perceptions resulted in the influence of the self increasing 
from .70 to .72, and the not-self being reduced from .42 to .25. 
The results indicate therefore that the self schema cannot be thought 
of as homeostatic,as the self evidently has a greater effect upon self 
acceptance than the not-self. This point is further illustrated 
by referring to between group difference. 
The statistical analysis established that there were significant 
differences between the teams in their players' levels of self acceptance. 
For the first administration both Loughborough and the Freshers XV were 
significantly more self accepting than either York, or Newcastle and York 
respectively. The second administration established that the players 
from Loughborough and York were significantly more self accepting than 
either the Freshers XV, Newcastle or Durham respectively. 
Inherent in the above results is that there is an apparent relation-
ship between self acceptance and team membership. And using the above 
discussion which traced the effects in self acceptance of the players' 
self and not-self perceptions, it will be possible to analyse this 
theoretical proposition. 
It will be remembered that the between group analysis of the players' 
self perceptions established for the first administration that both 
Loughborough and the Freshers XV were significantly more homogeneous 
than either Newcastle or York. It later transpired that these perceptual 
concentrations were centred about those octants designated as the ideal 
interpersonal themes; AP, BC and to a lesser extent NO. As a consequence 
of these power oriented perceptions, the players from these 
two teams are c~osely identified with their ideals. 
The players from Newcastle and York however, were much more hetero-
geneous in their distribution around the circumplex, with a number having 
self-effacing or dependent self perceptions. (The players from these 
two teams do in fact account for 7~~ of the overall total who utilised 
these interpersonal themes). 
The results for the second administration revealed that the players 
from Loughborough had the most homogeneous perceptions of sel~ significantly 
more-so than either the Freshers XV, Newcastle or York. 
The analysis of the not-self established that there were no significant 
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differences between the teams for either administration, although there 
were a number of players, particularly from Newcastle and York, who in 
the first administration, rejected the ideals of octants AP and BC. 
These results obtained from the between group self and not-self 
perceptions, when transposed on to the concept of self acceptance 
appear to support many of the points raised. The significant differences in the 
players' levels of self ~tance, for t.re first actIini.<;tffitim, 08rd~i.r1t:.er;:r'P.te:l in't.am3 of 
the homogeneity of the players' perceptions of self. It was proposed 
at that time that team homogeneity was related to the degree of formal 
group structure which surrounded interpersonal relationships. However, 
there is again the question as to why both Newcastle and York (teams who 
have been shown to have extremely loose formal structure),should share the 
need for such critical ideals. One explanation is that this perceptual 
emphasis is related to security gained through the shared pledge for 
power; a situation discussed in detail above. For the purpose 
of this present discussion the following definition illustrates the group 
motive: Newcomb (1951) states that: 
"(T)he distinctive thing about a group is that its members share 
norms about something. The range covered by shared. norms may be great 
or small, but at the very least they include whatever it is that is 
distinctive about the common interests of the group members."(p.64). 
Consequently, as the players from these two teams have no rigidly 
defined norm as to their self perception, the sharing of a value system 
brings some instrumental dynamism into group interaction. It is therefore 
as Sartre proposed, in order to preserve the group from disintegration, 
the group itself places severe restrictions on its members, restrictions 
based upon the traits of the sports -type. Consequently, the players share 
an identity based upon normative ideals by which they can not only 
feel part of one group, but feel part of the larger rugby playing 
community. Although, as was pointed out earlier, the result of 
obtaining group security through value systems based on power is again 
apparent with many of the players from these two teams having a low level 
of self acceptance. 
The differences in the teams levels of self acceptance for the 
second administration although following the results of the self for , . 
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the most part, did reveal some unexpected findings. 
Loughborough, as was stated above, had the most homogeneous 
distribution of player self perception, centred almost exclusively around 
octants AP and BC. Similarly, they are also the most 'self accepting' 
team. Moreover, their increase in homogeneity from 39.24 to 28.39 over 
the two test administrations"iwas accompanied by a significant increase 
in group self acceptance (p = .013). The significant difference between 
York and Durham was something of a surprise, however Durham does have 
players whose self perception falls in the less 'socially desirable' 
FG, HI and LM octants. 
The level of self acceptance manifested by the players from Durham 
is somewhat incongruous with their success, particularly when compared 
with Loughborough. ,At the time of testing Durham had recently beaten 
Loughborough in the final of the U.A.U. Championship and yet there is 
a clear disparity between the two teams in terms of their degree of 
homogeneity or self acceptance. The result is therefore somewhat 
anomalous, although it could be due to a combination of two factors; 
the time of testing, and the nature of self acceptance. Loughborough 
were given the questionnaire two weeks prior to the U.A.U. final, and 
at the time they were described by their coach as being tired. As a 
consequence of (a) the expectation of the final and (b) their level 
of fatigue, the players could have narrowed what was already an extremely 
inflexible perceptual field, covering all aspects of the self schema. 
The high self accepting profile which resulted from this perceptual 
homogeneity could therefore be a direct result of Neuringer et aI's (1966) 
theory of 'high self concept appraisal'. They contend that: 
"there is, phenotypically, stability of interpersonal relationships 
among high self concept individuals. But this may be due to the masktng 
effects of social group composition" (p.321. Emphasis added). 
Similarly, the curvilinear relationship between self acceptance 
and adjustment proposed by Crowne and Stephens (1961) and discussed in 
chapter 2, could explain the players' cognition behind the above statement. 
They state that individuals describing themselves as very close to their 
ego-ideals: 
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"tend to deny and suppress threatening features of themselves and 
cannot be considered mature or healthy."(p.110). 
Therefore, in response to somatic fatigue and environmental tension the 
Loughborough players 'masked' or suppressed any threatening stimuli by 
becoming an "overly-integrated" unit, (.Crowne ancf Stephens). 
The discussion so far has concentrated upon enlarging the statistical 
analyses to encompass both the singular and interactive nature of each 
self percept, and as a result show the self schema as a coherent,inter-
related unit. The reader will, hopefully, be aware of both 'normal' and 
'abnormal' perceptual trends, and although proposals have been advanced in 
an attempt to explain the motives behind this diversity, the affective 
consequences have been ignored. 
The relationship between cognition and affect is axiomatic to any 
psychology based upon self perception and although theories of maladjustment 
have been advanced in connection with certain interpersonal themes, the 
degree of affective arousal which accompanies these perceptions has not 
been mentioned. Consequently the remaining discussion will relate the 
'normal' and 'abnormal' self perceptions to both general (trait) and 
situation specific (state) feelings of anxiety. 
In chapter 2 contemporary research into the relationship between 
cognition and affect was described as having very little historical 
basis, as from the time of the classical Greek philosophers through to 
Freud's psychoanalytic theories, they have been regarded as mutually 
exclusive psychological processes. It was not until the 1950's that 
the holistic/humanistic psychologists and the 'philosophical psychologies' 
of Sartre (1956) and Merleau-Ponty (1962)began to formulate an inextricable link 
between the two conditions. Coles (1982) summarises the contemporary view of 
this link when he defines cognition as: 
"The perception and evaluation of one's ability to deal with the 
environment. The affective component is anxiety or fear, since there 
is a relationship between the ability to control or predict the consequences 
of an event and this emotion" (pgs. 123-124). 
The psychological processes involved in this relationship were also 
extensively detailed in chapter 2; in brief however, this cognitive-
affective relationship was conceptualised as being made up of four inter-
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related elements (Smith 1980); (a) the situation; (b) the cognitive 
appraisal of the situation; (c) physiological arousal responses, and 
(d) instrumental behaviour. 
Briefly the situation can be classified as being constituted by 
either external stimuli, i.e. the forthcoming game, or internal stimuli 
such as thoughts and memories. The second part of the model (b) entails 
a cognitive appraisal of the situation (a). However as Fransella and 
Bannister (1977) state: 
"Nobody has ever responded to a stimuli. They respond to what 
they perceive the stimuli to be ".(p. 7). 
The third (c) and fourth (d) parts of the model simply entail the degree 
of emotional arousal and its appropriateness to the situation. 
Using the above model the following discussion will establish the 
way in which the eight generic interpersonal notions of self influence 
the players' cognitive appraisal of the group and game situation, with 
specific 'reference being made to their effect upon trait and state anxiety. 
Before the discussion takes place however it is necessary to 
establish the construct validity of Spielberger's trait and state anxiety 
theorem, as it is the basis upon which all further discussion will take 
place. Spielberger et al (1970) define trait anxiety as representing 
relatively stable individual differences in anxiety (state) proneness, 
and state anxiety as a transitory emotional state which fluctuates over 
time, (see chapters 2 and 3). There is an obvious conceptual difference 
in the temporal nature of these two constructs, and the following 
correlation coefficients established that this was in fact the case. A 
Pearson 'r' of .744 was obtained for the test-retest analysis of the 
players trait anxiety scores, and a lower 'r' of .436 was obtained for 
their state anxiety. 
The size of both coefficients are in keeping with Spielberger et aI's 
(1970) findings. They report that: 
"(T)he test-retest correlations for the A-trait scale was reasonably 
high, ranging from .73 to .86 while those for the A-State scale were 
relatively low, ranging from .16 to .54, with a median 'r' of only .32", 
(p.9). 
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It is evident from both the above results and the accompanying brief 
definitions that trait and state anxiety are affective responses to different 
stimuli; the former a general response to the interpersonal environment; 
the latter a more specific response to a particular stimulus, in this 
case the forthcoming game. As a logical consequence of this difference 
the relationship between the self-schema and trait anxiety will be considered 
first. 
The results of the correlation coefficients, used to determine both 
the strength and direction of any relationships which exist between the 
various self percepts and trait anxiety, all reached significance apart 
from the second administration not-self, which failed to reached significance 
at any level. 
The relationship between self perception and trait anxiety revealed 
that the octant/anxiety regression followed what has come to be a familiar 
pattern; an inverted 'U' shape around the interpersonal" circumplex. The 
nature of this relationship is illustrated by the differences in size 
of the mean deviations associated with each octant in table 32 .on page 177. 
From the table it is apparent that for both administrations there is a 
general increase in the mean level of trait anxiety, the further one moves 
away from the apex of the vertical 'Dom' axis. Moving in an anticlOCkwise 
manner, this relationship reaches its maximum at HI, and then reduces 
with each subsequent octant until AP is reached. 
A general analysis of the above result indicates that the players' 
cognitive appraisal of their ability to manage the interpersonal environ-
ment is directly related to their particular self perception. More 
specifically, those octants which are associated with high levels of trait 
anxiety all fall below the horizontal 'Lov' axisJconsequently all are 
characterised by the generic interpersonal theme of 'weakness', These 
particular octants, HI and JK in the first administration, and HI and LM 
in the second, reflect a self perception which stresses self-depreciation, 
dependency or benign cooperation. All apparently see their interpersonal 
environment as threatening, and research completed by the Kaiser Foundation 
links each one with the incidence of anxiety. Leary (1957) states that 
those who have a self-effacing self perception (HI): 
"Are overtly anxious and unhappy. They exhibit guilt and self-
depreciation. Doubt, rumination and obsessive uncertainty are emphasised" 
(p.287). 
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Similarly, of JK he states that the results of M MPI profiles stress -
that it characterises "a person who is unhappy, anxious (D), worried and 
fearful(Pt)." He continues: 
"The third and most pathonombnic set of symptoms characteristic of 
a docile, dependent personality includes the manifestation of ove,'t free-
floating anxiety" (p.296). 
Finally LM is reported by Leary as bewg related to "generalised 
"nervousness" or anxiety vaguely defined" (p.307). 
Conversely octants AP, BC and NO, the generically dominant inter-
personal themes, are all associated with a low level of anxiety trait. 
Leary states that the MMPI llrofile 'of BC indicates that "the anxiety 
and passivity scales are low (D and Pt)" (p.336). It is apparent therefore 
that the players whose self stresses power, authority and independence 
perceive themselves as being able to manage the interpersonal environment. 
The basic difference betwee'.l the high anxious and low anxious octants is 
summarised by research corr.pleted by Weitzner, Stallone and Smith (1967). 
Using the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule they found that: 
"The personality traits measured ••• showed the low manifest 
anxiety subjects to be independent, to analyse their own motives and 
those of others... • •• The high, manifest anxiety subjects, in comparison, 
were dependent u;;on the encouragement, sympathy, and affection of others"(p.l64: 
The relationship between the not-self and trait anxiety produced an 
octant/anxiety regression which was 'U' shaped. However, this relationship 
was only significant 'for the first administration, (p < .01). Table 35 
on page 178 illustrates, using mean deviations" the nature of this 
relationship. From the table it is apparent that a rejection of the 
dominant interpersonal ,themes of AP, BC and NO is associated with high 
levels of trait anxiety. Conversely, a rejection of either FG, HI or JK 
is related to far more moderate levels. 
It will be remembered, that during the discussion of the players) self 
and not-self perceptions a proposal was advanced to account for the motives 
behind the concentrated acceptance of the generically 'strong' interpersonal 
themes. and the ,concentrated rejection of the generically hostile. 
These motives took the form of a cognitive-dualism; (i) the desire to 
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share the general team experience and so ensure effective interpersonal 
relations by accepting dOminant, independent themes (AP, BC and NO), and 
rejecting disruptive, self-depreciatory others and (ii) the desire to 
maintain or enhance one's self-esteem. 
It is apparent that any deviation from these group norms will be 
perceived by the players as threatening, as. they reject those traits which 
have been defined by the team as having a positive valence. Similarly 
using Leary's theory of reciprocal relations they will receive little if 
any positive feedback from others due to (a),having a dependent, self-
depreciatory self and (b), a not-self which rejects those octants whose 
dominant orientation 'pulls' respect, admiration and obedience from others. 
The consequence of these perceptions is that these players lose feelings 
of group conformity and therefore security. They feel unable to manage 
their interpersonal environment because of their dependence upon others 
to make them feel secure and needed. 
The consequence of Leary's theory of reciprocal relations in cases 
where the subjects have self perceptions· which 'pull' hostile (HI) or 
leadership (JK) responses from others can be further illustrated by using 
research completed by Watson and Friend (1969) and Richardson and Tasto 
(1975). Both reported an association between a general fear of negative 
evaluations and high levels of trait 'social' anxiety. There findings 
add a further dimension to the cognitive appraisals of those players who 
do not manifest perceptual norms; they are further isolated from the team 
by the fear of rebuke from their peers. 
In essence then)the derogation, guil~and anxiety experienced by the 
above players is the direct result of 'deviate' self perceptions threatening 
the preservation of the group. The situation thus follows the implications 
of breaking away from the restrictive practices of the bonded group, 
proposed by Sartre (1982) and described in full in chapter 2. In this case the 
consequence of seceding the 'pledge' to the group-as-sports~type·exposes 
the player to the 'terreur' which includes 'the fear of what the other 
group members wiil do to (he) who secedes or betrays', (Sedgewick 1982, p.80), 
this fear of negative appraisal placing the individual on to the periphery 
of group process. In order that group status is confirmed then, self is 
dependent upon the evaluation of the other rather than upon his own 
commitment •. 
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The failure of the not-self anxiety relationship to reach 
significance for the second administration indicates that the interpersonal 
environment is not regarded as having the same degree of threat to those 
who expect negative appraisals from it. This factor will be detailed 
toward the end of this chapter. 
The final relationship which proved to be statistically significant 
for both administrations was that between self acceptance and trait 
anxiety. The resulting 'r's of .419 and .590 for each respective 
administration established that there is a positive, linear relationship 
between the two variables4• Both of these results are in keeping with 
previously reported findings. Sullivan (1956), Rogers (1959,1961, 1965 ), 
Saranson (1960) and Mowrer (1965, 1966), all report that dissatisfaction 
with self is associated with elevated feelings of 'moral', 'social' or 
general anxiety. Spielberger et al (1980).using the STAI state. that: 
"Research shows that it is to be expected that feelings of self-
rejection will induce high A-trai t" (p. 95) • 
Similarly, Weitzner, Stallone and Smith (1967) using the Cattell 16 PF 
reported that: 
"the means of the high and low self acceptance groups (were) 
Significantly different for seven of the sixteen scales on the 16 PF. 
Furthermore, six of the seven significant differences are on the scales 
making a contribution to the second order factor of anxiety."(p164). 
It will be remembered however that in an earlier part of this dis-
cussion self acceptance was found to be significantly influenced by both 
self and not-self perception, and as such it must be seen as a part, and 
not the whole of the cognitive mediation process. In general terms high 
self acceptance was found to be the product of a dominant, managerial 
self and a not-self which rejected all forms of hostile weakness. Conversely, 
a low level of self acceptance had the inverse perceptual profile to that 
described above. As a consequence of these relationships the players 
with low levels of self acceptance were found to manifest the major 
traits of self-depreciation, weak ego-strength and dependent attitudes, 
integrated with a conscious rejection of their ability to manage their 
interpersonal environment. 
- -- - ------------------------
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Further research by Ohnmacht and Muro (1967) found that those subjects who 
were both highly anxious and low in self acceptance, were also characterised 
on the Cattell 16 PF as manifesting tendencies toward: 
"ego weakness (C-), shyness (H-), paranoid tendency (L+), guilt 
proneness (0+), self conflict (Q3-), and high ergic tension (Q4+) "(p. 237) • 
Each one of these personality factors being characteristic traits of the 
HI and JK interpersonal themes, and the antithesis to those which define 
the sports:..type. 
It is paradoxical that in their attempt to increase their security 
and so reduce tension, the players who try to overcome their self perceptions 
of inferiority and dependence by acceding to the values of others,do no 
more than bolster their fear of environmental threat. In chapter 2 this 
relationship between anxiety and values was described by Rollo May (1980) as 
being based upon an individuats concern with other people and their 
expectations of him. Consequently: 
"what makes him prey to anxiety is to be different, to stand out ••• 
Some are driven to conform because of loneliness - validating the 
self by means of becoming like everyone else." (p.245). 
Although May illustrates the way in which individuals attempt 
to reduce environmental threat by introjecting its value structure, he 
fails to attend to the consequence of self validation through other-
centred conformity. It has already been established that this process 
only furthers intra-psychic conflict as the self and not-self perceptions 
are invariably incongruent with those of the environment. Thus, 
rather than cognitions mediating the interpersonal environment into 
manageable dimensions, the appraisal process confirms one's inability 
to direct one's existence, as it is based upon self perceptions which 
stress a general lack of self-efficacy (JK) and negative internal self-
statements (HI). 
Sartre (1956) summarises this relationship between the self-schema and 
anxiety with his concept of Mauvais Fois (Bad Faith); the basis of which 
is Being-For-Others. As a consequence of this mode of existenc~dependent 
(JK), self-effacing (HI), or overconventional (LM) perceptions of self 
appraise the environment in terms of the fear of failure before, and of 
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negative appraisal from, the others; the self cognises the environment 
thus: 
"I have come to see myself only as others see me ••• Am I 
anything more than the dread that others have of me." (Sartre 1946, p.103). 
A player's general anxiety of his interpersonal environment has been 
shown to be significantly related to 'other centred' dependen~and generically 
weak self perceptions, characterised specifically by octants HI, JK and 
LM. However, this is only one part of the affective response associated 
with a person's cognitive appraisal of his ability to manage and direct 
his interpersonal environment. The second component, state anxiety, is 
a temporary affective response to a specific environmental situation .. 
for this experiment, characterised by the players forthcOming game. 
It will be remembered that Spielberger conceptualised the affective 
relationship between trait and state anxiety as being that,in general, 
individuals high in A-Trait exhibit A-State elevations more frequently than 
those low in A-Trait,because of their tendency to respond to a wider range of 
interpersonal situations as threatening to self-esteem, (1980), (for a more 
detailed description of this relationship please see chapters 2 and 3). 
The analysis of covariance, used to examine the influence that the 
different self perceptions have upon the trait-state anxiety relationship, 
established that self perception was a significant factor in mediating 
the players' A-State intensity in a situation which involved "some threat 
to self-esteem"( i.e. the forthcoming game). This was found to be the 
case for both administrations. 
As the experimental design controlled trait anxiety for the influence 
of each self percept, it was possible to generate the hypotheses of no 
difference that the trait-state anxiety regression would be homogeneous 
for each octant around the interpersonal circumplex, and for each self 
acceptance discrepancy unit. However, as was stated above, the beta 
coefficients which accompanied each analysis established that this was 
not in fact the case. 
The heterogeneous effect that controlling trait anxiety for the 
influence of self perception has upon the trait-state anxiety regression, 
is illustrated by the different sized beta coefficients in tables 39 
and in table 40 on page 180. (It will be remembered that the size of 
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the beta coefficient indicates the 'steepness' of the regression between 
the two components of anxiety; the larger the coefficient, the higher 
are the trait and state anxiety scores associated with either a particular 
octant or self-ideal discrepancy unit). 
From table 39 it is apparent that it is octants DE and FG which 
have the lowest beta coefficients. A somewhat surprising finding given 
the negative appraisal of these two interpersonal themes in a previous 
discussion, although it perhaps indicates the vagaries in the players~ 
perception of what constitute a temporal ego-threat, a factor which will 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Octants AP and BC are both associated with relatively low anxiety 
regressions, (their beta coefficients being equal to .620 and .630 
respectively), particularly when compared to octants HI, JK and LM, which 
all have 'steep' regression slopes indicating an association with higher 
levels of both trait and state anxiety, (their betas being equal to .707, 
.659 and .707). 
The beta coefficients for the second administration however (illustrated 
in table 41 ), show no such degree of theoretical uniformity. Octant DE 
now has the steepest anxiety regression, (.643), although the more 
interesting phenomenon is the reduction in the slope of the anxiety 
regression associated with octants HI, JK and LM, (.707 to .511; .649 
to .594; .707 to .588l In fact the AP regression is steeper,or as steep 
as each one of these generically weak interpersonal themes. The reason 
for these seemingly incongruous results can be better understood by comparing 
them with those of the first. 
It is evident that the overall reduction in the size of the beta 
coeffiCients, between the two administrations, represents an increase in 
the players/perception of their ability to manage the interpersonal environ-
ment manifested by the forthcoming game. This is a logical occurrence 
as for many players the second administration of the questionnaire coincided 
with the end of their season. Consequently, as the "ego threat" of the 
forthCOming game was diminished, their state anxiety was low. 
The beta coefficients for not-self perception are illustrated in 
tables 43 and 45, on pages 181 and 182 respectively. From table 43 
it is apparent that there is little, if any, theoretical uniformity to 
the different sized beta coefficients. although the rejection of the 
expressive Responsible-Hypernormal octant (NO), has a clear effect upon 
the anxiety regression as the size of the beta coefficient is .950. 
The other octants which would be expected to be associated with high levels 
of A-Trait and A-State, based upon previous results, AP and BC, have no 
such effect. The beta results for the second administration, illustrated 
in table 45, reflect the same factious distribution, with AP having the 
lowest anxiety regression of any octant (.500). However, it is interesting 
to note that it is again NO which is associated with the highest trait 
and state anxiety scores (.741), although in keeping with the proposal 
made above, all the beta coefficients apart from the one associated with 
LM, show a decrease in size between the two administrations. Although 
it is the apparent stability of the NO anxiety regression which is the 
most interesting finding. 
When reviewing the results obtained from the statistical analyses 
of the players' not-self perceptions, it becomes apparent that unlike 
the other octants, the rejection of NO is a consistent indicator of both 
self rejection and high levels of trait anxiety for both administrations. 
For the analysis of the effect that the players'not-self perceptions have 
upon self acceptance, although the sample as a whole failed to reach 
statistical significance for the second administration, the rejection of 
NO is a consistent influence upon self rejection for both administrations, 
with mean self-ideal discrepancies of 85.5 for the first administration 
and 61 for the second, (the maximum possible being 114). Similarly, for 
the analysis of the relationship between not-self perception and trait 
anxiety, although again failing to reach statistical significance for 
the second administration, the mean deviations associated with a rejection 
of this interpersonal theme rose from 4.85 to 11.83, this second figure 
being the highest for the whole circumplex (see Table 35 on page 178 ). 
The results confirm the apparent temporal stability of a rejection of 
NO as an indicator of negative self appraisal and high affective arousal. 
Although no measures of statistical significance can be attached to the 
above results it is proposed that the possible reason for this consistency 
is the expressive nature of the Responsible-Hypernormal octant. It is 
characterised by the message: 
"I am a strong, competent, empathiC person on whom you may count 
for understanding and emotional support" (Carson, 1968, p.109). 
A rejection of this interpersonal theme then, involves the emotional 
rejection of the other (Foa 1965). As a consequence, the 'threat' posed by 
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either the general or more specific interpersonal environment remains 
constant due to one's inability to integrate into the group. 
The beta coefficients which resulted from controlling trait anxiety 
for the influence of self acceptance, are illustrated in Tables 47 and 
49 on pages 183 and 184 respectively. From Table 47 it is readily 
apparent that there is little uniformity to the different sized beta 
coefficients, although there is some evidence of a general linear increase, 
with the discrepancies of 81 (.675), 84 (.701) and 105 (.726).having 
steeper regressions than the lower discrepancy units of zero (.638), 23 (.632), 
26 (.544) or 41 (.588). Although the coefficients from the second 
administration, illustrated in Table 49, present no evidence of theoretical 
uniformity, in fact there is evidence of an inverse relationship, 
going from a high anxiety regression of .815 and .829 associated with 
the low discrepancies of 0 and 23, to a low regression of .549 and .694 
associated with the high descrepancies of 84 and 91. The results are 
further compounded by the general increase, over the two test administrations, 
in the size of the beta coefficients indicating an increase in the players' 
levels of trait and state anxiety, an anomalous situation, which at the 
present, cannot be accounted for. 
However, although the beta coefficients are, for the most part, 
theoretically heterogeneous, there is a high degree of uniformity in the 
proportion of the variance in the state anxiety scores explained by trait 
anxiety when it is controlled for the influence of the self schema: R2 
was found to be greater than 95% in all cases. 
The apparent theoretical disunity of the above results.(apart from 
those from the first administration,'$elf) ,can be directly attributable 
to the conceptual nature of the trait-state anxiety regression. Many 
researchers have conceptualised the interpersonal situations which will, 
in all probability, result in high A-trait individuals eliciting high 
A-state responses. Hodges( 1968), McAdoo (1969) " 0' Neil, Spielberger and 
Hansen. (1969), Rappaport and Katkin (1972) and Spielberger (1972): 
"Have all found that high A-trait persons in ego-threatening conditions 
or situations report greater changes in A-state levels than do low A-trait 
persons. (However) in neutral or non-threatening Situations, the level 
of A-state arousal should not be appreciably higher for high A-trait 
persons as compared to low A-trait persons" (Endler 1980 p.258). 
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Using Endler's summation as a theoretical base it is probable that 
as the players'perceptions of the situation are ego-syntonic, at the time 
of testing their cognitive appraisals categorised the situation as being 
neutral or non-threatening to their perception of self. As a consequence 
there was no theoretical uniformity to the different regressions for 
either the octants or self-ideal discrepancy units •. However, although 
this argument can be justifiably proposed for the results which arose 
from the second administration, when the threat of the interpersonal 
environment could conceivably be said to have reduced, It cannot be taken as 
offering a comprehensive explanation for the factious variation in the 
results obtained from the first, due mainly to the fact that the effect 
on the anxiety regression of controlling A-Trait for the influence of 
self perception was for the most part, in keeping with the conceptual 
relationship between the two anxiety components. 
Although octants AP and BC did not produce the lowest trait-state 
regression as would be expecte~they were associated with relatively low 
levels. Conversely, octants HI, JK and LM, interpersonal themes which 
all correlated with high interpersonal trait anxiety, did produce the 
steepest anxiety regressions. A factor which suggests that these 
players perceived the specific interpersonal environment as threatening 
and responded to this threat with high A.-State intensity. As each one 
of these octants has been shown to be characterised by weak ego-strength, 
the results establish the ego-centric nature of the anxiety relationship. 
The remaining results however proved theoretically inconclusive, 
and it is proposed that there are three possible reasons which could 
account for this situation: (1) As the relationship between trait and 
state anxiety is situation specific (see Endler 1980 above) it is possible 
that the administration of the questionnaire did not coincide with a 
forthcoming match which would be perceived by the players as posing a 
significant interpersonal threat. However, if this was in fact the case 
one would expect a far more homogeneous set of beta coefficients for the 
not-self and self acceptance analyses. Moreover, as the results for the 
perception of self reflect some theoretical uniformity it does suggest 
that there was some differentiation in the players perception of the 
specific interpersonal threat posed by the forthcoming game. 
The second factor entails an assessment as to the validity of the 
proposed self schema - trait-state anxiety relationship. Wylie (1979) in a 
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study of the psychotherapeutic relationship between the self concept and 
trait-state anxiety states: 
"Although both trait and state indice' were employed (in this study), 
I consider here only the former, because self-reported trait anxiety seems 
more. appropriately classifiable as a specific aspect of self conception" 
( p.824) 
Based upon the results obtained from this research this would appear to 
be the case, as the relationship between the self schema and trait anxiety 
proved to be statistically significant in all but one case for both 
administrations. Perhaps a more accurate assessment of the 
situation would be that the self schema is, in total, Significantly related 
to self reported trait anxiety. But only a part of the schema, self 
perception, can be considered as having a significant influence upon the 
trait-state regression, p'ossibly because it is the conceptual bedrock 
from which all the other self percepts radiate. The legitimacy of this 
. proposal can be established by considering the third factor; the conceptual 
nature of the STAI itself. 
Endler (1980) states that: 
"Spielberger's (1972) trait-state theoa of anxiety accurately 
describes the relationship between A-state, type of threat, and A-trait. 
However, the STAI measure is restricted to interpersonal A-traits and 
ignores other facets of the domain of trait anxiety" (p.260). 
As a consequence Endler proposes that the STAI is unidimensional as the 
A-trait scale "assesses primarily A-state proneness to ego-threat" (p .259). 
To overcome this situation Endler proposes that we adopt a multidimensional 
approach to the classification of anxiety based upon three domains; the 
physical danger domain, the ambiguous, and the interpersonal domain. 
However, Endler's criticisms of the STAI can similarly be used against 
him. Introducing the threat of physical danger will correlate with fear 
not anxiety, due to its association with a specific environmental object 
or situation. Ambiguous anxiety would, by its very nature, be difficult 
to assess and could be confused with phobic reaction or any of the other 
negative affective conditions replete in the literature. All of which leaves 
only interpersonal trait anxiety, which, by its very nature is related 
to the self concept. Consequently it is not the 'domains' within the 
situation which need elaboration, it is the nature of the interaction 
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between interpersonal anxiety and the situation. 
Leary (1957) states that: 
"Interpersonal behaviour is aimed at reducing anxiety. All the 
SOCial, emotional, interpersonal activities of an individual can be 
understood as attempts to avoid anxiety or to establish or maintain 
self-esteem", (p. 59). 
Although this proposal was rejected as it entails a conception of 
the self-system as being totally motivated by anxiety and as such being 
a neurotic phenomenon (Guntrip 1978), it can become more theoretically 
significant if interpersonal behaviour is regarded not as being aimed 
solely at reducing anxiety, but as maintaining the equilibrium of the 
self-schema in its interaction with the interpersonal environment. It 
is only when disequilibrium occurs, in the form of situational threats 
to self-esteem, that situation specific anxiety will occur. Implicit 
in this statemen~regarding the nature of the person/situation interaction, 
is the subjective way in which we cognitively appraise our ability to 
deal with our present circumstances. Consequently, any disequilibrium 
arising out of our perceptions of the situation are person-specific,and 
therefore the criticism which should be levelled at both Endler (1980) 
and Spielberger.et al (1970'-is .their unidimensional conception of 
ego-threat which, as it stands, cannot account for the multiplicity 
of self-situation-anxiety interactions. 
No-one is free from the predisposition to be anxious, however the 
stimuli that elicit anxious responses are invariant with the self schema. 
The factor of state anxiety does not take this into account as it fails 
to differentiate ego-threat, and this fundamental theoretical weakness 
can be elaborated using Leary's interpersonal theory. 
It has been proposed that ego-threat is invariant with the self 
schema, as such it is multi-dimensional, consequently Leary states 
that each generic interpersonal theme is threatened by different situations. 
The managerial-autocratic self has the capacity to be made anxious but 
only when the situation encodes the threat of "the possiblity of being 
weak, uniformed, submissive" (p.325). Similarly the DE interpersonal 
self is "made most anxious in a situation which pulls for tender, agreeable 
or docile feelings" (p.342). Each octant has its own particular 
situational threat and although they are all generically linked to ego 
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threat it is evident that as it stands the concept is not sensitive to 
the vagaries of the interpersonal environment. Endler (1980) encapsulates 
this whole argument in the following statement: 
"It is necessary to focus on persons perceptions of situations and 
the meanings that situations have for them. We should isolate the kinds 
of situations that make individuals anxious and the cues in the situations 
that they perceive as threatening. The message that the environment is 
sending may not be the message that the individual is receiving" (p.266). 
It is proposed therefore, that although the results for the first 
administration self'did indicate that the trait-state regressions were 
generally influenced by ego-threat (octants HI, JK and LM), this alone 
is not sufficient to establish positive links between the self-schema 
and Spielberger's conception of state anxiety. Indeed if anything the 
result atests to the fact that state anxiety per se, is a general affective 
response to a specific stimuli,given that the common denominator between 
the three interpersonal themes is generic weakness. Other than this, 
based upon the failure of the other self percepts to exert any significant 
theoretical influence, it·is difficult to elaborate. As such, and until 
further investigation takes place, the utility of state anxiety as an 
affective dimension of the self-schema is questionable. It therefore 
remains to follow Wylie's contention that trait anxiety is more appropriately 
classifiable as a specific aspect of self perception. The following 
will briefly discuss why this should be so. 
Leary's personality traits are in essence categorising concepts and 
as such they do not refer to anyone specific interpersonal Situation, 
whether real or imaginary. Their function is therefore in that they: 
"Perform a necessary summar~s~ng function and provide a convenient 
shorthand for communicating about social behaviour" (Hampson, 1982; p.160). 
Trait anxiety is yet one more category, based upon individual 
differences in general interpersonal anxiety.. Although it, like state 
anxiety, is directly related to ego-threa~it is by definition distinct 
from real anxiety (state~ in that conceptually it is not anxiety at all; 
, , 
it does not exist as an affective response. Coles (1982) states that: 
"If anxiety is an emotion, it is impossible for it to be active and 
neither seen nor experienced in some way" (p.126). 
Trait anxiety, on the contrary, summarises a person's experience 
of being-in-the-world-in-general,. which as we have established is mediated 
by the self-schema. Therefore conceptually trait anxiety is an abstract 
affective mode of the self-schema, whereas state anxiety is the affective 
response by the self-schema regarding its ability to manage a specific 
situation. The concluding discussion, regarding the between group 
differences in player affective arousal, will further illustrate some 
of the points already raised. 
The results established that there were no significant differences 
between the teams in their players'levels of trait anxiety, for either 
administration. However, there was a significant difference between the 
teams in their players/levels of state anxiety for the first administration; 
p < .05. A more detailed analysis of this result established that the 
Freshers XV had a significantly lower level of state anxiety than either 
Loughborough, Durham or York. 
The results, interpreted in terms of Spielberger:'s theoretical formula, 
again indicates its shortcomings, as one would expect that if the teams 
differed significantly in their levels of A-state, then they would also 
differ, to some degree at least, in A-trait and this is not of course 
the case. This difference between the teams however, can be attributable 
to the "cognitive worry" dimension of state anxiety which indicates, in 
general terms, that the players from Loughborough, and in particular those 
from the Freshers XV, see themselves as being more in control of any threat 
arising from their interpersonal environment. And given the Freshers 
results up to this time this would indeed appear to be the case, as they 
had won most of their previous matches by very convincing margins. It 
is also interesting to note these two teams'state anxiety responses for 
the second administration, when they were given the questionnaire a little 
before a very important game. As can be seen from Table 31 there is little 
difference between theirs and the other teams state anxiety T-distributions. 
In fact Loughborough has a mean score which is the equivalent to that 
for Spielberger's undergraduates (50 t points are equal to the mean). 
This finding again indicates the probable influence on the players of 
their formal group structure. The factor will be discussed in more detail 
in the concluding remarks to this chapter. 
Perhaps, the most important development however is that although 
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there are no differences between the five teams in their players'levels 
of general interpersonal anxiety, every team has at least one member who 
perceives his interpersonal environment as threatening, and when this 
is linked to the previous findings associated with this cognition it is 
evident that not all players exhibit the same degree of "tough-minded 
emotional stability", and as such their interpersonal needs cannot be 
stereotyped. 
The discussion, taken as a whole, has established that there 
are significant interpersonal trends which mediate the players1self 
perceptions; dominant-independence for the self; hostile-weakness for 
the not-self; authoritarianism for the ideal self. However, although 
these perceptual characteristics were in evidence for.every team studied, 
the homogeneity of the players around these particular themes did appear 
to be influenced by particular group membership. It was proposed 
therefore that it was the degree of formal group structure which directly 
influenced the players" depersonalization', whereby they undergo "a 
change from personal to social" evaluation (Brown and Turner 1981 p.40). 
This process is summarised by Brown and Turner (op cit) when they state that: 
"Under conditions where a shared social identification becomes salient, 
social behaviour tends to become more uniform both within the ingroup 
and towards the outgroup ••• This is because, under such conditions, 
individuals define themselves and others in terms of their common 
attributes as group members and not in terms of their iciosyncratic 
features as unique persons" (p. 40) • 
Left at this point the research could be interpreted as merely perpetuating 
the myth of the male sports type as being stereotypically "high in dominance, 
social aggression, leadership, tough-mindedness and emotional control" 
(Kane 1978; p.122). In the language of the interpersonal circumplex 
managerial-autocratic (AP) or competitive-narcissistic (BC) behaviour. 
Inherent in Kane's statement is the identification and proposal of 
a social norm and as W.A. Scott (1958) states: 
"Adjustment is necessarily determined with reference to norms of 
the total society or of some more restricted community (i.e. the team) 
within the total society. Accordingly, one may conceptually define adjustment 
as adherence to social norms" (p. 31) • 
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However, it was established .that there were players whose self 
perceptions did not in fact adhere to the rugby player norm. They reported 
being low in dominance (JK), social aggression (HI), and leadership 
skills (JK, LM and HI), yet they still appear to function as an effective 
part of their respective teams. Their mere inclusion in the experimental 
sampleat~~ to that. Moreover, there were a number of players who 
manifested the above self perceptions who were in positions of responsibility 
within the teams and also had various representative honours. It does 
seem however that this deviation from the norm was not without personal 
cost, as most in this position tried to establish some identity with the 
group by introjecting its value system. a situation which merely seemed 
to exacerbate their situation as it resulted in very low levels of self 
acceptance and high levels of general interpersonal anxiety. 
The question which faces 'IS now therefore, addresses the necessity 
of these self-depreciating and anxious responses. Are they an inevitable 
but justifiable consequence of an inability to conform to the team norms? 
There are probably still those who would answer yes, however: if this~· is 
not so then how can the coaches, athletes and other researchers in the 
field rectify the situation? It is to this question that the comments 
in the concluding ch,pter·will be addressed. 
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Footnotes 
1. It may seem paradoxical that BC is both valued as a self preception 
and rejected by the not-self.. However, the situation is not as 
incongruous as it first appears as it is a direct manifestation of 
the diametric relationship which exists between the self and not-self 
perceptions. A situation which will be described in full later in 
the chapter. 
2. Cartwright and Zander (1968) propose that; 
"a group is a collection of individuals who have relations to 
one another that make them interdependent to some significant degree". 
Because a rugby team consists both of a number of highly specific 
role relationships i.e. scrum-half and hooker, scrum-half and fly-half 
etc., and also a high degree of physical proximity between its members, 
there exists a strong sense of interdependence, a necessary 
concomitant if effective team functioning is to take place. 
3. Using a correlated groups design the table below illustrates the 
change in the team means. 
First Administration Second Administration 
Teams 
Loughborough 29.39 34.65 
Freshers 42.5 45 
Durham 38.7 20.2 
Newcastle 38.35 38.85 
York 46 39.1 
4. The positive correlation between self acceptance and A-trait may at 
first sight seem an anomalous result i.e. high self acceptance being 
associated with low A-trait suggesting an inverse relationship. 
However, this illusion is entirely due to using Leary's discrepancy 
scores where perfect self acceptance is equal to zero, perfect self 
rejection 114. A positive relationship is therefore acceptable. 
Chapter 7 
Implementing the Athlete-Centred Approach: 
Implications of. and Strategems for. the Ccach-Athlete Interactioo 
"Hell is other people~' (sartre 1946). 
"Self-realisation is not an anti-social principle; it is firmly based on 
the'fact that men need each other to be themselves" (Storr 1981; p32-33). 
The seemingly disparate views offered by the two authors above 
illustrate the fundamental paradox of the human condition. The continual 
threat to self's existence posed by real or imaginary others who make 
up each of our separate realities, interfaced with self's need of others 
in order to facilitate acceptance and growth of self through their 
continued approval, encouragement and support. The more destructive side 
of the Others influence is described by Leary (1957) when he proposes 
that some individuals, rather than face the anxiety and subsequent loss 
of self-esteem generated by their interpersonal relationships, choose 
to destroy self through suicide. An extreme but sobering example of one 
of the consequences of the power we invest in others. However, although 
it is not my intention to conclude by proposing that sport, with its 
emphasis upon enforcing stereotypes, is a breeding ground for suicide, 
the potentially devastating influence it can have upon an athlete's sense 
of identity cannot and should not, be ignored. The more extreme manifest-
ation being that: 
"A nwnber of prominent athletes have sought psychiatric help and 
many others have abandoned promising careers publicly stating that to 
continue would have caused a nervous breakdown". (Patmore 1979 p. 10). 
A less extreme consequence of the anxiety and conflict caused by participation 
in sport has been reported by Yaffe (1983), who observed that out of the 
418 medical complaints presented by British athletes at the Moscow OlympiCS, 
60 (14%), were directly related to stress l . Similarly, others such as 
Moore (1968), Sanderson (1977) and Rosenblwn (1979)" involved in monitor-
ing athletes'general health, all report that those who manifest high levels 
of anxiety and intra-psychic conflict are predisposed toward either psycho-
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somatic injury conditions or~ltiple injury phenomenon'~ The proposed 
source of much of this stress and anxiety being the 'normal-abnormal' 
classificatory system which perpetuates the mythological sports-type. As 
a consequence the validation of the athlete as being an extrapolation 
of the Nietzschein 'ubermensch' 3, either through the research of the sports 
psychologist or via the verbal descriptiOns of the coach, is a misnomer 
based upon a wholly inadequate paradigm. Therefore, although the athlete 
as sports~type falls within the tolerance of the old model, based as 
described in chapter 1, on a series of inadequate theoretical and 
methodological assumptions, a shift toward the athlete-centre approach 
reveals that the former has merely papered over the differences in 
individual athletes personality dispositions, and hence authenticated 
'scientifically', the myth of the male sports-type. The way in which this 
theoretical proposition influenced the structure of the thesis is summarised 
below. / 
In chapter one the implications for the athlete's psychological well-
being of maintaining the approach described above was considered, and 
it was proposed that the differentiation of athlete from non-athlete on 
the baSis of their personality traits was a myth, used ostensibly to 
control and also 'facilitate' athletic performance. Control being maintained 
by transposing the moral system of the sports-type on to a 'normal-abnormal' 
classificatory system, such that any athlete whose self perceptions deviate 
from the normative cluster of traits is defined as a 'problem' athlete 
and is 'punished' by being 'expelled' to the periphery of the group. 
The psychological result of this breaking of the 'bonded' pledge being 
intra-psychic conflict and anxiety. It is via this process that the 
athlete as sports~type is validated and perpetuated. 
In order to analyse (a), the existence and also prevalence of the sports-
type and (b) ,its effect upon the athlete, an alternative theoretical 
, methodology was proposed based upon the phenomenological and experiential 
perceptions of the athlete whilst performing. Using such an approach 
entailed accounting for the influence of the performance situation; the 
athletes interpersonal environment; his perceptions of self; and the 
'intentionality', in terms of the effect upon others, of these perceptions, 
factors previously ignored by the traditional approach to research on 
athlete personality which concentrates upon validating stereotypes with 
the aim of enhancing performance, ipso facto winning. 
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This parad~shift was likened to a move away from the emphasis 
upon group process, where the individual athlet~ sense of self is obscured 
by the collective consciousness of the group, to praxis, a perspective 
which accounts both for the situation in which the athlete ~,'artd also 
the needs, intentions and perceptions generated by the situation. To 
facilitate this shift a self-schema was introduced, a construct which was 
to represent the basic perceptual unit of being-in-the-world. The schema 
consists of self, not-self, and ideal self, perceptions which can be 
analysed individually or as part of a perceptual 'gestalt'. Moreover, it 
was proposed that these perceptions could be used in conjunction with self-
report measures of anxiety in order to quantify the influence, on the 
athletes affective threshol~of adherence to or deviations from the 
'normal-abnormal' personality classification. 
Chapter 2 discussed the prevalence of anxiety and intra-psychic 
conflict within sport in more detail, particularly the way in which such 
conditions were rationalised by the coach. Similarly the methods by which 
the athlete personality can be depersonalised were advanced. It was proposed 
that the sports group acts in the same way as Sartre's(1982) bonded group. 
·Whereby an athlete's loyalty to his group i.e. maintaining the sports-type 
and hence a definition as an athlete, is maintained through the anxiety, 
fear and guilt as to what the others will do, or say, if he deviates or 
lets them down by manifesting behaviour outside the rubric of the sports-
type. The psychological process by which these unpleasant affective states 
are manifested was described using a model developed by Smith (1980). 
The relationship between the athletes'cognitions of the performance 
situation and his degree of affective response, being mediated by his 
appraisal of self's ability to cope with the demands of the situation. 
As an athlete's level of anxiety is dependent upon the outcome of this 
mediational process/then one would expect those whose sense of self deviates 
from the bonded group norm to perceive the demands of the performance 
situation as threatening to sel~ and respond to this threat with elevated 
levels of anxiety. 
Chapters 3 and 4 described in detail the two psychometric techniques, 
La Forge and Suczek's (1955) 'Interpersonal Check List' and 
Spielberger et aI's (1970) . 'State Trait Anxiety Inventory', which 
were to be used to analyse the above proposals, and introduced 
the experimental sample of 96 rugby players from 4 universities 
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and one college of education. Reasons for the choice of this particular 
sample were advanced. 
In chapters 5 and 6 the empirical analyses were described and discussed 
respectively. The results indicated that stereotypes existed for each 
aspect of the self-schema; a managerial-competitive self; a rebellious 
not-self; and an autocratic ideal. There were however, perceptual deviations 
evident in all 5 teams from the normative typologies of self and not-
self. These traits, which in general terms were the antithesis to those assoc-
iated with the sports-type, e.g~ submissive, dependent, doCile, were found 
to be significantly associated with high levels of both self-rejection 
and also general, or trait,anxiety. The influence of this 'weak' depreciatory 
interpersonal self perception, interpreted in terms of Smith's model, is 
that the athlete mediates his cognition of the game situation, using as 
the criterion. a series of internal self-statements based upon self-
rejection. The emphasis therefore, is upon self's inability to cope with 
this segment of reality, the competitive situation threatens to engulf 
self, the result being high levels of affective arousal. 
Moreover, the results of the players ideal self perceptions confirmed 
the influence of the bonded group, as most individuals, irrespective of 
their self or not-self percepts, placed their ideal at the apex of the 
vertical 'Dom' axis of Leary's circumplex, the autocratic interpersonal 
octant whose traits embody those of the sportstype. It is evident from 
this finding that those players whose self or not-self perceptions deviated 
from the norm described above, attempt to compensate for their deviancy, 
and also retain their 'pledge' to the team,by adopting as their ideal 
the octant which contained the traits associated not only with the sports-
type, but because of the structure of the group, their peers as well. 
Unfortunately however, the statistical analysis revealed that this compensatory 
process did little to solve their anxiety and guilt, rather it had a 
significant effect upon their feelings of self-rejection and also appeared 
to reduce their threshold of affective arousal. 
The theoretical and methodological tenet of the above supported by 
the empirical findings, suggest that there are athletes who find that 
partiCipation in sport, under the present conditions, disturbing, with 
possible damage not only psychologically but physiologically as well. 
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the sample used in this study did 
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not represent the top echelon of sports participation, a factor which 
enables the hypothesis to be generated which suggests that the stresses 
imposed upon top sportsmen and women muSt'create an environment for 
tremendous psychological conflict, affective arousal and possible 
physiological injury to take place, lhree factors which together form 
a vicious Circle often eased solely through the use of drugs., 
The emphasis upon athlete-as-"sports.- type by coach, athlete, spectator, 
and the media in general continues, largely unabated, to structure the 
aim of sport in general, and the influence of the bonded group in particular. 
Consequently, as sport becomes more and more of a financial medium, the 
stress imposed upon sportsmen and women will become proportionally larger, 
particula~as winning, rather than entertaining, becomes the commodity 
at a premium. Moreover, the influence of the media exacerbates the need 
for 'heroes' of the track, football or rugby field, and as a consequence 
the myth of the male sports~type is perpetuated by these printed or 
visual symbols, as well as by those involved in promoting the succe~~ 
of the athlete; ·the coach. Indeed it is perhaps the coach-athlete inter-
action which must accept most of the blame. Dr. Peter Sperryn (1983), 
secretary of the British Association of Sport and Medicine, comments that: 
"The stress on top athletes has become extreme. This is not 
adequately understood by the publiC, the media ••• sports officials 
or, ironically, the athlete and his coach." (in the Guardian p. 14). 
Nowhere have these stresses been manifested in greater detail than in 
the number of British athletes who, due to mysterious virus or muscle 
injury, had to either drop out of, or compete below their best at the 
World Athletic Championships in Helsinki. This problem however, is not 
solely limited to athletes in the United Kingdom,(where the British 
malaise does appear to differ though,it is in the concentration upon 
the purely physiological factors), but as was pOinted out at the beginning 
of this chapter, many injuries are merely physiological symptoms of the 
psychological stresses imposed by the in-group and out-group demands of 
participation in sport. 
The overriding question is therefore what steps can be taken to allow 
athletes freedom of individual expression by abolishing the covert 
classification of personality based upon a criteria of normal-abnormal 
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behaviour, while maintaining a sensitivity to the needs of each individual 
athlete, his perceptions of, and participation in, the performance situation. 
The paradigm shift employed by this thesis suggests that it is up:to the 
coach and to a lesser extent the athlete, to facilitate this change. 
Of course the range of this study is, of necessity, limited, and 
much more work needs to be undertaken. It is suggested that future research 
could concentrate upon using Kelly's (1955) repertory grid technique, rather 
than standardised trait inventories, as the type of constructs elicited 
would be a more valid representation as to the extent and also influence 
of the sport~type. The use of this psychometric technique could be backed 
up with a selection of in-depth interviews and, where possible, participant 
observation. Different sportsJage-groups, particularly using school 
children, and levels of competition would, of necessity, have to, be 
compared. Similarly given the apparent gender-bias (see Riesman 1967, Tiger 
1968, and Millet 1977 in chapter. 4) of the sports-type, sex differences in sport 
would be a useful criterion.4 And a seemingly fruitful area would be 
to monitor how participation in sport transfers into the other areas of 
an athlete's life. These suggestions concentrate mainly upon analysing the 
influence of the sports-type and the stresses associated with this 
influence. :r.he other side of the coin, as the title of this final chapter 
suggests, is how the current concern with the athlete as sports-type can 
be replaced by an athlete-centred approach. Consequently, the remainder 
of this conclusion will speculate as to the practical implications,firstly 
for the coac~and secondly for the athlete, of implementing an athlete 
rather than a performance (sport~type) centred approach. 
1. The Coach ang the Athlete=C~tred AQQroach 
The traditional view of the 'successful' coach's personality sees 
him as being: 
"Dominant, authoritarian, hard-working, artless, tough-minded and 
manipulative: task oriented rather than player-centred" (Straub 1978 p.261). 
Similarly, the emphasis placed by these interpersonal reflexes during 
the coach-athlete interaction stresses the dominance of the former and 
the submission of the latter. Indeed Straub(op cit) comments: 
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"In the mid-1940s leadership was often defined as a form of dominance 
in which followers more or less willingly accepted direction and control 
by another person. Many people would probably agree that this definition 
holds true today in the sports environment."(p.2S8). 
Much of the contemporary research into the coach-athlete interaction 
supports Straub'~comments: Cooper and Payne (1972), who analysed the coaching 
methods used in the four divisions of the English professional football 
league found that task-oriented coaching was the 'best' predictor of team 
'success', a particular approach in which the coach emphasises job-
completion, problem solving and a persistent work-rate, rather than inter-
action orientation which is concerned with maintaining harmonious 
relationships between coach and athlete. Toward the less extreme end of the 
'coaching scale' Nygaard (1971) found, when looking at the behaviour of 
40 physical education teachers, that they used verbal behaviour which had 
a 'direct' influence upon the student; that they did most of the talking; 
and that they viewed themselves as authority figures. Cheffers and Mancini 
(1978) who carried out similar research reported that during the teacher-
athlete interaction there was "virtually no acceptance of student feelings 
and ideas, praise or questioning behaviour." The current status of both 
the coach and athlete, and the pattern of their role relationship,is 
perfectly summarised by the work conducted by Carron (1978). Questioning 
both coach and athlete he reports that the coaches were perceived both 
by themselves and the athletes as being dominant and in ~ontrol. Conversely, 
the athletes were perceived as being SUbmissive and recipients of control. 
Moreover, the coaches eschewed warm, personal friendships, they saw them-
selves as being the recipients of these expressive traits. 
Perhaps Sage (1978) concludes the whole ideology of the current coaching 
methods when he states: 
"It is easy to see how this system may produce coaching behaviour 
which emphasises the treatment of players for what they can do for the 
coach - win, rather than the treatment of players based upon what coaches 
can do for the personal social growth of the athlete as an individual" (p.154). 
It is apparent therefore. that the current role of the coach is an extra-
polation from the bonded group process whereby control, through dominance, 
is maintained. If we accept the contention however that sport is a 
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microcosm of society in general, then the current coaching techniques 
represent antiquarian management practices. Unfortunately tho~many 
coaches can answer this charge with some degree of conviction in that 
'this is all very well but our methods have been shown to facilitate high 
levels of performance', the question however is - at what cost? Moreover, 
just because one method has been shown to be 'successful' (and one wonders 
in whose terms), it does not follow that it cannot be improved. It also 
must be pointed out at this juncture that the shift toward the athlete-
centred approach does not entail a move away from a high standard of 
performance or necessarily the desire to win or to do well in competition. 
What it does mean is that the coach and athlete re-define competition and 
performance. Consider the following statement by Gallwey (1982): 
"What is seldom recognised is that the need to prove that you are 
better than someone else is based on insecurity and self-doubt. Only 
to the extent that one is unsure about who and what he is does he need 
to prove himself to himself or to others. 
It is when competition is thus used as a means of creating a self-
image relative to others that the worst in a person comes out" (p.1471. 
The basis of the bonded group is therefore 'neurotic competition'; 
self-worth gained through 'successful' performance, a positive attitude 
to self achieved by winning, but winning adhering to the stricture of 
the sports-type. However, if neurotic competition exists then so must 
'normal' competition, but under what conditions can a transformation take 
place? The first step must be a collaborative goal-setting between the 
coach and athlete, such that they set their own standards of performance 
or execution of a skill, upon which they both agree, and which is imposed 
from within the coach-athlete interaction and not from the mores of the 
neurotic-competitive situation. How though can this equanimity between 
coach and athlete be achieved? There has been a paucity of alternatives 
to coaching from the basis of neurotic competition. Cratty (1978), was 
concerned as to the rate of psychological morbidity attributed to the 
traditional coaching practices, and as an alternative he suggested a series 
of 'models of maintenance' as a means of reducing anxiety and conflict. 
The basis of these 'models' is that a professional psychiatrist or counsellor 
is enlisted by the coach to assist in the expressive side of coaching. 
Such an approach has been used by a number of professional football teams, 
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and two psychologists calling themselves the 'Sporting Bodymind' are 
available for consultation upon such topics as "body awareness','relaxation' 
and 'concentration,'.5 For most however, Cratty's ideas, although represent-
ing a large step forward, involve too radical and expensive a first step. 
There are very few institutions which can afford to employ, whether on a 
full or part-time basis, the services of a psychologist. Moreover, as 
the title of Cratty's model suggests, the aim is on maintenance rather 
than upon the prevention of the emotional problems caused by participation 
in sport under the present system. Thus the athlete is still seen as 
presenting the problem and no attempt is made to adapt coaching techniques 
or expectations. Cratty's aims therefore combat the effects but not 
the cause of the emotional disturbances. 
George Sage (1978) has probably proposed the most fundamental 
alternative to current coaching practices. In his paper entitled 
'Humanistic Psychology and Coaching' he argues that in the past: 
"Instead of coaching from the expressive foundation of personal 
fulflllment, coaches often adopt a production profile in working with 
athletes Under the banner of efficiency, personal relationships 
give way to distance and manipulation." (p.155) 
He proposes, as an alternative to the above perspective, the humanistic 
method of coaching: 
"The humanistic coach places individual expression above group 
conformity, self-discipline above authority, independence above 
dependence. She makes an effort to give attention to every player on 
the team." (p.159) 
There is within Sage's proposal, the beginnings of a more athlete-
centred environment, fostered by the coach, within which the athlete can 
grow psychologically as well as physically. However, although both Sage 
and Cratty have identified and proposed solutions for the effects of the 
traditional coach-athlete relationship, neither is particularly specific 
in his approach as to the means of implementing, and also the practical 
implications of an athlete-centred coach-athlete relationship. Within 
this problem there is of course the dilemma of replacing one inflexible 
stereotype with another. A way round this is to first ask the coach to 
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reflect upon himself as, by definition, he is part of the interaction. 
It should be realised therefore that there are 'problem' coaches as well 
as the ubiquitous 'problem' athlete. 
The most important factor of the athlete-centred approach is that 
the coach must believe that such as interaction will be more fulfilling, 
and hopefully have an influence upon the psychological growth and health of 
his athletes generally. It should not be regarded.as being just another 
gimmick with which to enhance performance. Moreover, the main resource 
for employing such a technique need only be the availability of his time. 
Argyle (1969), comments that in order for a compatible interaction 
to be possible: _ 
"two people must agree on the role-relations between them ••• 
they must agree on the definition of the situation, and be prepared to 
play socially defined parts in it." (cited in Carron 1980 p.143). 
At present the role-relationship is based upon the interpersonal reflex 
of dominance-submission and it is proposed that any interaction which is 
athlete-centred must (a) be based upon an environment, fostered by the 
coach, where problems may be aired and the athletes personal growth 
faCilitated, and (b) communication engendered by this environment should 
reveal, as much as pOSSible, the phenomenal self perceptions of the athlete~ 
~uCh that, where necessary, coping strategies for stress or conflict can 
be implemented or support offered. Tnis point will be described in more 
detail in section 2 below. In order for (a) to be achieved the coach 
must realise that by definition he or she is in a position of directive 
leadership. However, the extent of this direction can be tempered by 
the coach questioning the objectives and self perceptions which shape 
his leadership style. A simple but useful exercise would be to answer 
the following questions: As a coach: (i) Do I trust the capacity of 
the athlete to meet the problems with which we are faced, or do I basically 
trust only myself; (ii) Do I free the athlete for creative discussion 
by being willing to understand, accept and respect all attitudes, or do 
I find myself trying subtly to manipulate discussions 'so that they come 
out my way; (iii) Do I trust the athlete to his 'job'; (iv) When tensions 
occur, do I try and make it possible for them to be brought out into the 
open, (adapted from Rogers, 1965). The intentions contained in .the 
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above represents the desire· for a more equal coach-athlete interaction, 
their roles being based upon a mutual trust and respect of, and for, each 
other's abilities. As such there is a collective model of leadership 
or direction in which: 
"a coach can directly involve his athletes in a collaborative goal-
setting and thereby influence them into a kind of '" ••• psychological 
contacting with themselves." (Botterill 1976. Cited in Straub 1980 p.59). 
Of course the problem of implementing an athlete-centred approach 
is exacerbated when the coach is dealing with a sports group, such as 
the rugby team used in this study. Tensions between members and the need 
for a collective approach make collaborative goal-setting more difficult, 
but not impossible. 
are beyond the scope 
Unfortunately the major problems of group dynamics 
of this thesis although the prinCiples outlined above 
should still be implemented. There are however, other factors which can 
be added. Team-members should be shown that the group works synergetically,6 
in that it is the result of the combined or coordinated action of 211 its 
members. As such the coach should endeavour to get the various task-groups 
within the team to discuss their function i.e. in rugby the Hooker and 
the two Prop Forwards, in soccer the goalkeeper and his defenders. This 
can then be supplemented by inter-mixing the members of each individual 
task-group so that the players gain an understanding of the perceptions 
and actions of their team-mates with whom they are not usually in direct 
contact. To achieve this however, the coach must organise the physical 
as well as social environment. For instance the coach must realise that 
if he wishes a group discussion to take place the players should be seated 
in a circle or semi-circle so that each player can see and be seen by 
his team-mates. 7 This simple but effective manipulation of the physical 
environment helps prevent the more established team-members monopolising 
the group discussion. 
It is by using the above points, whether upon individual or groups 
of athletes, that the coach begins to understand the athlete's perceptions 
of himself as a being-in-the-world, and as a consequence, should a particular 
athlete manifest conflict and anxiety, based upon a cognitive set of 
negative self appraisals, the coach can help, as opposed to merely defining 
the athlete as a problem with an uncharacteristic show of weakness. The 
final section below will consider how the athlete can learn, utilising 
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where possible the more 'therapeutic , coaching environment,6 to reduce 
the stress involved in sports participation under the influence of the 
sport~type and the bonded group process. 
2. C9P~ng Strategie~ and_the_Athlete-Centred Approach 
One of the objects of this thesis has been to illustrate the incidence 
of psychological conflict and anxiety within a sample of 96 rugby players, 
~he cause of which was attributed to the predominant influence of the 
male sports-type as the athletes' role model. However, although the 
discussion below represents an extension of the athlete-centred environ-
ment described in section one above, it must be made clear that its exist-
ence is not necessarily contingent upon it (see footnote 6 above). In 
essence it entails not only a recognition of the stresses involved in 
participation in sport, but specific coping strategies for the athlete 
to use in order to reduce the level of affective arousal by developing 
a more positive self-image. 
The role of the athlete within the athlete-centred coaching inter-
action is that he or she must take responsibility, and offer some direction 
f0,' his or her actions. This entails that the athletes perceptions of 
the coach must transcend the directive, dominant stereotype, and replace 
it with the need for a more equal relationship. Moreover, athletes should 
help each other·to recognise signs of stress or conflict. This shift 
towards a more expressive manifestation of the bonded group enables players 
to start to become self rather than other centred. However, regardless 
of the quality of the coaching interaction the athlete will, at some 
stage, manifest high levels of affective arousal, the response to the 
vagaries of the (neurotic) performance environment. It is at this point 
that the coach should help the athlete recognise his loss of control, 
and this can be achieved by monitoring the signs of rising levels of 
arousal and also disturbances in concentration. Nideffer (1g81) lists 
several such signals which need to be monitored: 
1. Any change in the athletes arousal level, for example a significant 
or decrease in activity. 
2. Increased tension in the muscles, particularly those of the upper 
body and neck. 
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3. Changes in breathing, especially hyperventilation or the incidence 
of asthmatic attacks. 
4. The presence of small facial tics and twitches. 
5. An increase in the muscle tension of the jaw. 
6. Alterations in the ability to shift attention. 
7. A change in the frequency of natural tension reducers, such as yawning, 
stretching and coughing. 
Other signs which can be monitored solely by the athlete include: headaches; 
dizziness; blurred vision; palpitations; backache and the presence of a 
'nervous rash'. Of course these symptoms could be caused by some physio-
logical ailment and it is obviously important that the athlete be screened 
medically, before using a psychologically oriented programme to acquire 
independence and control. The stress management programme borrowed from 
Smith (1980), offers a method by which the cognitive appraisal of the 
performance situation can be enhanced and the level of affective arousal 
reduced, via a cognitive-affective stress management programme. It will 
be remembered that Smith's model, used throughout this thesis, proposed 
that an individual's level of anxiety is the result of the interaction 
between the situation and the person's cognition of his ability to cope 
with that situation. High levels of anxiety are therefore, the product 
of an inadequate coping mechanism based upon negative or irrational state-
ments about self. The stress management programme (S.M.P.) has been 
applied to a variety of clinical and nonclinical populations, including 
pre-adolescent, college and professional athletes in a variety of individual 
and team sports. The S.M.P. consists of five partially overlapping phases, 
each one will be described in detail below. Before beginning this 
description however, it must be made clear as to why this particular 
programme has been included. There are many other stress management or 
coping strategies available which could be used instead of the S.M.P •• 
This particular technique was preferred however, as it has actually been 
used in sport, although its inclusion is solely to give the reader an 
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idea as to what such a programme entails. There are a number of points 
inherent in the S.M.P. which are contiguous with other techniques - these 
will be defined below, after the description of the S.M.P., in an attempt 
to summarise the major aims of a coping strategy. 
(a) Pre~treatmeot A§s~§§meot: 
This phase attempts to assess the nature of the individual's stress 
responses, its effect upon performance and other behaviours. Assessment 
is also directed towards an evaluation of the athlete's behavioural and 
cogni ti ve skills, i. e. how w.ell can the person voluntarily relax; how 
aware is he or she of the cognitive processes that elicit affective arousal, 
or conversely reduce stress and improve behavioural efficiency. In essence 
the assessment attempts to define the athlete's strengths so that they 
can be built on, and identify the deficit areas where new coping skills 
are required. 
(b) Tr~atIJlenLBi!ti9naJ,e: 
The training programme starts by helping the athlete understand the 
nature of their stress response in terms of the cognitive-affective model. 
Smith comments that it is fairly easy to ensure that the athlete arrives 
at the conceptual model on their own simply by asking them to describe 
their stress responses; 'When did it happen'? 'What was it like'? and 
so on. 
Two important points are emphasised during this phase. One is that 
the S.M.P. is an educational and not a psychotherapeutic programme. The 
second point is that it is a programme of self control, the goal being to 
ensure that positive changes are attributed by the athlete to him or herself 
rather than to the actions of the coach. Smith reports that test-anxious 
college students who took part in 
on a measure of self-efficacy 
the programme 
(Nye 1979). 
showed significant gains 
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(c) Skill Acguisition: 
The skill acquisition phase consists of learning a muscle relaxation 
technique paired with an analysis of thought processes, and replacement 
of stress-eliciting self-statements with specific cognitions designed to 
reduce stress and improve performance. 
The voluntary muscle relaxation technique used was formulated by 
Jacobson (1938). Individual muscle groups are tensed, slowly relaxed 
halfway, and then slowly relaxed completely. Eventually, as training 
proceeds, increasingly larger groups of muscles are combined until the 
entire body is being relaxed as a unit. 
During the course of relaxation training 
upon deep breathing to facilitate relaxation. 
special emphasis is placed 
Deane (1964) reports that 
respiration amplitude and frequency can affect heart-rate as well as 
subjective feelings of anxiety. The athlete is asked to breathe slowly 
and deeply and to emit the mental command to relax upon exhalation. This 
stimulus-response pairing becomes important as, at a later stage, the 
command becomes an eliciting cue for relaxation. 
During this phase the athlete is required to identify his or her 
maladaptive self-statements. To facilitate identification and their 
replacement by adaptive self-statements the athlete is asked to list the 
emotion they experienced prior t~and during the performance Situation, 
what they must have told themselves about the situation in order to have 
become upset, and what they might have told themselves instead to have 
prevented their upset. Once completed the athlete and coach can discuss 
the. stress-eliciting and anti-stress substitute. Of the former the athlete's 
responses are legitimized and it is pointed out that others feel the same 
way. 
Smith proposes that up until this point the programme is simply a 
form of cognitive restructuring,however the work of Michenbaum (1977), 
has resulted in the addition of self-instruction training elements to the 
cognitive coping skills training. This entails that specific, task-
relevant self-commands are developed by the athlete so that they can be 
emitted in the performance situation, a simple one would be 'take a deep 
breath and relax'. 
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(d) Skill Rehearsal: 
Like any athletic skil~.stress coping skills, to be effective, must 
be rehearsed and practised under conditions which approximate the situation 
in which they will be employed. Smith proposes the use of the procedure 
known as induced affect, which generates high levels of emotional arousal 
·which are then reduced by the athlete, using the coping responses acquired 
in the preceding phase above. Basically the athlete is asked to imagine 
the performance situation as vividly as possible and focus on the feeling 
that the situation elicits. The coach suggests that as (s)he focuses 
on it the emotion will grow~ When a high level of arousal is obtained 
the subject is instructed to reduce it·with.the coping responses. As 
the athlete inhales he or she emits a stress-reducing self-statement; 
at the peak of the inhalation the athlet~ says the word 'so' and while 
slowly exhaling instructs him or herself to 'relax' and induce muscle 
relaxation. 
(e) EvalU?t;i.gn: 
Smith reports that because of the subject matter involved in this 
type of work, subjective self-reports of individuals, experimental research 
into the efficacy of the techniques is problematic. However, his research 
using athletes where measures of performance are available suggests that 
the S.M.P. is a useful method for reducing the degree of an athlete's 
negative self-appraisal and also affective arousal. 
Perhaps the most important factor stressed by Smith in the above 
programme is that it is an educative rather than a therapeutic process. As 
such the coach could simply concentrate upon implementing the second 
phase and introduce the athlete/s to the nomenclature of anxiety, a 
situation I feel would be invaluable given the way in which the causes 
of anxiety are largely ignored. It would also legitimise affective responses 
as the athlete could see and understand its universality. This definition 
of affective arousal could then be paired with the relaxation exercjses, 
and as the athlete becomes more proficient in being able to relax,use the 
relaxation condition to visualise the performance situation and focus 
his (her) attention on a series of realistic goals. In essence then 
the whole of the above programme does not need to be implemented, the 
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coach,or more importantly the athlete on his or her own can use just section 
of it. The main thing being that they understand the rationale behind 
each section's use. The programme can be summarised then into four sections: 
(i) Anxiety defined; (ii) Relaxation; (ii) Visualisation; (iv) Anxiety 
into energy. 
At the end of the last chapter I asked the question as to whether 
conflict and high levels of affective arousal were inevitable by-products 
of participation in sport. The question can be answered in two ways. 
It is inevitable as long as the coach endorses the aims of the bonded 
group, and the researchers into sports personality blame the reliability 
of the measuring instrument because it shows variation in the athlete's 
perceptions of self. However, as more and more people begin to use sport 
as a medium for self-expression (i.e. the number running marathons and 
jogging), it need not be inevitable if process becomes praxis and if we 
re-define the concept of competition. Under this new definition the athlete: 
"Is not out to show himself or the world how great he is, but is 
simply involved in the exploration of his latent capacities. He directly 
and intimately experiences his own measures and thereby increases his 
self-knowledge." (Gallwey 1982 p. 153). 
This is not a esoteric or quasi-mystical phenomena but a definition of 
what being-in-sport is. Borrowing from the existentialists credo -
et fac quod vis - realise that you are free. 
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Footnotes 
1. The exact diagnoses of these medical complaints were insomnia (40); 
headache (13); depression (3); anxiety state (3) and hysteria (1). 
2. In dynamic activity, the sequence of muscle tension and relaxation 
is termed the motor unit firing sequence. Marshall (1976) explains 
"athletes capable of replicating the proper motor unit firing sequence 
for their particular activity enjoy athletic successes". However for 
athletes who manifest high levels of affective arousal, this excessive 
tension not only hinders the above sequence and deters performance 
but also increases the incidence of muscle injury. (Tomayko 1978) 
3. The connection between the ideals of the sportstype and the Nietzschien 
superman are contained in Warnock's comments on the latter in that he 
"aims in all his perception and judgement to dominate his world, and. 
to bring it within his power," (1971, p.20)~ 
4. I was talking to a colleague who ran a successful women's rugby team 
at Loughborough, and he expressed disappointment that the players 
seemed to have taken the men as their role models both on and off 
the field. However, how much of this aggression and violence was 
due to having male rugby players as role model~and how much was 
the women expressing themselves for themselves would be an interesting 
study. 
5. Chris Connolly and John Syer of the Sporting Bodymind commented in 
conversation that one of the difficulties they had when at Tottenham 
Hotspur Football Club was that the manager forbad the words psychology 
or psychologist to be used in connection with his team. This outlines 
the fundamental problem when applying psychological principles to 
any sport, that of stigma. 
6. It should be pointed out that even in traditional coaching and 
competitive environments the athlete can still employ these techniques 
to help himself. 
7. Connolly and Syer comment that one of the first changes they made 
at Tottenham F.C. was to put the players in a circle for the Monday 
group discussion and a straight line for the Saturday pre-match talk. 
The former facilitating group dialogue, the latter concentration solely 
upon the manager. Prior to their arrival the situations had been 
reversed and both meetings were described as 'problematic'. 
Appendix·A: The Questionnaire. 
Name of University =-__ ~~~~~~~~~~~=-~ 
Date of Administration 
=================== 
To All Respondents 
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Please read the instructions accompanying this questionnaire 
carefully and ensure that you answer every question. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Please Turn Over. 
-1-
In order to complete the questionnaire please read the accompanying 
instructions carefully. Could you also note the following: 
- Do not hesitate to ask any questions if you are not sure 
about something. 
- There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers to any of the 
questions. 
- Every questionnaire will be treated with the strictest of 
confidence. 
- If you make an error please ensure that it is completely 
erased before putting in your corrected response. 
- The questionnaire may seem'bulky'but it should only take 
between twenty to thirty minutes to complete. 
To answer please put a tick in the appropriate box unless asked to 
do otherwise. 
, 
Name ____________________________________ ___ I 
Please 
leave 
blank 
1 
Age Years .... , __ --'-__ --' 
How many years have you played rugby football? yearsD 
1-3 
4 
5-6 
7-8 
During this time have you had any representative 
honours? yesn 
No D 
Please 
leave blank 
Please Turn Over. 
-2-
If your answer to the previous question was yes 
please specify what the honours were. 
County Schoolboy 
Schoolboy International 
U.A.U. Representative 
Senior County Representative 
Under 23 International 
Senior International 
Any others ( Please specify ) 
How long have you been at this university? ( If 
less than one year put the number of months ). 
How many times have you played for the 1st. XV 
this season? ( If you have never played put a 
zero in the box ). 
How many times (approximately), did you play for 
the 1st. XV last season. ( If you never played 
put a zero in the box ). 
Do you play for another club when not attending 
university? 
If your answer to the above question was yes 
which club do you play for ? 
Years 
Months 
yesD 
No U 
1----t 10 
1-----t 13 
15 
l.--J 
0=]18-19 
[020-21 
Please 
leave blank 
022 
Please 
leave blank 
Please Turn Over. 
-3-
What is yoUr current position on the field? 
( Please specify just one position, eg Right wing 
What is yoUr regular position on the field? 
( Please specify just one position) 
What is your preferred p()si tion on the field? 
( Please specify just one position) 
). 
Please Turn Over. 
Please 
leave 
blank 
IT] 24-25 
Please 
leave 
blank 
IT] 26-27 
Please 
leave 
blank 
CD 28-29 
-4-
A DIIIRber ot stataenta which people bave IIBed to ~eacribe theiiJaelves 
are given below. Read each statement and then tick in the appropriate 
column, situated to the right of the statement, the category which 
indicates hovyou senerally feel. Do not spsnd too much time on any 
one statement but give the ansver which seems to describe how you 
senerally feel. 
Almost Some-
Never times 
Often Almost 
Always 
I feel pleasant •••••••••••••••• ~ __ 4 
I tire quickly ••••••••••••••••• ~ __ 4 
I feel like crying ••••••••••••• L-__ j 
I wish I could be as happy as 
others Beem to be •••••••••••••• ~ __ 4 
I feel reBted •••••••••••••••••• ~ __ 4 
I am 'cool, calm and collected_'L-__ ~ 
I feel that difficulties are 
piling up so that I can't D 
overcome them •••••••••••••••••• 
I worry too much over somethingB 
that really doesn't matter ••••• 
I aDl llappy ••••••••••••••••••••• 
I am inclined to take'things 
hard. • • • . • • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . • • • 1----1 
I lack self-confidence ••••••••• 1-__ -1 
I feel secure ..••.....•......•. '--__ ~ 
I try to avoid facing a crisis 
or difficultY •••••••••••••• • ••• I-__ -I 
I feel dO\lll •••••••••••••••••••• 1-__ -1 
I am content •............ e .••••• '--__ J 
ODD 
8GB 
Please Turn Over. 
Please do 
not write 
herlL-_ .... 
1-----1 30 
1------131 
L.....-...J32 
1---133 
1--~34 
'----.J35 
1--~39 
1----140 
~~41 
~--l42 
~-l43 
~...J44 
-5-
Using the instructions described overleaf •••••• 
Almost Some-
Never times 
Often Almost 
Always 
Some unimportant thought runs 
through my mind and bothers me. DODO 
I take disappointments so 
keenly that I can't put them 8 
out of my mind ••••••••••••••••• 
I am a steady person ••••••••.•• 
I become tense and upset when I D 
think about my present concerns 
888 
ODD 
Please Turn Over. 
Please do 
not write 
here 
045 
'----'-_....J150-51 
Total T.A.S. 
-6-
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves 
are given below. Read each statement and then tick in the appropriate 
column, situated to the right of the statement, the category which 
indicates how you feel right now, that is, at this moment, about the 
forthcoming game. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but 
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
Not at A 
All Little 
I feel calm ••....•........ I---l 
I feel tense •••••••••••••• I---l 
I feel secure •••••••••.••• I---l 
I am regretful ••••••••..•• t--; 
I feel at ease •••••••••••• 
I feel upset ••••••••.••.•• 
I am presently worrying 
over possible misfortune •• t---l 
I fe,el rested •.......•...• t---i 
I feel anxious ...........• 
I feel comfortable •••••••• 
I feel self-confident ••••• 
I feel nervous •••••••.•••• 
I am jittery ••.••••••••••• 
I feel 'highly strung' •••• 
I am relaxed •••••••••••••• 
I feel content ••••.•.••••• 
I am worried •••••••••••••• 
I feel over-excited and 
Quite 
a Lot 
Extremely 
So 
Please do 
not write 
h".,." 
1---152 
1---153 
1---154 
55 1---1 
1---1
56 
57 1...---' 
5 
5 
6 
~ 
6 
~ 
~ 
6 
~ 
~ 
6 
8 
9 
o 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
rattled ••••••••••••••••••• 
I feel joyful ••••••••...•• 
I feel pleasant ••••••••••• L-_~ 
1---169 
1---170 
,--+_-471 
Please Turn OVer. 
L---I._....J72- 73 
Total S.A.S. 
-7-
In order to respond to the list of statements below you are 
required to describe the sort of person that you think you are 
when you are playing with your team-mates during the course of 
a gamel 
If you agree with the statement put a tick in the column 
headed 'Like Me '. 
- If you think that the statement is not at all like you put 
a tick in the column headed 'Not Like Me'. 
- If you think that the statement is not applicable in 
describing the sort of person you are put a tick in the column 
headed 'Not Applicable'. 
- If you don't know put a tick in the column headed 'Don't Know'. 
Please respond to every statement on the questionnaire. Do not spend 
too much time on anyone statement but base your 'answers' upon 
first impressions. 
When I am playing with my team-mates during the course of a 
game I think that •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
le ike 11e A Julicable Know 
I am Able to Criticize Myself •••••• 1---1 
I am Able to Doubt Others •••••••••• 1---1 
I am Cooperative •••••••••••..•.•••• \---l 
I am Able to Take Care of Hyself ••• 1----4 
I Ac t Importantly •••••••••••••••.•• 1----4 
I Accept Advice Readily •••••••••••• 
I Admire and lmi ta te Others •••••••• 1----4 
I am Affectionate and Understanding 1--1 
I agree With Everyone •••••••••••••• 1--1 
I am Dictatorial ••••••••••••..•••••. ~::~ 
I am Always Giving Advice •••••••••• I--~ 
I Resent Being Bossed ••••••••••••• _1--1 
I am Apologetic •••••••••••••••••••• L-~ 
Please Turn Over. 
Please do 
not write 
here 
5 
1 o 
1 4 
1 7 
When I am ~ playing vi th my team-mates during the course of a 
game I think that •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
I am Appreciative •• " .••••.•....•..• 
I am Big Hearted and Unselfish •••• 
I am Bitter ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
I am. Boastful .................... . 
I 8JIl Bossy •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
I am Businesslike •••••••••••••••.• 
I Can be Frank and Honest ••••••••• 
I Can be Indifferent to Others •••• 
I Can be Obedient ••.•••••••••••••• I--
I Can be Strict if Necessary •••••• I--
I Can Complain if Necessary ••••••• I---
I am a Clinging Vine •••••••••••••• 
I am Cold and Unfeeling ••••••••••• 
I am Complaining •.•...••.......... .. 
I am C onsidera te ...•..•..•........ 
I Usually Give In ......•......•.•• 
I am Critical of Others ••••••.•••• 
I am Cruel and Ul'lkind. ••••••••••••• 
I am Dependent •••••••••••••.•••••• 
I am Over-Sympathetic ••••••••••••• 
I am Easily Fooled ••.•..........•. 
I am Dominating ••.•..............• 
I am Eager to Get Along With Others 
Please Turn Over. 
Please 
do not 
write 
here 
18 
1----1 
20 
1----1 
25 
I------l 
29 
30 
B 5 
4 o 
-:9"-
When 1 am playing with my team-mates during the course of a game 
1 think that •••• 
Like Not Not 
Me Like Me Applicable 
. '1 am Easily Embarra s sed •••••••• '1---1 
1 am Overprotective of Others •• t-_, 
1 am Self-Respecting ••••.•••••• t-_, 
1 am Egotistical and Conceited.t-__ I 
1 am Always Ashamed of Myself •• '1-__ 1 
1 Enjoy Taking Care of Others"1-__ 1 
.1 Expect Everyone to Admire Me. "1--_1 
I am Firm But Just •.....•.•.•.. • 'f--I 
I am Fond of Everyone •....•.•.. -1----; 
I am Forceful ......•........... _1----1 
I Forgive Anything .............. 1----; 
1 am Frequently Angry ••••.•..•• '1--_1 
1 am Frequently Disappointed ••• '1----; 
I am E'riendly .•................ -1----; 
1 am Able to Give Orders ••••••• 'f--I 
1 am Generous to a Fault ...... "f--I 
I am Resentful .....•.••.•.•..•. _1--_1 
I am a Good Leader ••••••••••••• _1--_1 
I am Grateful ••.••••••.••..•.•• -1----; 
1 Will Confide in Anyone .. "" "f--I 
I am Hard Hearted •••••••••••••• -1----; 
1 Hardly Ever Talk Back ........ '1----; 
I am Hard to Impress ••..•••...• eL-.--J 
Don't 
Know 
Please Turn Over. 
Please 
do not 
write 
here 
1----141 
1-~45 
f---;50 
1_-155 
1----1 60 
-10-
When· I am playing with my team-mates during the 
I think that •••• 
Like Not 
Me Like Me 
I am HelPful ••••••••••••••••••• .I~ 0 
I am Impatient With Others Mis-
takes.······ ••• • •• •• ••••• ······.~ ___ 1 
I am Independent ••••••••••••.••• ~ __ ~ 
I am Irritable •••••••••••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
I am Jealous .•................. '~ __ -I 
I am Kind and Reassuring •••••••• 
I Lack Self Confidence •••••••••• 
I Give Freely of Myself ••••••••• 
I Like Every-body •••••••••••••••• 
I Like to be Taken Care Of •••••• 
I Like to Compete With Others ••• 
I Love Everyone ••••••••••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
I Make a Good Impression •••••••• I ____ ~ 
I Manage Others •...•.......•..• '1---1 
I am Submissive •••••••••••••••• '1----1 
I Like Responaibili ty •••••••••• '1----1 
I am 11odest..... . ............. .. -----' 
I Obey Too willingly •.•........ 'I_~ 
I am Often Admired •.•••....•..• 'I------l 
I am Often Gloomy .....•........• __ _ 
course of a game 
Not Don't 
Applicable Know 
o 
-
Please Turn Over. 
Please 
do not 
write 
here 064 
6 5 
7 o 
7 5 
8 o 
r 3 14 
5 
7 
-11-
When I am Pl~ing vith rrry team-mates during the course of a game 
I think that •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
I am Often Helped by Others ••• '1--1 I-
I am Often Unfriendly •••••••••• 1-_1 I-
I am Outspoken •• " •••• """ •• ".,,. _1--1 
I Let Others Make Decisions ••• '1--1 
I Want Everyones Love" •.•. " .•.• 1--1 
I am Passive and Unaggressive"I-_1 
I am Proud and Self-Satisfied •• 1_-1 I---
I Rebel Against Everything ••••• 1_-1 
I am Respected by Others ••••••• ~~ 
I am Always Pleasant and 
Agreeable. " " " " . " . " " " " . " " " " " . " " • 
I aIIl Selfish.""." .. " . " . " " " . " " .. 
--
I am Sarcastic •••••••••.•••.•.• 
I am Self-Confident •...•.•••••• 
I Encourage Others ••••..•.••••• 
I Distrust Everybody ••••••••••• 
I am Self-Reliant and Assertive 
I am Easily Led .•••••••.••••••• I--
I am Self-Seeking •••••...•••••• 
I am Shrewd and Calculating •••• 
I am Sl'ly'.""""." •• """"".,,"",,.,, •• 
I am Sceptical ••••.••..•••••••• I-
I am Slov to Forgive a Wrong ••• 
I am Sociable •.••.••••••••••••• I-
I am Somevhat Snobbish ••••••••• 
I am Spineless ••..•••...••..••. 
Please Turn Over. 
Do Not 
write 
Here . 
8 
9 
1 o 
15 
20 
25 
30 
1----1 
32 
'--' 
-12-
When I am playing with my team-mates during the course of a game 
I think that •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
I Spoil People With Kindness ••• ~ __ ~ 
I am stern but Fair •••••••••••• 4-__ ~ 
I am straightforward and Direct4-__ ~ 
I am stubborn •••••••••••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
I am Tender and Soft-Hearted ••• 4-__ ~ 
I Think Only of Myself ••••••••• _---< 
I 8.lIl Timid .......•.•....•...... ~ __ --1 
I am Touchy and Easily Hurt ••••• ___ ~ 
Do not 
write 
he e 
1----133 
1----134 
1--~35 
~:n~:~·~~~~~·~~~~~~~~~·~~··B n n R R 
I am Too Lenient with Others... ~ ~ 
I am Too Willing to Give to 
others •.•....................... 1---1 
I Try to be Too Succcessful ••••• 1---1 
-
I Try to Comfort Everyone ••••••• __ __ 
I am Trusting and Eager to B 
Please .....•.•.•.••.•........... 
I am Friendly All the Time •••••• R R R R 
I am Very Anxious to be 0 
Approved Of •••.•.•..•...•.•.•..• o 0 [j D 
I am Very Respectful to 
Authori ty •••..•..•..........•.• • ,1--__ 1 
I Want Everyone to Like Me ••••• '1--_1 1---150 
I am Self-Punishing •.•••......• _1----1 
I Want to be Led ••••••••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
I am a Warm Per8on ••••••••••••• +-__ ~ 
I am Well Thought Of ••••••••••• • L--....,j 1---,54 
Please TUrn OVer. 
When -I am playing with my team-mates during the course of a game 
I think that ••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
I Will Eelieve Anyone ••••••••••••• ~. __ ~ 
I am Neighbourly •••••••••••••••••• r-__ , 
I am Tough-Minded When Necessary, ,'-___ , 
Total: 
AP 
BC 
DE 
FG 
HI 
JK 
ill 
NO 
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Do not 
write 
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---156 
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59 
60 
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62 
63 
64 
65 
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In order to respoDd to the list of statements below you are 
required to describe the scrt of person that you would ideally 
like to be when you are playing with your team-mates during the 
course of a game. 
- If you agree with the statement put a tick in the column 
headed 'Like Me' ~ 
- If you think that the statement is not at all like the sort 
of person that you would ideally like to be, put a tick in the 
'Not Like Me' column. 
- If you think that the statement is not applicable in 
describing the sort of person that you would ideally like to be, 
put a tick in the column headed 'Not Applicable'. 
- If you don't know put a tick in the column headed 'Don't Know'. 
Please respond to every statement printed on the questionnaire. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement and base your answers 
upon first impressions. (you may duplicate your responses to the 
previous questionnaire where necessary). 
When I am playing with my team-mates during the course of a game I 
would ideally like to be ••• 
Able to Criticize Myself ••••••••••••• 
Able to Doubt Others ••••••••••••••••• 
Cooperative ••••••••••••••••.•••••.••• 
Able to Take Care of Myself •••••••••• 
Act Importantly ••••••••••••••••••.••• 
Accept AdVice Readily ••••••••••••.••• 
Admire and Imitate Others •••••••••••• 
Affectionate and Understanding ••••••• 
Agree with Everyone •••••••••••••••••• 
Dictatorial ••••••••••••••••••••••.••• 
Always Giving Advice ••••••••••••••••• 
Resent Being Bossed •••••••••••••••••• 
Apologetic ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Appreciative ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
· 
• 
· 
· 
• 
• 
• 
• 
· 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Like 
me 
Not 
Like Me 
f--
-
r--
f--
-'---
Not Don't 
APplicable Know 
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Do not 
write 
here 
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1----i67 
1--...,68 
1--...,69 
1----i70 
r--I75 
"---....179 
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'!/hen I am playing vi th IIifI team-mates during the course of a game 
I would ideally like to be •••• 
Big Hearted and Unselfish ••• 
Bitter •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Boastful ..................................... .. 
Bossy ............................................ .. 
Businesslike.· .. .......................... .. 
Frank and Honest •••••••••••• 
Indifferent to Others ••••••• 
Obedient •••••••••••••••••••• 
strict if Necessary ••••••••• 
Complain if Necessary ••••••• 
A Clinging Vine ••••••••••••• 
Like 
Me 
Cold and Unfeeling •••••••••• I-~ 
Complaining ••••••••••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
Considerate ••••••••••••••••• , ___ ~ 
I Would Like to Usually 
Give In ..... ~ ................ " ................ I----~ 
Critical of Others •••••••••• ~ __ ~ 
Cruel and Unkind ....................... 1-___ 1 
Dependent ..................................... 1-__ " 
Over-Sympa the tic ........................ 1----1 
Easily Fooled ............................. 1----1 
Dominating .................................... L-__ ~ 
Not 
Like Me 
Not Don't 
Applicable Know 
- I 
I 
r--
DO 
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4 4 
Do not 
write 
pere 
r "5 
10 
15 
20 
'----125 
'When I am pl8¥ing vi th T11:f team-mates during the course of a game 
I would ideally like to be •••• 
Like Not Not Don' t 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
Easily Embarrassed_.·.···.;·· -1-_-1 
Overprotective of Others •••• '1----1 
Self-Respecttng •••••••••••••• I-_-I 
Egotistical and Conceited ••• '1----1 
Alw8¥S Ashamed of Myself ••••• L---! 
~;:~: ~::r::.~~::.~~~~.D 0 n n 
I Would like to Expect 
Everyone to Admire Me •••••••• ~_~ 
Firm but Just •••••••••••••••• ~-~ 
Fond of Everyone •••••• ~ •••••• ~ __ ~ 
Forceful •••••••••••••••••• • •• ,L---~ 
I Would like to Forgive 
Anythlng •.••••••••••.••••••• ~ __ """ 
Frequently Angry •••••••••••• 1---1 
Frequently Disappointed ••••• 1----1 
Friendly •••••••••••••••••••• I-_~ 
Able to Give Orders ••••••••• ~ __ """ 
Generous to a Fault •••••••••• I-__ ~ 
Resentful •••••••••••••••••••• I-__ ~ 
A Good Leader •••••••••••••••• 1-__ -1 
Grateful ••••••••••••••••••••• L-_~ 
I Would like to Confide in B B B B 
Anyone ...................... . 
Hard Hearted ••••••••••••••••• 
Please Turn Over. 
Do not 
write 
here 
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'l/hen I am playing wi th my team-ma tea during the courae of a game 
I would ideally like to be ••• 
I Would like to Hardly Ever 
Like 
Me 
Talk Back ••••.••••.•••••••• 1----1 
Hard to Impresa •••••••••••• I--__ -I 
Helpfl1l •••••••••...•.•••.•• ~_-I 
Impatient With Others 
Mi5 takes •••••••••••.•••••• _1-_-1 
Independent •••••••••••••••• I-__ ~ 
Irritable ••••••.•••.••••••• I--__ -I 
Jealous •••.••.•..•.•....••. 1-----1 
Kind and Rea8suring •••••••• ~ __ ~ 
I Would like to Lack Self ~ 
Confidence ••••••••••••••••• ~--~ 
I Would like to Give FreelD 
Of Hyself •••••••••••••••••• 
I Would like to like 
Everybody ••••••.••.•••..•• _1--__ -1 
Taken Care of •.••.•....•.• _1-__ -1 
Compete With Others •••••••• · ____ ~ 
I Would like to Love D 
Every-one ••••••••••••••••••• 
~ WOuld. like to Make a GOO~ 
~press~on ••••••••••••••••• ~_~ 
~t:::~. ~~~~ . ~~. ~~~ ..... B 
Submissive ••••••••••••••••• 
I Would like to like a 
Responsi bili ty • • . • • . . • • . .• __ 
Modest •••••••••••••••••••• 
Not Not Don't 
Like Me Applicable Know 
r1 
n 
D 
o 
o 
o 
n 
D 
n 
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When I am playing .... ith nr:r team-mates during the course of a game 
I .... ould ideally like to be •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Kno .... 
I Would like to Obey Too 
Willingly •........•.....••.. ""-----l 
Often .. Admired ••••••••••••••• 1----1 
Often Gloomy •••••••••••••••• 1---1 
Often Helped by Others •••••• ""-----l 
Often Unfriendly •••••••••.•• ~ __ ~ 
outspoken •................•• ~ __ ~ 
Let Others Make Decisions ••• \..... __ ~ 
I Would like to Want 
Everyones Love ••••••••.••••• ~ __ ~ 
Passive and Unaggressive •••• 
Proud and Self-Satisfied •••• 
Do not 
write 
here 
1-----1 69 
_-4 70 
1-----1 75 
BB B B I '~ould like to Rebel AgainS8 Everything ••.•.....•....•.•• Respected by Others •••••••• 
Always Pleasant and 
Agreeable •.•...........•...• 
Selfish •.................... 
Sarcastic ••••••••••••••••••• 
Self-Confident ••••.••••••••• 
I Would like to Encourage 
others ••••••••••••••••••.•• 
I Would like to Distrust 
"Everybody •••••••••••••••••• 
Self-Reliant and Assertive. 
Easily Led ••••••••••••••••• 
Self-Seeking ••••••••••••••• 
RR B 8 
RRB 
nno 
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When I am playing with mY team-ma.tea during the courae of a game 
I would ideally like to be •••• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable. Know 
Shrewd and Calculating •••• '~---I 
s~ ........................ ~_I 
Sceptical •••••••••••••••••• ~---I 
Slow to Forgive a Wrong •••• ~---i 
Sociable ••.......••.•..... '~---i 
Somewhat snobbi8h •••• ~ ••••• t----I 
Spine less •.......••••.••••• '---' 
I Would like to Spoil People 
With Kindness ••.•••.••.•••• 
stern but Fair ............. ~---i 
Straightforward and Direct'l-----I 
stubborn ••......•..•••... "~---i 
Tender and Soft Hearted •••• '----' 
I Would like to Think Only 
Of r-tYself ••••••••••••••••• '1-----1 
Timid .....••............... ~---i 
Touchy and Easily Hurt ••••• '----' 
;::e:::~~~.~~~~~~~~~.~~ ... ~ 
Too Lenient With others •••• I~ 
Too Willing to Give to 0 
Others .•.•••.•.•••••.•..... 
I '''ould like to Try to be 0 
Too Successful •••••.••••••. 
I 'liould like to Try to 0 
Comfort Everyone ••.••••.••. 
BB B 
D [] 0 
0 [] D 
D D n 
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Wheil I am-pl~iD4fV1th IQ' team-mates duriDg the course ot a game 
I would idBallY·: like to be •• 
Like Not Not Don't 
Me Like Me Applicable Know 
Trusting and Eager .to PleaseD 0 8 D 
Friendly All the Time ••••••• D 0 D 
:;::.~~~.:~.~:.~~~~~~:~.~ ~ 
:::o:::;:::~~ . ~~ .......... 0 D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
I Would like to Want B 
Everyones Love •••••••••••••• 
Self Punishing •••••••••••••• B 8 B 
I Would like to Want to be 
Led •••••••••••••••••••..•••• 1----1 
A Warm Person ••••••••••••••• 1----1 
Well Thought of ••••••••••••• '-----' 
I Would like to Believe 
Anyone •••••••••••••••••••••• 1----1 
Neighbourly ••••.•......••.•• 1----1 
Tough-Minded When Necessary. _ 
Total: 
AP 
BC 
D:<S 
FG 
HI 
JK 
la 
NO 
Do not 
write 
here 
832 33 
B 
<1 3 
44-45 
46-47 
48-49 
50-51 
52-53 
54-55 
56-57 
58-59 
276. 
Spielberger. et. al' s .. Stati:. Anxiety. Inventory 
The strength of any questionnaire is in its ability to be understood 
by each and every respondent so that there is no ambiguity or discrepancy 
between what the interviewer and interviewee think a certain word, state-
ment, or category means. Such a discrepancy seems to have arisen over 
the 4-point scale posited by Spielberger et al in their State Anxiety Inventory, 
by which they differentiate differing degrees of situation specific 
affective arousal. This interpretive problem first arose during a pilot 
study of the questionnaire where it was discovered that many respondents 
expressed difficulty in (a) differentiating, and (b) quantifying the 
categories of 'somewhat' and 'moderately so'. Figure 1 below illustrates 
how they appear on the S.A.I. 
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT MODERATELY SO VERY MUCH SO 
I feel calm ••• o o o o 
The implication of using a 4-point rating scale with which to 
differentiate individual responses is that it is not the items contained 
in the inventory which are scaled, as they are all of equal value, it 
is rather the individual's responses to these items; the "scaling" 
comes about through the sums of the individual's responses to the above 
categories. The consequence therefore of using an ambiguous rating scale 
is that the validity and also reliability of the individual "scaling" 
will be impaired. In terms of the present interpretive problem this 
impairment includes; confusion as to which category matches one's present 
level of affective arousal; this confusion could in fact distort a 
respondent's level of A-State; both of these in turn affect the construct 
validity of the inventory items. 
The problem thus seems to be that Spielberger et al have provided an 
inadequate 'scale' of affective intensity, chiefly represented by his 
two 'middle' descriptive categories. With this in mind it was decided 
to investigate just what meaning, in terms of levels of arousal, people 
would attribute to these two scaler items. An alternative group of 
words were also proposed with the idea of replacing the Spielberger et al 
originals if they were found easier to rate by our respondents. 
~~th9do19gy: 
It was decided to replace Spielberger et ai's 4-point scale with one that 
extended from 0 to 10, as it was thought that this would give a more 
accurate representation as to each category's affective connotation. 
It was expected therefore that given a proper spread of 'intensity'; 
271. 
0= Not at all; 3 = Somewhat; 1 = Moderately so; and 10 = Very much so. 
Similarly, with the replacement categories; 0 = Not at all; 3 = A little; 
1 = Quite a lot; and 10 = Extremely so. It was thought that by proposing 
all the categories, and not just those in direct contention, that it was 
more likely to find which group provided the most reliable scale. 
The testing took place on a busy Sheffield pedestrian precinct 
between 11.30 a.m. and 12.50 p.m. Two interviewers placed either side 
of the precinct, stopped pedestrians at random and asked them to look-
at the questionnaire which has been reproduced in Figure 2 below. 
figyr~ 2:_ The Qyestionnaire 
Affective Intensity Scale 1. 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
Moderately so 
Very much so 
Affective Intensity Scale 2. 
A little 
Not at all 
Quite a lot 
Extremely so 
Scale 1 proposed by Spielbergeret al, was administered first and its 
order was changed so that each word was defined on its own so that any 
contamination from the progressive intensity of the other word-categories 
was avoided. Each respondent was told to think of the word 'calm', and 
then asked to rate, using the numbers on the 'intensity' scale, how calm 
they would be if they were; 'somewhat calm'; 'not at all calm'; 
'moderately calm'; and 'very much calm'. The responses were noted. They 
were then shown Scale 2, which had been kept covered during the first 
part of the interview, and asked to repeat the procedure with the alter-
native categories. After this they were told that the interview had 
finished. Thirty-two people responded in all. 
278. 
Results: 
The raw data obtained from the above is presented in footnote 1, 
from these results it is possible to show how, by using the mean intensity 
score for each category, the scales match the spread of intensity proposed 
above. 
Category Mean Score Proposed Intensity 
Somewhat 5.25 3 
Moderately so 5.31 7 
A little 3.06 3 
Quite a lot 7.69 7 
. A 't' test for independent samples2 was then used to establish whether 
the above means differ significantly from the proposed intensities. The 
results are given below. 
Category Score Proposed Intensity 't' Significance 
Somewhat 5.25 3 7.23 p < .001 
A little 3.06 3 0.205 N.S. 
Moderately so 5.31 7 7.60 p < .001 
Quite a lot 7.69 7 3.38 p < .001 
Finally by simply looking at the percentage 'mix-up' in the affective 
intensities represented by the categories. Fifteen people, or forty-
seven per cent, placed 'somewhat' as either higher 01 as llaving the same 
intensity a~ 'moderately so' on the rating scale. Where-as only one 
person or three per cent placed 'a little' above or equal to 'quite a 
lot' on the rating scale. 
,summary: 
The results of the 't' tests establish that there is a significant 
difference between Spielberger et ai's categories and the perceived intensity 
of those categories; p < .001 for both 'somewhat' and 'moderately so'. 
Conversely, there was BO significant difference between the category of 
'A little' and its perceived intensity, and although 'Quite a lot' 
differed significantly from its proposed intensity of 7, the mean of 7.60 
indicates that it has a greater affinity with the proposed degree of 
affective arousal than the original, 'moderately so' (5.31 compared 
to 7). Indeed it is evident that by simply comparing the means for 
'somewhat' and moderately so' that people have found difficulty in 
differentiating between them. Results of 5.25 and 5.31 clearly illustrate 
the scales' ambiguity. The alternative scale however appears a much more 
valid representation of differing degrees of affective arousal with mean 
279. 
scores being almost identical to those proposed; 3.06 as compared to 3, 
and 7.60 as compared to 7. Perhaps the most conclusive factor which 
indicates the confusion inherent in Spielberger et aI's scale is the number 
of people who inverted the two categories. Forty-seven per cent rated 
'somewhat' as representing a higher degree of calm than 'moderately so', 
a sure indication of the inadequacy of the scale used in the A-State 
inventory. 
CQnclusion: 
The results clearly indicate that the categories devised by 
Spielberger et al to indicate a gradient of situation specific affective 
arousal are inadequate. With this in mind the alternative scale is 
proposed as a replacement as it is felt that it avoids the linguistic 
ambiguities which appear inherent in the A-State inventory as it stands. 
Footnotes: 
1. The data is presented in the sequence that it was shown to the 
various respondants, (see questionnaire design). The results are as 
follows: 
SOmewhat: ••••••• 68 69 376355 66 3545 6495 325657 5725 46 
Not At All: ••••• 02 0 1 0 2 20 00 02 02 2 1 20 20 0 0 1 4 0 6 03 1 0 0 0 
Moderately So: •• 4 446 6557 365556557656754778 6555 33 
Very Much So: ••• 9 99 10 1099109/0/010/088/0 /°979 ID 9/09/0 /0 /0 99998 
A Little: ••••••• 2 3 3 3 1 6 3 3 2 3 8 1 2 4 3 2 1 3 8 2 2 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 3 3 3 2 
Not at All: ••••• 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 
Quite A Lot: •••• 7 7 8 8 8 8 5 8 7 8 9 4 /0 9 9 8 8 8 7 8 8 6 9 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 7 8 
Extremely So: ••• ID /0 9'010 /0 9/0/0/0 /06 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/010101010/0/09 9 9 9 
2. The formula for computing 't' is as follows: 
-------------r-------------------
(- %:XL -:.l!tX,l 2 mll -tI-li -t';~ 2 LNll ~ (No + N!c) 
N, + Nt - 2 . N, N • 
. Where, lX, = Sum of scores,. group 1, 
IXt = Sum of scores, group 2, 
ZXt = Sum of squares, group 1, 
~Xf = Sum of squares, group 2, 
N, = Numbers in group 1, and, 
N1 = Numbers in group 2. 
Degrees of freedom is given by the formula: d.f. = N + N - 2 
Team 
Appendix C: 
Pre~entation of th~_H"w Data with He§t>egt_ 
to Team-M~mp~rship 
Team Self Team Not-Self Team 
1 2 1 2 1 
Loughborough AP BC FG FG AP 
Freshers XV AP AP FG HI AP 
Durham AP AP FG FG AP 
Newcastle AP AP DE FG AP 
York AP AP DE FG AP 
280. 
Ideal 
2 
AP 
AP 
AP 
AP 
AP 
Key: The alphabetical notations above represent the generic themes of 
the interpersonal circumplex; AP, Managerial-Autocratic; BC, 
Competitive-Narcissistic; DE, Aggressive-Sadistic; FG, Rebellious-
Distrustful; HI, Self-Effacing-Masochistic; JK, Docile-Dependent; 
LM, Cooperative-Overconventional; NO, Responsible-Hypernormal. 
1 and 2 refer to the test administrations. The data presented 
overleaf has been ordered in terms of the magnitude of the players 
trait anxiety scores, ( first administration ). The figures 1 and 
2 again refer to the respective test administrations, the alpha-
betical and numerical notations,Leary's eight generic themes. 
281. 
Loughborough: 
Number Trait State Self Code Not- Code Ideal Code Self-Accptnce. 
Self 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
001 54 45 54 43 7 7 LM 111 2 2 BC BC 1 1 AP AP 8.1 81 
002 50 46 33 43 2 3 BC DE 6 8 JK NO 1 2 AP BC 44 44 
003 44 49 41 57 3 3 DE DE 7 8 LM NO 2 3 BC DE 44 --
004 42 38 39 33 2 1 BC AP 4 5 FG HI 1 1 AP AP 41 --
005 41 36 50 34 7 2 LM BC 4 3 FG DE 2 2 BC BC 84 23 
006 41 36 42 37 2 1 BC AP 5 4 HI FG 1 1 AP AP 41 23 
007 40 39 43 36 3 3 DE DE 6 5 JK HI 2 2 BC BC 44 44 
008 38 40 37 45 4 2 FG BC 3 3 DE DE 2 2 BC BC 66 23 
009 38 40 39 38 1 1 AP AP 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP 23 23 
010 38 38 38 36 8 1 NO AP 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP 41 --
011 37 39 41 39 8 2 NO BC 4 4 FG FG 1 2 AP BC 44 --
012 37 36 39 37 2 3 BC DE 2 6 BC JK 1 2 AP BC 41 41 
013 35 41 57 47 2 1 BC AP 6 4 JK FG 1 1 AP AP 44 --
014 35 35 30 30 2 2 BC BC 3 3 DE DE 1 1 AP AP 41 41 
015 33 33 36 35 8 2 NO BC 3 4 DE FG 1 1 AP AP 41 41 
016 32 29 42 38 1 2 AP BC 5 5 HI HI 1 1 AP AP -- 44 
017 30 30 21 23 8 8 NO NO 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP 44 41 
018 29 26 31 34 1 1 AP AP 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP -- --
019 28 30 29 30 1 1 AP AP 4 1 FG AP 2 1 BC AP 26 --
020 28 30 27 29 3 2 DE BC 4 3 FG DE 1 1 AP AP 66 41 
021 26 26 23 23 1 2 AP BC 4 5 FG HI 1 1 AP AP 23 44 
022 26 26 33 21 2 2 BC BC 5 6 HI JK 2 2 BC BC -- --
023 24 24 22 21 1 2 AP BC 4 4 FG FG 2 2 BC BC 44 23 
282. 
Freshers XV: 
Number Trait State Self Code Not- Code Ideal Code Self -Accptnce. 
Self 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
024 45 41 30 38 3 3 DE DE 7 7 LM LM 2 2 BC BC 44 44 
025 43 36 25 36 6 8 JK NO 3 4 DE FG 8 1 NO AP 66 44 
026 41 44 40 53 2 1 BC AP 2 5 BC HI 1 8 AP NO 41 44 
027 40 34 7 LM 2 BC 1 AP 66 
028 40 28 24 35 1 8 AP NO 4 3 FG DE 1 1 AP AP 23 44 
029 39 38 1 AP 4 FG 1 AP --
030 38 37 39 36 7 6 LM JK 2 2 BC BC 8 1 NO AP 41 84 
031 38 20 3 DE 7 LM 1 AP 66 
032 38 36 8 NO 4 FG 8 NO 41 
033 37 37 36 41 8 1 NO AP 4 4 FG FG 8 8 NO NO -- 44 
034 37 39 35 45 3 1 DE AP 5 3 HI DE 2 1 BC AP 41 23 
035 37 50 4 FG * 2 BC 66 
036 34 33 1 AP 6 JK 1 AP --
037 34 31 29 26 2 2 BC BC 6 6 JK JK 1 1 AP AP 44 44 
038 33 34 33 34 2 3 BC DE 5 5 HI HI 2 2 BC BC -- 44 
039 32 30 29 33 2 2 BC BC 6 6 JK JK 2 2 BC BC -- --
040 30 28 29 34 1 2 AP BC 5 5 HI HI 1 1 AP AP -- 44 
041 29 32 27 27 1 2 AP BX 5 5 HI HI 1 1 AP AP -- 44 
042 28 28 32 31 1 8 AP NO 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP -- 44 
043 28 26 28 33 7 8 LM NO 3 3 DE DE 1 1 AP AP 66 41 
* This players not-self standard score fell at the intersection of 
the 'Dom' and 'Lov' axes, and as a consequence I was unable to 
classify his not-self perception in terms of one of Leary's generic 
themes. 
283. 
Durham: 
Number Trait State Self Code Not- Code Ideal Code Self-Acceptnce. 
Self 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
044 54 49 51 30 5 4 HI FG 2 4 BC FG 5 1 HI AP 23 84 
045 51 41 51 35 6 5 JK HI 3 3 DE DE 1 1 AP AP 84 91 
046 48 41 34 37 1 1 AP AP 5 5 HI HI 1 1 AP AP -- --
047 48 53 36 32 2 1 BC AP 1 3 AP DE 1 2 AP BC 41 26 
048 43 32 35 27 1 1 AP AP 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP 23 23 
049 40 42 57 39 3 2 DE DE 8 6 NO JK 1 2 AP BC 66 --
050 39 50 2 BC 6 JK 2 BC --
051 38 44 34 35 2 1 BC AP 4 4 FG FG 1 2 AP BC 44 44 
052 36 37 2 BC 1 AP 8 NO 66 
053 35 47 1 AP 4 FG 1 AP --
054 35 32 2 BC 5 HI 2 BC --
055 35 34 39 36 6 1 JK AP 2 4 BC FG 1 8 AP NO 105 44 
056 29 23 1 AP 4 FG 1 AP --
057 29 29 32 27 8 7 NO LM 4 3 FG DE 1 1 AP AP 44 81 
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Newcastle: 
Number Trait State Self Code Not- Code Ideal Code Self-Acceptnce. 
Self 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
058 52 56 7 LM 3 DE 8 NO 44 
059 48 47 38 36 5 7 HI LM 1 3 AP DE 1 1 AP AP 91 66 
060 46 39 42 44 6 7 JK LM 2 3 BC DE 8 8 NO NO 81 44 
061 43 46 36 46 1 3 AP DE 4 4 FG FG 8 1 NO AP 41 66 
062 43 38 39 39 5 8 HI NO 1 4 AP FG 1 1 AP AP 114 41 
063 40 39 7 LM 3 DE 1 AP 81 
064 39 31 20 26 2 3 BC DE 1 2 AP BC 1 1 AP AP 41 66 
065 38 43 32 27 7 8 LM NO 4 3 FG DE 1 1 AP AP 66 41 
066 37 34 31 38 6 4 JK FG 4 5 FG HI 1 8 AP NO 84 68 
067 36 37 35 32 2 2 BC BC 4 5 FG HI 1 1 AP AP 41 41 
068 36 26 35 46 2 2 BC BC 5 5 HI HI 2 1 BC AP -- 44 
069 35 34 43 33 6 8 JK NO 2 3 BC DE 1 1 AP AP 84 44 
070 33 32 38 25 2 2 BC BC 4 5 FG HI 2 2 BC BC -- --
071 33 33 28 32 3 3 DE DE 3 2 DE BC 2 2 BC BC 41 41 
072 33 37 7 LM 3 DE 8 BC 44 
073 32 33 33 34 1 1 AP AP 4 3 FG DE 1 1 AP AP 23 --
074 30 24 4 FG 3 DE 2 BC 66 
075 30 36 2 BC 6 JK 1 AP, 44 
076 29 29 3 DE 6 JK 2 BC 41 
077 27 28 46 22 1 1 AP AP 3 4 DE FG 1 1 AP AP 23 --
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York: 
Number Trait State Self Code Not- Code Ideal Code Self-Acceptnce. 
Self 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
078 56 63 5 HI 2 BC 2 BC 105 
079 53 54 54 6 7 JK LM 3 3 DE DE 1 8 AP NO 84 44 
080 53 42 6 JK 3 DE 1 AP 84 
081 48 37 50 3 3 DE DE 8 6 NO JK 8 1 AP AP 105 81 
082 47 48 6 JK 2 BC 1 AP 105 
083 47 48 39 2 3 BC DE 2 8 BC NO 1 1 AP AP 41 81 
084 40 42 53 1 8 AP NO 4 4 FG FG 8 8 NO NO 44 --
085 40 35 40 1 1 AP AP 4 4 FG FG 1 1 AP AP -- --
086 39 40 50 2 2 BC BC 6 5 JK HI 2 1 BC AP 23 44 
087 39 31 28 3 2 DE BC 7 5 LM HI 8 8 NO NO 105 81 
088 38 39 7 LM 4 FG 8 NO 41 
089 37 42 5 HI 2 BC 2 BC 84 
090 37 34 33 2 1 BC AP 5 5 HI HI 1 1 AP AP 44 --
091 35 35 5 HI 2 BC 1 AP 91 
092 33 31 8 NO 3 DE 1 AP 41 
093 33 31 2 BC 4 FG 8 NO 66 
094 32 28 8 NO 3 DE 1 AP 44 
095 31 31 40 2 2 BC BC 4 7 FG LM 1 2 AP BC 44 --
096 30 45 8 NO 4 FG 8 NO --
There are' no state anxiety scores available for the second administration 
due to the time of testing. Please see chapter 4 for more details. 
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